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1. Introduction 
 This study explores the rhetorical notion of allegory, based on the methodology of discourse analysis. 
Before beginning data analysis and discussion, this first chapter specifies the scope, objectives and methods 
of this endeavor, and outlines how arguments will proceed. 
1.1 Scope, Aim, and Method 
 The topic of this study is the rhetorical notion of allegory, which can be informally sketched as a 
strategy of analogical comparison (a technical definition will be provided in Chapter 2). In order to make it 
easy to grasp the concept, let us look at the example below, taken from a science-fiction novel by Robert J. 
Sewyer, Flashforward. As an unintended consequence of a scientific experiment, everyone on Earth blacks 
out for two minutes, during which they experience a glimpse of their own lives a few decades in the future. 
After the incident, Michiko begins to believe that what she saw during the blackout was her future destiny 
and that it would be pointless to keep going along the fixed path of her life. Her partner Lloyd argues against 
this view, claiming that her life is still meaningful even if its course is predetermined.  1
(1) Michiko frowned. “I don’t know. I’m not sure. I mean, (a)what’s the point of going on if it’s all 
already fixed?” 
 “(b)What’s the point of reading a novel whose ending has already been written?” 
 She chewed her lower lip. 
 “The block universe concept is the only thing that makes sense in a relativistic universe,” said 
Lloyd. (Sweyer, Flashforward) 
In response to Michiko’s pessimistic question (1a), Lloyd asks the same question in reply, analogically 
comparing the situation they are in with reading a novel (1b). Importantly, his argument is essentially based 
on the analogy drawn. That is, just as reading a novel is not usually recognized as meaningless even though 
the story is already predetermined from the beginning to end, Lloyd claims that living a fixed life cannot be 
pointless. In this way Lloyd strategically tries to convince his partner. In addition to conversations in 
fictional works like (1), the strategy of allegory is also utilized in everyday discourse. In an attempt to 
 If not otherwise noted, the underlining in the examples in this thesis are all mine.1
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communicate something to others in casual talk, for example, speakers sometimes compare what they want 
to say with something similar, and by talking about this ‘something similar’ they attempt to effectively 
achieve their communicative purpose—just as Lloyd does in (1) above. Allegory is thus a rhetorical strategy 
that is used as a discursive means to achieve certain purposes through analogical comparison in ordinary 
language use. 
 So far, however, the notion of allegory has not been satisfactorily investigated. First, in traditional 
studies, it has not even been treated as a rhetorical strategy used in actual discourse but rather employed to 
characterize various genres of texts: proverbs, parables, fables, and a kind of novels (Abrams, 1999: 5-8; 
Reboul, 2000: 81-85). This may be because each genre has a common textual shape, which makes it easier 
for analysts to collect homogeneous data, and consequently identify the features shared among the texts. 
Proverbs have a sentential, idiomatic structure, and convey conventionalized social wisdom (Yanakh, 1994: 
3386); parables take the form of a story and carry religious messages (Barton and Hudson, 2004: 149-150); 
fables are anecdotes that teach moral lessons (Drabble ed., 2000: 344); and allegorical novels are stories that 
represent certain events in the real world (Barton and Hudson, 2009: 7). Although these four text types are 
characterized as allegorical genres, their functions in discourse are still not clear. Previous research tended to 
focus on interpreting what the texts represented, i.e., without looking at what speakers and writers were 
attempting to do by deploying the analogical strategy. To put it differently, traditional studies of rhetoric have 
approached these genres by extracting them from actual contexts of use, putting out of focus, as a 
consequence, how the texts were produced and interpreted in discourse. Since people actually do things with 
the allegorical strategy as briefly seen in (1), however, it is important to understand in detail what they 
communicate with it. In line with this, moreover, traditional studies have ignored the fact that conversational 
talk-exchange can be constituted with the strategy of allegory. It is true that conversational use of allegory is 
difficult to approach, since speakers can deploy the strategy by various means, which causes the resultant 
allegorical utterance(s) to appear as a diverse set. Still, this is not a sound reason to exclude this type of 
allegorical phenomenon from the scope of analysis. In fact, conversational talk-exchange can offer fruitful 
data to observe how the rhetorical strategy of allegory is used in detail. Thus, refusal to acknowledge 
allegory in conversational interaction cannot be supported. Finally, whereas previous research has examined 
proverbs, parables, fables, and allegorical works of fiction in detail, it has not explained how these genres are 
related to each other. In addition to providing insights into each of them, it is also possible to integrate the 
findings about each genre and clarify their relationship. This would be a valuable direction of investigation. 
Such integrative discussion may also contribute to a deeper understanding of the concept of allegory itself. 
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To sum up, prior research on the concept of allegory leaves room for improving our comprehension of this 
phenomenon. 
 Given the insights and problems of earlier work, this study aims to investigate the mechanisms and 
workings of allegory as a rhetorical strategy. My objective is two-fold: (i) examining in detail how each of 
the five discourse genres are composed by using the allegorical strategy; (ii) integrating the specific insights 
of their characteristics and revealing what the core concept of allegory is more clearly. Pursuit of these goals 
will bring about a deeper, more comprehensive understanding of the concept of allegory. 
 In examining allegorical phenomena, we adopt the methodology of discourse analysis—one accepted 
method for studying language in use. More specifically, it is a close, systematic analysis of written texts or 
records of speech that pays systematic attention to the reasons for the shapes and functions that they have 
(Johnstone, 2000:126-127). One important point to note here is that discourse analysts start by carefully 
observing the many things that transpire in the discourse situation. Only through thorough observation can 
one systematically interpret why the discourse has the shape and function that it does. The methodology used 
in discourse analysis enables scholars to answer multiple kinds of questions such as “In what way do people 
use language?”, ”For what purpose do they do it?”, and in some cases “Why do they do it in that way?” 
(Tannen, Hamilton & Schiffrin eds., 2015; Schiffrin, 1994; van Dijk ed., 1985). In their investigations, 
discourse analysts have developed specific tools and concepts that delve deeply into various sorts of text and 
talk, which can be used to better understand in detail how allegorical discourse is realized. This study thus 
employs the methodology of discourse analysis to scrutinize the rhetorical strategy of allegory, and as such 
can be characterized as a discourse analytic rhetorical study. 
 In addition to the specific arguments regarding allegory, we discuss possible directions for the study of 
rhetoric in general. Rhetoric is a very complex notion and has been confronted in multiple ways. Ancient 
philosophers and rhetoricians (including the notorious sophists) prescriptively listed and classified a large 
number of schemes for persuasion that can be effectively employed in political and legislative speeches 
(Aristotle, 330BC; Cicero, 84BC, 55BC, 46BC, 44BC; Quintilian, 95). Logicians and researchers of 
argumentation have stated that such persuasive schemes may even be logical fallacies which people are 
inclined to make in actual discussions and debates. They go on to show how they can be manipulated in 
critical thinking and claim-making (Adachi, 1984; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; Walton, 1987). 
Literary critics have described and analyzed how figures of speech serve to beautify, craft and interpret prose 
and verse (Lausberg, 2001; Suzuki, 1996). Psychologists have conducted experiments to discover how and 
why rhetorical expressions influence people’s thinking and emotion (Dillard & Pfau, 2002: part 4; Gentner & 
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Bowdle, 2005; Glucksberg & Haught, 2006). At the same time, linguists have considered the resources and 
mechanisms, whether of linguistic or of other sorts, that enable or constrain the figurative use of language 
(Komatsubara, 2016; Lakoff, 1993; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980). Thus, a variety of approaches has revealed 
different dimensions of rhetoric. 
 Nevertheless, little attention has been paid to how rhetorical schemes and figures are pragmatically 
used in actual discourse. Somewhat surprisingly, scholars of rhetoric have not been inclined to include 
conversational talk-exchange in their analytical purview. This is a serious omission because conversational 
interaction may be the most primitive, hence perhaps the most basic context in which people speak 
rhetorically. It may turn out that conversation is the best context for clarifying how rhetorical strategies work, 
through observing their processes and effects. Direct interaction between interlocutors in conversational talk-
exchange can be quite transparent, enabling analysts to show how a rhetorical strategy is utilized and what 
effects it has. For these reasons, conversational interaction seems like a promising source of data for a 
pragmatic rhetorical analysis even though it has largely been excluded from traditional research. 
 Along with arguments concerning the direction of rhetorical studies, the discussion will focus on the 
concept of ‘rhetoric’ itself. So far I have used expressions such as “using of the strategy of allegory in 
discourse” and “people speaking rhetorically” fairly casually. The former might seem to entail the latter 
since, generally speaking, if someone uses a certain rhetorical strategy, it will usually (or almost inevitably) 
be recognized that s/he is speaking rhetorically. Likewise, it may be natural to think that rhetorical schemes 
or figures are characterized as such simply because they function rhetorically. This is not always the case, 
however, because any single rhetorical strategy can fail and often does. Recall the classical definition of 
rhetoric as “the art or the discipline that deals with the use of discourse, either spoken or written, to inform or 
persuade or motivate an audience, whether that audience is made up of one person or a group of persons” 
(Corbett & Connors, 1999: 1). What this means is that the true nature of rhetoric is nothing more than the 
technique of utilizing these particular strategies. Put another way, the mere use of a rhetorical device does not 
always constitute a rhetorical utterance; rather, the rhetorical status of an utterance is only truly realized by 
how skillfully it is shaped and what effect(s) it has achieved. In short, rhetoric is not just the use of strategies 
but the skill of using them in discourse. Even this does not tell the whole story, however. If a speaker builds 
up his/her talk with a certain scheme or figure—no matter how skillfully they do it—it does not 
automatically ‘count’ as rhetorical. In order for an utterance to be rhetorical, it needs the interlocutor’s 
evaluation as rhetorical as well. The same is true in written discourse: a passage in a literary work cannot 
successfully portray beautiful scenery without being recognized as such by the reader. In this sense then, 
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rhetoric—or rhetorical status of talk and text—is only achieved through negotiation between speaker and 
hearer or writer and reader. Along this line of argument, the study aims to re-define the notion of rhetoric as a 
discursive phenomenon. 
1.2 Overall Structure 
 Given the objectives, scope, and methodology of the proposals above, the thesis proceeds as follows. 
 Chapter 2 reviews how previous research has defined allegory, and points out that the concept has 
been applied too narrowly to some literary works such as John Bunyan’s The Pilgrim’s Progress, Johnathan 
Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels, and George Orwell’s Animal Farm. Written discourse is not the only environment 
where the allegorical strategy can be employed, however. In fact, allegorical discourse can be observed both 
in different contexts and in a variety of shapes. This chapter illustrates variations of allegorical discourse and 
explains why they are considered allegorical. The forms of discourse to be analyzed include allegorical 
argumentation, proverbs, parables, fables, and a kind of fictional work. It attempts to provide a rough sketch 
of the relationship among these kinds of discourse to serve as a basis for the more detailed analysis of each 
form in following chapters. 
 Chapters 3 through 7 examine each of the five genres of allegorical discourse, respectively. Close 
investigation reveals how speakers manipulate the allegorical strategy to shape diverse kinds of discourse. 
 Chapter 3 observes allegorical utterances occurring spontaneously in conversational talk-exchange. As 
mentioned above, traditional rhetorical studies have focused mainly on monological (and often preplanned) 
talk and text such as oral speeches and literary narratives in their attempts to identify rhetorical strategies 
(Eisenhart & Johnstone, 2008: 4). The analysis in this chapter illustrates the importance of dialogical uses of 
rhetorical strategies, showing how powerfully allegory contributes to the construction of dialogue. 
Observations of how speakers compose allegorical utterances through a variety of resources in face-to-face 
talk are reason enough for rhetorical analysts to pay special attention to interactional discourse and 
understand the mechanisms and functions of rhetorical strategies in detail. The analysis of allegorical 
argumentation in this chapter points to a basic methodology which is subsequently adopted in following 
chapters, and which should arguably be part of rhetorical studies in general. 
 Chapter 4 focuses on the deployment and interpretation of proverbs in conversational discourse. 
Several reasons for using proverbs have been offered in previous studies (Drew & Holt, 1988, 1998; Norrick, 
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1985: ch.2; Takeda, 1999b), but one has surprisingly gone unnoticed. In this, speakers display how they 
receive an assertion of their interlocutor by using a proverb. It is significant in that it sheds light on the 
receptive aspect of conversational interaction; previous studies, on the other hand, had focused only on the 
assertive uses of proverbs. The chapter then classifies proverb use in conversational talk-exchange into three 
types, including this particular receptive one. The taxonomy reveals that conversational uses of proverbs 
reflect the structure of conversation, where two or more people interact in a reciprocal manner. 
 Chapter 5 looks at parables, i.e., “[stories] designed to convey some religious principle, moral lesson, 
or general truth” (Shaw, 1972: 274). In the Gospels, Jesus often narrates parables to help his interlocutors 
understand the religious doctrines of Christianity. We examine how these allegorical stories are constructed, 
and in what way they contribute to conveying the message to his audience, as well as to readers of the 
Gospels. In analyzing the structure and function of parables, it becomes apparent that this rhetorical strategy 
complements another one, namely aposiopesis (i.e., “Stopping suddenly in midcourse, leaving statement 
unfinished; Lanham, 1991: 20). In recounting scenes where Jesus interacts with a variety of people, the 
Gospels systematically avoid describing how his interlocutors respond to him, even though it was clearly 
possible to do so. This way of describing conversation in the Gospels—i.e., through the use of aposiopesis—
serves to portray Jesus as an authoritative figure, and invites the reader to actively imagine how his words are 
received. Given its functions, aposiopesis can thus deliver Jesus’ doctrinal message more effectively to the 
reader. By observing the interplay between parables and aposiopesis in detail, we can better understand how 
the Gospels carry Jesus’ message to readers. 
 Chapter 6 concentrates on structural variation in the discursive genre of the fable, traditionally defined 
as a story which exemplifies a moral lesson at the end (Abrams, 1985: 6; Barton & Hudson, 2004: 80; 
Cuddon, 1980: 256; Drabble ed., 2000: 344; Lanham, 1991: 77; Shaw, 1972: 154). This description is 
insufficient, however, as in fact fables exhibit various structures in exemplifying the lesson. Conversely, in 
conversational interaction, exemplification with a story is achieved through a standard procedure. Why then 
does the fable have multiple ways of exemplification? The answer to this question concerns the context in 
which a fable is realized, i.e., written discourse. Whereas speakers in conversation must anchor an exemplary 
story in ongoing talk with another certain interlocutor, the fabulist is free of this constraint. Through the 
written word, they can perform the act of exemplification in more ‘elliptical’ ways, resulting in fables with a 
variety of different structures. The various forms of the fable thus arise from the freedom of written 
discourse. 
 Based on the findings and analyses presented in chapters 3 through 6, Chapter 7 explores some of the 
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theoretical and methodological implications that this study has for the study of rhetoric in general. This thesis 
can be characterized as a rhetorical study in that it focuses on a particular rhetorical strategy, i.e., allegory. It 
is different from traditional rhetorical studies, however, in shedding analytical light on the functions of the 
strategy in discourse — i.e., from a discourse analytic perspective. Against the backdrop of research in 
multiple disciplines, we propose a new direction for rhetorical studies in terms of methodology. In addition, 
Chapter 7 explicates our understanding of the concept ‘rhetoric’ and offers some prospects for future 
research. Since the age of Aristotle, many scholars from a variety of backgrounds have contributed to the 
study of rhetoric. Nevertheless, they have more or less seen rhetoric as individual schemes and figures such 
as metaphor, irony, hyperbole, dilemma, and argumentum ad hominem. Our central thesis, however, is that 
rhetorical schemes and figures are not ready-made building blocks to be used in actual communication, but 
rather a creative manner of constructing discourse itself. Put another way, rhetoric is not the use of schemes 
and figures but a part or dimension of composing discourse, of any kind. We thus re-define the concept of 
rhetoric as a technical dimension of language use, a view that arguably opens up a new direction of discourse 
analytic rhetorical study. 
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2. Revealing Allegory: An Overview 
2.1 Introduction 
 This chapter reveals how the rhetorical strategy of allegory is employed in different contexts of use.  2
There are three problems confronting allegory. First, four kinds of discourse are traditionally described in 
connection to the notion, but their discursive aspects are not sufficiently delineated. Second, how those 
allegorical genres are related to each other has not yet been explained. Third, even though the strategy of 
allegory is employed in conversational talk-exchange, little attention has been paid to this type of allegorical 
discourse in previous studies. This chapter thus aims to characterize allegory not just as a rhetorical strategy 
of putting forward one’s perspective, but as a method for shaping discourse of various kinds. To this end, we 
examine in detail how each kind of allegorical discourse is actually realized. 
 The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 reviews previous research on allegory, specifically 
looking at how the concept of allegory is traditionally defined in the study of rhetoric with the goal of 
locating problems to tackle later on. Sections 2.2 through 2.5 focus on four genres of discourse: proverbs, 
parables, fables and satirical novels which have been traditionally characterized as examples of allegorical 
texts in previous studies. Through detailed data analysis, we show how these kinds of text are constructed 
using allegory. Section 2.6 focuses on how the strategy can also be deployed in conversational talk-
exchange, illustrating the particular characteristics of such constructions. Based on theoretical evidence, it is 
further claimed that conversational allegory should be recognized as the most basic, primitive domain of the 
strategy. Section 2.7 integrates the findings of the preceding sections, concluding that the diversity of 
allegorical forms is rooted in three aspects of the five genres. 
2.2 Previous Studies 
 In attempting to communicate to others, speakers sometimes analogically compare it with something 
else with the goal of achieving their communicative purpose by talking more about this ‘something else.’ For 
example, textbooks of science sometimes explain the structure of the atom by drawing an analogy with that 
of the solar system, which is supposedly more familiar to readers. Let us take a look at a concrete instance of 
this way of talking in order to pin down the target of the investigation. Example (2) below is taken from an 
 The analysis and discussion in this chapter is based on Hirakawa (2010, 2015).2
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interview with the American actress Cloë Grace Moretz about a film in which she co-starred with Nicolas 
Cage (AERA English, February 2011). 
(2) Interviewer: The scenes with you and Nicolas Cage were so emotional and dramatic. 
Moretz: He’s a phenomenal actor. So, it was like ping pong: you return the serve. If you play with a 
good player, you work hard at it so that you can be on the same level. With an amazing actor 
like him, emotion just flows. (AERA English, February 2011) 
Here Moretz compares acting in a scene with Nicolas Cage to playing ping pong. What she says about ping 
pong analogically represents how she conceives of her own acting: playing with a good player — in 
particular returning a serve — corresponds to her acting with Cage; working hard at the game corresponds to 
working hard at acting; and being “on the same level” as the opponent translates as the emotion that flows in 
her performance. Moretz signals this correspondence coherently by employing equivalent syntactic 
structures in talk about table tennis and the acting experience. “With an amazing actor like him” naturally 
corresponds to “with a good player” and this serves to relate the parts of talk that follow, hence “emotion just 
flows” and “you work hard at it so that you can be on the same level.” Notice also that a conditional 
relationship concerning ping pong is also mapped onto her acting performance: “With an amazing actor like 
him” can be paraphrased as ‘If you play with an amazing actor like him’ in the overall matching between the 
two sentences. Note too how Moretz designs her analogy as a reply to the interviewer’s comment with the 
term “emotion” — a morphologically linked form of “emotional” in the interviewer’s utterance, anchoring 
her remark in the talk-exchange within which she is engaged. In short, she characterizes the ping pong 
analogy as reason for the scenes with Cage being so emotional, as the interviewer has pointed out. Thus in 
reply to the interviewer’s comment she strategically illustrates what it was like to play her role with a great 
actor, not by talking directly about her acting experience itself, but through an analogy with ping pong. 
 In the terminology of rhetoric, such an analogical way of shaping discourse is called ‘allegory.’ 
Technically, it is defined as “a method of representation in which a person, abstract idea, or event stands for 
itself and for something else” (Shaw, 1972: 12). This simple definition includes several notable points. First, 
the use of this strategy establishes two levels of meaning: (i) what the words and phrases literally refer to; 
and (ii) what the literal referents represent. In the example in (2) above, the words and phrases about table 
tennis describe how a game is played with a good opponent. As a whole, this works as a representation of 
what it was like for Moretz to act with Cage. Second, the relationship between the literal referents and what 
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they represent is one of similarity. In the above instance, in introducing the ping-pong analogy, Moretz uses 
the phrase “it was like,” claiming that her acting experience was similar to playing ping pong with a good 
player. Third, the similarity that the use of allegory constitutes is systematic, and has structural properties of 
its own (Sato, 1992b: 198-204; Sato et al, 2006: 498-499). In (2), the actors and their relationship in the 
game of ping pong have a counterpart in the topic of acting: “a good player” corresponds to Cage; “ping 
pong” for acting; “return[ing] the serve” to responses to Cage’s performance, “play[ing] with a good player” 
to acting with Cage; the level of play to the level of performance; and the positive result of hard work to the 
natural flow of emotion. In this way she describes what it was like to play a role with Cage in a film by 
drawing on the structure that underlies talk about what it would be like to play table tennis with a good 
opponent. That is how the strategy of allegory can be characterized as an analogical way of communication. 
The fourth point is that structural similarity between two semantic levels in allegorical discourse is not a 
ready-made relationship, but rather part of what the speaker builds in discourse. That is, allegory is a way of 
systematizing the topic at hand by comparing it with the structure of something different. In the case of (2), 
the correspondence between the two activities is not something ‘out there’ but a systematic product of 
Moretz’s sense-making activity. The essence of the strategy of allegory lies in performing an act of structural 
imprinting. To sum up, the rhetorical strategy of allegory can be characterized as a method of talking about a 
topic analogically by drawing on the structure of something else. 
 In defining allegory, it is important to note that traditionally, it has been characterized in relation to 
metaphor. Examples of such a characterization include Sato’s, “allegory is after all ‘a strip of discourse 
organized as a sequence of metaphors belonging to the same group’” (1992b: 197) and Sloane’s, “[allegory] 
differs from metaphor in that the substitution does not involve one lexeme but a series of lexemes” (2001: 
18).  The term ‘metaphor’ refers to “an implied comparison between two things of unlike nature that yet 3
have something in common” (Corbett & Connors, 1999: 396), e.g., talking about someone’s idea in terms of 
eating: cf. “I just can’t swallow that claim” (Kövecses, 2002: 5). The metaphorical use of words and phrases 
overlaps with the allegorical strategy in that it also establishes two levels of meaning. In fact, Moretz’s 
utterance in (2) can be seen as consisting of a chain of several metaphors like “ping pong” for acting and “a 
good player” for Nicolas Cage. Seen this way, viewing allegory as a method to form a verbal sequence of 
metaphorical expressions might seem appropriate. Still, the allegorical strategy is not always reducible to 
sequences of metaphorical words and phrases. First, in Cognitive Linguistic terms, a metaphorical expression 
 Similar characterizations are also found in Baldick (1990: 5), Drabble (2000: 18), Komatsubara (2016: 303), Lanham, (1991: 4), 3
Semino (2008 : 64-65), and Shaw (1972: 12).
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necessarily links two intrinsically different fields of meaning, or “conceptual domains” (cf. Kövecses, 2002: 
4), like Ideas and Foods in the above example,  and for this reason, it is different from a literal comparison 4
(Pragglejaz Group, 2007). In contrast, allegory does not necessarily require a relationship between the two 
levels of meaning to be metaphorical. Instead, the essence of allegory lies in the function that it serves, i.e., 
drawing a structural comparison in discourse, and not in the kind of relationship it establishes. Second, 
defining allegory as a sequence of metaphors would exclude some important phenomena that are closely 
related to it. For example, proverbs like birds of a feather flock together or where there’s a will, there’s a way 
are both allegorical in that their semantic structure is mapped onto a discursive topic.  Only the former works 5
as a metaphor for people, however, whereas the latter does not; the second one is synecdochical in actual 
contexts of use, where the will and the way are specified.  A narrow definition of allegory bound to the 6
concept of metaphor would fail to capture how these seemingly different proverbs work in similar ways. 
Third, what the speaker does with the allegorical strategy is structurally compare the topic at hand with 
something else, and whether the comparison is metaphorical or not is not essential to its use. If the 
metaphorical-or-not distinction can have any relevance at all, it would only be of interest to analysts, and not 
for speakers. Thus although allegory is often characterized alongside the notion of metaphor, this study 
defines it as a rhetorical means of structural comparison between two semantic levels in discourse.  7
 Whereas allegory is a way of shaping discourse, it has not been recognized as such in the study of 
rhetoric. Instead, it is conceived of as a literary concept which is “applied to a work of fiction in which the 
author intends characters and their actions to be understood in terms other than their surface appearances and 
meanings” (Shaw, 1972: 12). Examples of such fictional works that mirror (often satirically) an event or 
situation in the real world are The Pilgrim’s Progress, Gulliver’s Travels and Animal Farm (cf. Barton & 
Hudson, 2009: 7; Sloane, 2001: 20). In the same vein, previous studies also characterize fables, (sometimes 
by well-known authors like Aesop and La Fontaine) as examples of allegorical texts. Technically, the term 
‘fable’ refers to literary stories with animals as central characters that exemplify a moral lesson (Drabble ed., 
2000: 334). The parable is another genre of text that is traditionally considered as an example of allegorical 
discourse. Typical examples in this category are analogical stories that Jesus in the Gospels narrates to get his 
religious message across (cf. Barton & Hudson, 2004: 149-150), e.g., the Good Samaritan and the Prodigal 
 Following the convention of Cognitive Linguistics, “the names of domains are […] capitalized” in my discussion (Dancygier & 4
Sweetser, 2008: 14).
 A more detailed analysis of proverbs as allegorical texts will be offered in Section 2.3.5
 Synecdoche is a trope that forms a genus-species relationship (Seto, 1997: 49).6
 The significance of defining allegory in this way will be further discussed in Section 2.7.7
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Son. Finally, proverbs — idiomatic one-liners that convey social wisdom (Yankah, 1994: 3386) — are also 
regarded as an allegorical text genre (Reboul, 2000: 82) in that they establish an analogical relationship with 
a situation to which they are applied (Lieber, 1994: 102). Thus have previous studies employed the concept 
of allegory as a means of characterizing and classifying different genres of texts, and not necessarily as a 
strategy for shaping discourse. Past researchers of allegory have, in other words, focused on ‘allegory as 
product’ rather than ‘allegory as strategy.’ 
 Identifying allegory in text genres does not shed any light on the discursive process that generates the 
texts, however: i.e., allegorical novels, fables, parables and proverbs. Whereas rhetorical researchers have 
found that the four genres contain instances of allegory, they have not revealed how the allegorical strategy 
contributes to the realization of those genres. That is, they have proceeded no further than cataloguing of 
proverbs, parables, fables and certain literary works as genres of allegorical discourse. Thus it is still unclear 
how each of these so-called allegorical genres shapes and is shaped in discourse. Another consequence of 
viewing allegory as a means for classifying genres is that the four genres have been treated separately, 
without taking into consideration that they are in fact end-products that employ a common feature. In other 
words, previous studies have discovered nothing more than that the allegorical strategy can be employed in 
various ways, which is an obvious conclusion that one could reach even without rigorous examination of 
actual data. What remains to be discovered is how the four genres of allegorical texts are related to each 
other. These two issues need to be addressed. 
 Given the state of affairs mentioned above, we need to observe in detail how the rhetorical strategy of 
using allegory contributes to the composition of various types of discourse, and find out how the four genres 
of allegorical discourse are related to each other. Our examination begins with examples like (2) above, 
where use of allegory in conversational talk-exchange appear to be productive. As mentioned, previous 
studies have paid little attention to the fact that people do talk allegorically in conversation. There is no 
sound reason for this oversight. Moreover, this type of allegorical discourse has a certain descriptive value in 
itself: conversational interaction is a good context for observing what people do with language, in what 
ways, and for what purposes (e.g., Cameron, 2001; Johnstone, 2008: ch.4; van Dijk, 1997). A detailed 
analysis of the conversational use of allegory will thus provide us with a guideline to follow in examining the 
other ‘traditional’ genres. 
2.3 Conversational Allegory 
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 This section describes how the rhetorical strategy of allegory is deployed in conversational interaction. 
A detailed analysis will reveal how this strategy is used, for what purpose it is employed, and what sort of 
relationship it may shape between the interlocutors. 
 The first text to be observed is an excerpt taken from the film Ocean’s 11. In the scene from which it is 
taken, the audio-visual junkie Livingston is seen working as an AV assistant in an FBI investigation. He is 
writing something in his notebook in a surveillance van, while two other officers are staring at the monitors. 
(3) OFFICER #1: [To OFFICER #2, pointing to a man in one of the monitors] See if we can move in 
on this man. 
[OFFICER #2 reaches to adjust a monitor] 
LIVINGSTON: [waving his head and his hand] (a)D- d- don’t- don’t- don’t… touch that. 
OFFICER #2: [reluctantly] (b)Why not? 
LIVINGSTON: Uh, (c)do you see me, grabbing the gun out of your holster and [waving his arm] 
waving it around? 
OFFICER #1: (d)Hey, Radio Shack, relax. 
[LIVINGSTON dejectedly goes back on his notebook.] (Soderbergh, Ocean’s 11) 
Livingston makes a claim about how the FBI agents should behave by superficially asking a question about 
his own possible actions in (3c). Specifically, “me” corresponds to the officers, “grabbing the gun” to the 
agents’ touching the monitors, and “pulling out” the firearm, “waving it around” to the officers’ potential for 
controlling the monitors in the van. This correspondence shows how Livingston designs his utterance with an 
allegorical method. 
 The most important features of Livingston’s utterance (3c) are (i) that it is made in the midst of 
conversational talk-exchange, and (ii) that as a consequence of its construction and understanding, it both 
orients to the preceding sequence of utterances and influences the design of the next utterance — discussed 
below. The interaction in (3) begins with Livingston’s hesitant order for officer #2 in (3a), which then 
triggers the investigator to make a retort by asking for a reason in (3b).  The interactional ‘slot’ after (3b) is 8
thus established as a place where Livingston’s answer to the (argumentative) question is expected. In this 
 To the audience of the film, Livingston’s hesitant style may serve as a clue of his timid character. The officer’s utterance (3b) cannot 8
be a mere question, for if he were willing to accept Livingston’s order he would simply say “OK” (or something similar) and refrain 
from touching the monitor. The fact that he actually asks for reason clearly indicates his reluctance to obey an assistant.
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sequence, then, Livingston’s allegorical utterance is designed as a claim providing him with a reason for the 
claim. 
 Let us now look at how Livingston builds up his utterance in more detail. First, the sentence has an 
interrogative structure, which requires the FBI officers to answer it. The answer must obviously be “No,” 
however, since Livingston is not touching either of the officer’s guns at all. (3c) occupies an interactional 
position after the agent #2’s question asking for the reason behind Livingston’s order (3b). As such, it 
functions as a rationale for his initial assertion (3a), even though it takes the form of an interrogative 
sentence. Livingston’s utterance in question can thus be paraphrased as ‘I’m not grabbing the gun out of your 
holster or waving it around, (am I ?)’ and from this his reasoning is clear: the FBI agents should not touch the 
monitors because Livingston is not grabbing for their guns. His wording carries an important implication: not 
only do “the guns” belong to the officers, but they are also obviously too dangerous for a non-expert like 
Livingstone to “[wave] them around.” Based on this allegorical correspondence, then, he argues that the 
monitoring equipment likewise belongs to him and not the officers, and it is too dangerous for non-experts 
— even FBI agents — to touch. The claim supporting utterance (3c) can be further paraphrased as this: the 
officers should not touch the monitors, both because they do not belong to them but also because Livingston 
is not touching their guns, which are extremely dangerous for a non-expert like him to handle. In this way, 
Livingston shapes his utterance allegorically in order to persuade the two officers. 
 Livingston’s allegorical gambit also posits a certain relationship between himself and the FBI agents. 
He claims that the officers must not touch his monitor based on the fact that he is not touching their guns. 
This line of argumentation presupposes a kind of equal, complementary relationship between Livingston and 
the officers. Livingston may be an audio-visual expert but a layman in weaponry, but the officers are also 
amateurs of electronic devices even though they are specialists in firearms. From his point of view, his 
knowledge of the surveillance cameras is just as important as the agents’ expertise in handling guns. Such a 
relationship further entails that Livingstone has a vital role in the investigation. Because Livingston and the 
officers both have specialist’s knowledge and experience, they should respect each other’s expertise. In the 
same vein, (though in a hesitating manner) Livingston is able to give an order to the officers (3a), which 
clearly signals that he sees himself as being in a position where he is allowed to control the use of the 
monitoring equipment. The allegorical strategy in (3c) thus contributes to advancing Livingston’s view of the 
relationship between himself and the FBI investigators.  9
 Whereas Livingston tries to persuade the two officers by carefully crafting an allegorical utterance, his 
 In rhetorical terms, Livingston is attempting to strengthen his ethos.9
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attempt is defeated by officer #1 in (3d). What is important to note here is that his retort is guided by 
Livingston’s reason-giving interrogative allegory (3c). Against Livingston, officer #1 redefines their 
relationship by calling him “Radio Shack.” This label casts Livingstone simply as a person hired by the FBI 
to monitor activities, not a surveillance expert as Livingston implies through his allegory. Moreover, the 
imperative form “relax” signals the officer’s assessment that the monitors would not be as dangerous for 
non-experts as firearms. What officer #1 does with his words is to deny the expertise and status of Livingston 
posited in (3c). In this sense, this negative utterance is founded on his preceding allegory. Thus, not only is 
Livingston’s use of allegorical strategy shaped by the preceding utterances, it is also influential in the 
composition of the next utterance. 
 To sum up, the analysis of the text above shows several important characteristics of allegory. First, it 
constitutes an interactional move in conversational talk-exchange. An allegorical response materializes in the 
context of preceding discourse, while pointing to possible directions that upcoming utterances will take. 
Second, it draws an explicit analogy. Both the current topic and sequential organization of the talk-exchange 
serve to construct the structural correspondence of allegory. Third, the allegorical strategy puts forth an 
argument, and speakers can get their interlocutor(s) to accept their perspective on the topic at hand. Thus can 
the rhetorical strategy of allegory in conversation be characterized as interactive, explicit and 
argumentative.  10
 This proposed function of allegorical discourse also sheds light on a problem that previous studies had 
regarding this rhetorical strategy, which did not clarify the discursive aspect of allegorical genres (proverbs, 
parables, fables, and certain types of literature). More specifically, previous studies could still explain how 
the allegorical strategy composes texts of those genres, what the goals of these texts are, or what sort of 
generalizations there are between speaker/writer and hearer/reader. Underlying this problem is the analytical 
perspective that previous studies have taken in dealing with allegorical phenomena. Oftentimes, data is 
isolated from contexts of use, and focus is solely on the formal and/or semantic dimensions of the texts 
involved. Dundes (1975), for instance, discloses that many proverbs have a quadripartite structure. Literary 
critics describe the analogy between the characters and happenings depicted in Animal Farm and the key 
figures and events in the Russian Revolution (Fowler, 1995: ch.9; Frye, 1986; Meyers, 1991: ch.7). Although 
an exploration of these aspects of allegorical texts is valuable, these studies have focused their analysis too 
narrowly on superficial dimensions. Accordingly, it is not clear what sort of sense-making activity such texts 
 Here, the term ‘argument’ is used in a broad sense to mean ‘inviting one’s interlocutor(s) to understand and accept the speaker’s 10
opinion or point of view.’ It is not intended to mean “a situation in which two or more people disagree, often angrily” (LDOCE).
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constitute. Observing discursive functions of allegorical talk and texts is another valuable direction of 
research. 
 With this in mind, we will take a discursive approach to the analysis of proverbs, parables, fables and 
allegorical novels. The following four sections will examine how each of the four genres of allegorical texts 
is realized in actual discourse. 
2.4 Proverbs 
 The first type of allegorical domain we consider is that of proverbs, which can casually be defined as 
“short, pithy statements of widely accepted truths about everyday life” (Abrams, 1999: 8). Let us first look 
here at how they are employed in conversation.  Cited below is an excerpt from the film Some Kind of 11
Wonderful. In it, a high school student, Keith, strives for a date with the most popular girl in school, Amanda. 
His best friend, Watts, claims that it is a lofty dream, however. 
(4) WATTS: You couldn’t score her in a million years. A: you’re too shy and closed up to her to even 
approach her. And B: she’d kill you. (a)Chicks like her have one thing on their mind. (b)And 
you don’t make enough of it to matter to her. 
KEITH: (c)Like, you can’t judge a book by its cover. 
WATTS: (d)Yeah, but you can tell how much it’s gonna cost. 
KEITH: That’s deep. 
WATTS: You want shallow, call Amanda Jones. (Deutch, Some Kind of Wonderful) 
In response to Watts’ stereotypical evaluation of Amanda (4a) and assessment of the low likelihood of 
success of her friend’s attempt to win her (4b), Keith quotes a proverb (4c). The proverb “you can’t judge a 
book by its cover” literally means that no matter how good the cover of a book looks, it does not necessarily 
portend good reading. The description of the relationship between the cover of a book and its contents 
corresponds to the relationship between Amanda’s outer appearance and her inner personality. By using it, 
Keith intends that it would be wrong to assess the kind of person Amanda really is based on what kind of 
 Conversational interaction is not the only context in which people cite proverbs. Still, it is regarded as the most basic context of 11
proverb use (Norrick, 1985: 12).
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person she looks to be. In the analogy drawn here, the contents of a book corresponds to the true nature of 
Amanda, and its cover to her appearance. In that the structure of description of the book is impressed upon 
the current topic (i.e., Amanda) the proverb (4c) constitutes an allegorical utterance. 
 One important feature of proverbs is that they are idiomatic. On one hand, they are “preformed, 
inventorized linguistic units,” and on the other “traditional items of folklore” (Norrick, 1985: 25). Individual 
proverbs have a fixed, sentential form of their own, in which they encapsulate time-tested wisdom of the 
linguistic community.  For this reason, speakers can “[fall] back on on the store of preformed utterances” 12
(Norrick, 1985: 26). In this sense, proverbs are quoted, rather than formed spontaneously by individual 
speakers in discourse.  Importantly, just as quoting a proverb entails citing “the linguistic community itself” 13
(ibid), since they are a part of, hence inseparable from the shared knowledge of the social group. In this 
regard, we note that Keith initiates his proverb with the word “Like,” which can be understood as a fragment 
of a formulaic phrase like Like they say, or Like it’s said. With this marker, Keith communicates that what he 
is about to say is a shared idea, not a personal opinion. By drawing on the authority of a socially shared 
opinion, he claims that Watts too should accept it. Thus by citing the proverb “you can’t judge a book by its 
cover” Keith attempts to ‘authorize’ his opinion of Amanda. As shared items of folklore, proverbs serve as a 
valuable resource for persuasion. 
 Not surprisingly, the shared status of proverbs makes it difficult to argue against them.  Still, Watts 14
successfully deflects the casual argument in (4). It is important to note here that her way of resisting Keith’s 
attempt at persuasion is tightly connected to the allegorical aspect of the proverbial utterance. In (4d), she 
acknowledges the ‘truth’ that the proverb carries (“Yeah”), but then with a contrastive connective (“but”) 
pushes the allegory in a slightly different direction, focusing on the cost of the “book.” In accordance with 
Keith’s analogy between Amanda and a book, the cost of paying for the latter is aligned with the effort that is 
needed for Keith to be successful with Amanda. In making this counter-argument, Watts strategically 
composes the central part of her utterance (“you can tell how it’s gonna cost”). On one hand, she deploys the 
same sentence-initial structure as seen in Keith’s proverb: with a second-person pronoun you plus the 
auxiliary verb can. On the other hand, her utterance is a positive one, making her contrastive stance more 
 Though the form of each proverb is fixed, speakers can change it in practical use, aiming at certain expressive effects. In this 12
regard, see Seto (1988: 119-120) and Takeda (1992: ch. 7). It should also be noted that proverbs often have allomorphs. For example, 
Little things please little minds has as its variants Little things affect/attract little minds, Little things attract light minds, and Small 
things please small minds (Toda ed., 2003: 225).
 The fact that proverbs are often introduced with an expression such as (as) they say or as the proverb goes indicates that they are 13
quoted (Takeda, 1999a; Yankah, 1994).
 This ‘resistance-proof’ feature of proverbs is shared with other kinds of idiomatic expressions (cf. Kitzinger, 2000).14
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obvious (“you can’t” vs. “you can”). This design not only displays an opposing attitude to Keith’s positive 
evaluation of Amanda, but also helps re-claim her initial assessment, i.e., that Keith cannot make enough of 
what girls like Amanda are after (money). In this way, Amanda resists the authoritative power of the proverb 
by extending it allegorically. 
 So far we have seen that proverbs can function as a resource for advancing the speaker’s perspective 
on a topic. Looking once again at (4), Keith’s proverb efficiently counters Watts’ stereotypical judgement of 
Amanda. It is quoted for an argumentative purpose in the context of the preceding talk-exchange, and at the 
same time affects the force of upcoming utterance. In this way, proverbs can be seen as an idiomatic textual 
format for hosting allegorical argumentation. 
 In conversational use of proverbs, analogies are drawn explicitly. In this regard, a proverb’s status as 
an idiomatic expression also determines how the analogy is interpreted. Since proverbs are taken as a 
linguistic resource inventorized and shared in a given society, members of the community are expected to be 
aware of how they can be applied in actual discourse. For English speakers, it is obvious that a book, its 
cover, and the relationship between them represent a similar one between Amanda’s appearance and her 
personality. The appropriate use of proverbs is therefore partly based the interlocutors’ knowledge. At the 
same time, the interactional slot in which a proverb appears also contributes to identifying the target of 
analogy. In the example above, Keith’s proverbial utterance (4c) follows Watts’ stereotypical remark about 
Amanda. Here, the proverb is naturally heard in relation to the preceding assertion. Other linguistic devices 
may also be employed to cue analogical interpretation. In (4c), Keith initiates his utterance with “Like” in 
order to juxtapose the content of the proverb with Watts’ evaluation of Amanda. Keith’s statement about a 
book thus invites analogical interpretation. In short, the analogy that proverbial utterances engender is 
evident in conversational talk-exchange. 
 In summary, the use of proverbs in conversational interaction has the following characteristics. First, 
proverbs can serve as a resource for shaping interaction between speakers. Used in conversational talk-
exchange, they constitute an interactional move. Second, the use of a proverb constitutes an argument in a 
broad sense. Speakers can advance an opinion on a current topic by drawing on the time-tested wisdom 
encapsulated in the proverb they quote. Third, an analogy is evident in proverbial utterances. The analogy is 
usually clear, based on an expectation of knowledge about the proverb usage — with some linguistic markers 
attached. Proverbs in conversation can thus be characterized as an interactive, argumentative and clear 
realization of the allegorical strategy. 
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2.5 Parables 
 Next, let us examine the parable, traditionally formulated as “a story designed to convey some 
religious principle, moral lesson, or general truth” (Shaw, 1972: 274). Well-known examples are those that 
appear in the Gospels, as the one below from Luke 15: 1-7 (Holy Bible: Contemporary English Version): 
(5) Tax collectors and sinners were all crowding around to listen to Jesus. So the Pharisees and the 
teachers of the Law of Moses started grumbling, “(a)This man is friendly with sinners. He even eats 
with them.” 
 (b)Then Jesus told them this story: (c)If any of you has a hundred sheep, and one of them gets 
lost, what will you do? (d)Won’t you leave the ninety-nine in the field and go look for the lost sheep 
until you find it? (e)And when you find it, you will be so glad that you will put it on your shoulder 
and carry it home. (f)Then you will call in your friends and neighbors and say, “Let’s celebrate! I’ve 
found my lost sheep.” 
 Jesus said, “(g)In the same way there is more happiness in heaven because of one sinner who 
turns to God than over ninety-nine good people who don’t need to.” 
(Luke 15: 1-7, Holy Bible: Contemporary English Version) 
In reply to the grumbling of the Pharisees and teachers of the Law of Moses (5a), Jesus gives the reasons for 
his willingness to be friendly with sinners through a story of “a lost sheep” (5c-f).  He concludes his turn 15
with a statement (5g) that serves as a literal retort to the criticism, and which amounts to a Christian truth. 
 The most prominent feature of Jesus’ defense is that a story (cf. (5b)), in accordance with the 
description of a traditional parable given above. According to Labov (1972), a narrative (story) typically 
consists of “a verbal sequence of clauses” corresponding “to the sequence of events which (it is inferred) 
 The criticism of the Pharisees and the teachers of the Law of Moses comes from the fact that tax collectors as well as sinners were 15
despised in the society of those times (Kato, 2006: 107; Takahashi et al. eds., 1991: 343). The sentence-initial particle “So” 
presupposes this.
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actually occurred” (Labov, 1972: 359-360). ,  In the example above, the clauses that constitute the story 16 17
(5c-f) each describe a hypothetical event in chronological order. The speaker first establishes a hypothetical 
situation with an if-clause, and asks his interlocutors what they would do in that situation (5c). Then he asks 
them to justify what they would do in a similar situation (5d). Finally, he states what they would do in the 
end (5e-f). By asking questions along the way, he suggests what one would normally do when one of his 
sheep got lost.  18
 The story in a parable is a vehicle for talking about a topic. In (5), the narrative of a lost sheep reflects 
a principle of Christianity. Specifically, Jesus portrays a religious truth in the story (5c-f) which he then 
articulates (5g): the entire story — including “you” as shepherd, sheep, and the relationship between them — 
is projected onto his view of sinners and their need to turn to God. Notice how he uses the phrase “In the 
same way” to link the narrative to the topic.  Jesus thus characterizes the principle as something similar to 19
what he has narrated. Given this holistic connection, connection between constituent parts also become clear: 
one lost sheep out of one hundred corresponds to one sinner out of many; the other ninety-nine sheep 
correspond to most good people; and the discovery and return of the lost sheep and the consequent joy 
correspond to the sinner’s turn to God and the resultant happiness. What the narrative structurally illustrates 
(5c-f) equals a religious truth (5g). Because parables typically build this kind of structural relationship 
between literal description and representative meaning, they conform to the allegorical strategy. 
 In the discourse of parables, such an analogy is not drawn completely, however. In (5) for example, the 
analogical counterpart of “put[ting] it [=the sheep] on your shoulder” and “call[ing] in your friends” has not 
been clearly established. Not every entity or action of the allegorical story corresponds to an entity or action 
in the topic being discussed. This does not mean that it is impossible (or valueless) for readers of the Gospels 
to try to find counterparts of seemingly ‘empty’ entities or actions, however. Still, it is important that the 
 Labov’s formulation of a narrative is of course not the only one that has been used to describe the genre (cf. De Fina & 16
Georgakopoulou, 2012: 86). The Labovian model aims to capture the typical form-function chain found in full-fledged narratives 
with a definite beginning and end (De Fina & Georgakopoulou, 2012: 32). His model is useful here because the genres of allegory 
(i.e., parables, fables and allegorical novels) take such a typical, full-fledged shape.
 Although Labov formulates his model based on narratives of past experience collected through interviews (Labov, 1972: 355-359; 17
Labov & Waletzky, 1997: 5-12), narratives can also be told for other purposes, in other situations (De Fina & Georgakopoulou, 2012: 
ch.4).
 Jesus changes his stance several times during telling of the story: from interrogative (5c), through confirmative (5d), to affirmative 18
(5e-f). These changes invite the Pharisees and the teachers to accept Jesus’ perspective on tax collectors and sinners.
 The end of the story is doubly marked: (i) by quoting a (hypothetical) remark that his interlocutors might use on finding the lost 19
sheep; and (ii) by starting a new paragraph with the phrase “Jesus said.” In this way, the talk is collaboratively designed, both by 
Jesus and the writer of the Gospels.
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parable texts are partly opened up for such interpretive work. In this sense, the discourse of parables is 
interpretive. 
 It is also significant that parables in the Gospels constitute an interactional move between Jesus and 
the other characters. In the excerpt above, the story of a lost sheep is triggered by — hence directed toward 
— a critical utterance made by the Pharisees and the teachers of the Law of Moses (5a). The initial linking 
adverb “Then” in (5b) signals that Jesus opposes their attitude, hence his story and his statement about 
sinners turning to God shape a counter-argument against their viewpoint. The concluding statement of his 
own view (5g) in particular serves as the very reason for him to spend time with tax collectors and sinners — 
the very target of his interlocutors’ censure (“I’m with them, because there is more happiness in heaven 
because of one sinner who turns to God than over ninety-nine good people who don’t need to”). The 
allegorical story (5c-f) is thus retroactively characterized by the final remark (5g) as a build-up phase from 
which to draw the literal explanation.  The parables that Jesus employs in the Gospels thus contribute to his 20
arguments in talk with his interlocutors. 
 While Jesus’ parables take shape in interaction, it is also important to note that such talk as a whole 
constitutes a large part of description in the Gospels. Through the text of the Gospels in which talk is 
embedded, Jesus communicates his religious message to readers. The Gospels are written texts, populated by 
characters that appear in the world created in the texts.  In this mode of discourse, Jesus’ talk is primarily 21
directed toward his immediate interlocutors where parables are fundamentally realized in talk-exchange.. 
Readers, on the other hand, interact with Jesus, but rather just ‘overhear’ the conversation between Jesus and 
other people. In (5), Jesus’ words are all addressed to the Pharisees and the teachers of the Law of Moses, 
while readers just observe how the interaction goes from Luke’s description. Thus, the parable can be 
characterized as a type of allegorical discourse that takes the form of a narrative in order to communicate a 
religious message. It is realized through indirect interaction between the text and the reader. 
 To sum up, parables have the following characteristics. First, they are shaped in the form of a story. At 
the same time, however, the discourse is not completely oriented to narration; rather, it is embedded in select 
 The effect that Jesus’s utterance in (5) has on the Pharisees and the teachers of the Law of Moses is not described in the text. In 20
fact, the Gospels generally avoid portraying how people respond to Jesus’ words. In the study of rhetoric, this way of describing talk-
exchange is called aposiopesis. Importantly it serves to deliver a doctrinal message effectively to readers. We will see how the 
rhetorical strategy of aposiopesis works in collaboration with parables in chapter 4.
 The Gospels to allow for different approaches, however. Some researchers aim to spot their origins, while others focus on their 21
sociological, cultural, and/or religious backgrounds; still others recognize the Gospels as self-contained stories (Asano et al., 2016). 
This study focuses on the fact that the Gospels choose a story form to describe how Jesus lived his life and preached to people. It thus 
aims to clarify their discursive aspects, not their historical accuracy or their theological significance.
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talk-exchanges between Jesus and his listeners. The interpretation of parables is thus based on preceding 
interactional context, and how subsequent utterances are affected. In this sense, parables are both narrative 
and interactional. Second, there is usually some analogy. While the plot of the story is being impressed on 
the discursive topic, corresponding aspects of entities and actions are being developed under cover. This 
leaves room for the reader to interpret the analogy on their own. Thirdly, the stories of a parable are narrated 
for argumentative purposes. Jesus tells them to his immediate interlocutors to advance his religious opinions, 
while the Gospels direct his message to the reader. The parable is thus both narrative and interactive; it is a 
partly explicit, argumentative and interpretive kind of allegorical discourse. 
2.6 Fables 
 Like parables, fables are a type of allegorical vehicle that takes the form of a narrative. According to 
traditional rhetorical studies, a fable is “a short narrative, in prose or verse that exemplifies an abstract moral 
thesis or principle of human behavior” (Abrams, 1999: 6). Let us first look at the text below cited from 
Fables of Aesop, edited by Handford and Robb: 
(6) The Fox and the Mask 
(a)A fox entered an actor’s house and rummaged through all his properties. (b)Among other things he 
found a mask representing a hobgoblin’s head — the work of a talented artist. (c)He took it up in his 
paws and said: ‘What a fine head! A pity it has no brain in it!’ 
(d)¶ This fable reminds us that some men of impressive physical appearance are deficient in 
intellect. (Handford & Robb eds., Fables of Aesop) 
Fables consist of two parts: a story and a moral lesson. First, the example above tells a story (6a-c), and then 
it states a lesson (6d). Let us observe how each of the two parts are composed. 
 In the discourse of the fable, focus is placed on narration itself. The main part is realized in typical 
narrative form: a string of clauses describes an action or event, and their sequence implicates the 
chronological order of events. The story in (6) begins with the fox entering an actor’s house and his 
rummaging through his belongings (6a). Then he finds a mask (6b), whose detail is also specified with a 
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positive evaluation — “the work of a talented artist”.  The next sentence (6c) is a direct quote: its 22
appearance is evaluated positively (“a fine head”), while its lack of brain is evaluated negatively (“a pity”). 
Note that the title concerns only the characters that appear in the story, although this is not the sole option. It 
does emphasize the story, however, rather than the epigram that follows. In the case above, it would also 
have been possible to assign it a more general title like ‘Good Appearance without Good Content.’ The real 
title refers to the story without mentioning what comes after it. By doing so, the discourse of a fable can be 
characterized as a kind of narrative discourse. 
 After the story-part of a fable, a general idea is presented (Abrams, 1985: 6).  In (6) above, the end of 23
the story is marked by the start of a new line with a paragraph symbol (“¶”). The phrase “This fable reminds 
us that” characterizes what follows as something we (the reader) already know. In the first part, the story of 
the fox is told in the past tense (e.g., “entered,” “rummaged,” etc.), but in the second, the present tense is 
chosen (“reminds”). The shift indicates that while the story concerns past events, the concluding remark is a 
timeless, general idea which may trigger the reader to interpret it as a universal lesson. Thus, fables extract a 
general view from a story.  24
 The story and the epigram of fables combine to form an allegorical relationship. In (6), the mask is 
described and evaluated both in terms of appearance and ‘inner content.’ The structure of the mask is 
connected to the concluding remark through its great appearance and lack of brain which correspond to men 
of great physical appearance and their lack of intellect. The linkage between the evaluation of the mask and 
the author’s assessment of certain people is linguistically structured in a loose way with the expression “This 
fable reminds us that.” A closer reading gives an even more specific matching: the fine appearance of the 
mask corresponds to the impressive physical appearance of some men, and the mask’s lack of brain to a 
perceived deficiency of intellect. The mask’s fine appearance with “no brain” is structurally impressed onto 
people who have an “impressive physical appearance” but “are deficient in intellect.” The fable thus assumes 
a form of allegorical discourse with a story that represents a timeless, general idea. 
 The words and phrases that connect the story and the epigram in fables are also seen as a building 
rapport with readers. Whereas they are almost universally realized in a written form of discourse, they do 
 It is natural enough to infer from this phrase that the mask itself is well-made. In this sense, the latter half of (6b) serves to assess 22
the mask positively.
 On the face of it, this characterization of the organization of fables is an oversimplification: fables can take several different forms 23
in terms of the location of the lesson. The structural variation of fables will be explored in detail in Chapter 6.
 To put is in rhetorical terms, the story and the general idea forms a synecdochical (i.e., genus-species) relationship. That is partly 24
why this study avoids defining allegory as a metaphorical strategy. Confining the strategy strictly to metaphorical ways of realizing 
discourse would exclude synecdochical fables such as (6) from my data set, which would unreasonably tear apart the genre of fable.
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contain some fragments of direct interaction. The linking phrase in (6) above (“This fable reminds us that”) 
is designed as if the writer were actually articulating the final statement to an audience, as in a story-telling 
event. Note the presence of a deictic expression (“This fable”) and the inclusive first-person plural form us. 
In oral discourse, deictic expressions are used to refer to entities in situations where the speaker and the 
hearer are both present (cf. Huddleston & Pullum, 2002: 1451). The first-person plural pronoun we is 
appropriate when talking about the speaker and the hearer (or in some cases several others) as members of 
the same group.  Given these general functions, their use in written discourse gives the impression that the 25
writer is talking directly to readers. Together, “This fable” and “us” act as if the narrator were telling a story 
about a fox first-hand, much like a conversational talk-exchange. With such linguistic devices, a general idea 
takes shape whereby the story is directed toward the reader. In this sense, the discourse of fables is perceived 
as interactional. 
 On the other hand, fables also leave interpretive room for readers. Realized in written mode of 
discourse, they are not exactly embedded in an ongoing talk-exchange with real-time interlocutor(s), which 
means there is no preceding context that directs interpretation. Their beginning is only marked by the title. 
Accordingly, how one interprets the concluding remark depends on each individual reader. In (6) above, the 
phrase “This fable reminds us that” introduces the epigram, but it does no more than explain the ‘point’ of 
the preceding story, not expecting readers know it already. In other words, it does not specify that the passage 
“some men of impressive physical appearance are deficient in intellect” is a moral lesson, thus allowing the 
words to serve as a ‘mocking reminder’ of that some people with good looks are intellectually.  In simple 26
terms, fables just draw a general, timeless principle from an animal story with no directive as to how to take 
it. Still, they do so allegorically. Fables thus partly rely on the reader’s interpretive work. In this sense, the 
discourse of fables is interpretive. 
 In summary, the discourse of fables can be characterized as follows. First, they are narratives. 
Although the epigram may be introduced with linguistic devices that suggest the interactional stance of the 
writer, the main focus is put on narration, not on using the story to make a certain claim. Any analogy which 
is drawn implicit rather than explicit. The structural correspondence between the story and the epigram is 
only loosely stated. Finally, the discourse of a fable is interpretive, not argumentative. How to link the story 
and the epigram is partly left up to the reader. Fables therefore constitute a narrative, somewhat implicit and 
 When used in this way, the first person plural pronoun is called ‘inclusive we’ (cf. Quirk et al., 1985: 341).25
 The traditional definition of fables as stories that convey a moral lesson is therefore not completely accurate. Most fables cast their 26
epigram as nothing more than a general idea, although some do indeed use the term ‘lesson’ to introduce the concluding remark.
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interpretive type of allegorical discourse. 
2.7 Allegorical Fiction 
 The last type of discourse realized with the allegorical strategy is a literary form that is traditionally 
recognized as a typical instance of allegory (Shaw, 1972: 12). Various works of fiction fall in this genre 
which as a whole represent particular events or situations in the real world. Classic examples include 
Johnathan Swift’s Gulliver’s Travels — critically mirroring the corruption of English society in the 18th 
century, and George Orwell’s Animal Farm, which satirizes the Russian Revolution, and so forth.  In 27
addition to novels, this type of allegorical discourse also includes works of different formats and media: 
poems, songs, pictures, films, etc. These can be analyzed as allegorical works in the same way. In this 
section, let us examine The Pilgrim’s Progress as an example.  28
 The official title — The Pilgrim’s Progress from this World to that which is to Come: Delivered under 
the Similitude of a Dream — is a religious novel written in 1678 by John Bunyan (Greenblatt & Abrams eds., 
2006: 2142).  The first part of the story is narrated as a dream sequence in which the protagonist, Christian, 29
undertakes a journey from his hometown — “the City of Destruction” — to the Celestial City.  Its overall 30
plot can be summarized as follows: 
(7) Christian sets out on his journey for the Celestial City, warned by Evangelist. On his laborious 
journey, he meets characters with names such as Hopeful, Faithful and Giant Despair, and passes 
through places like the Slough of Despond, the Valley of the Shadow of Death and Vanity Fair. 
Christian eventually reaches the Celestial City, where he is welcomed by angels. 
(Abrams, 1985: 5; Semino, 2008: 65; Yokoyama & Ishido eds., 2006: 128-130) 
 Initially, the story of The Pilgrim’s Progress can be viewed as a simple narrative. Let us look at an 
 For allegorical interpretation of these and other novels, see Abrams (1999: 5), Cuddon (1982: 26), Kawabata (2009), Shimizu 27
(2006), and Wales (1989: 17).
 The choice of this novel as the target of analysis here is totally arbitrary. The discussion presented in this section is applicable to 28
other novels and allegorical works of other formats and media.
 Literary critics traditionally refer to the novel as The Pilgrim’s Progress, and I follow this tradition here.29
 The second part of The Pilgrim’s Progress, which was published in 1684, deals with the journey of Christian’s wife and children 30
(Greenblatt & Abrams eds., 2006: 2142).
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excerpt from the novel below: 
(8) Then Christian fell down at his foot as dead, crying, ‘Woe is me, for I am undone,’ at the sight of 
which Evangelist caught him by the right hand, saying, ‘All manner of sin and blasphemies shall be 
forgiven unto men; be not faithless, but believing.’ Then did Christian again a little revive, and 
stood up trembling, as at first, before Evangelist. (Bunyan, The Pilgrim’s Progress) 
Each of the clauses in this excerpt describes an action of the characters, and their sequential order indicates 
the temporal order in which the events occurred: first Christian fell down, then Evangelist catches him by the 
hand, and finally Christian revives and stands up. The correspondence of clausal sequences and temporal 
order matches the Labovian definition of a narrative (Labov, 1972: 359-360). As in this excerpt, the rest of 
the story of The Pilgrim’s Progress is shaped in the form of a narrative. 
 Christian’s journey in The Pilgrim’s Progress is usually taken to represent a Christian worldview 
(Baldick, 1990: 5; Greenblatt & Abrams eds., 2006: 2142-2143; Semino, 2008: 65; Sloane, 2001: 20). As 
Semino (2008: 65) puts it, “Christian and his experiences exist literally in the fictional world (or, rather, in 
the narrator’s dream within the fictional world). However, the entities and experiences within this fictional 
world can be systematically mapped onto […] the life and experiences of human beings within Bunyan’s 
particular Christian view of the world.” To illustrate, consider the excerpt below from the beginning of the 
novel: 
(9) I dreamed, and behold I saw a man clothed with rags, standing in a certain place, with his face from 
his own house, a book in his hand, and a great burden upon his back (Isaiah lxiv.6; Luke xiv.33; 
Psalms xxxviii.4; Habakkuk ii.2; Acts xvi.31). (Bunyan, The Pilgrim’s Progress) 
In this passage, “the ‘Man clothed with rags’ is normally interpreted as corresponding to a man affected by 
sin; the ‘Burden upon his back’ is interpreted as corresponding to human beings’ tendency to sin; and the 
book from which the man reads is identified as the Bible” (Semino, 2008: 65). Similarly, the protagonist 
Christian is understood as representing people who believe in Christianity. Characters like “Worldly-
Wiseman” and “Giant Despair” stand for people with the attributes indicated by their names. Place-names 
such as “the Slough of Despond” and “Vanity Fair” are likewise intended to be taken as symbols for 
situations which people may experience in their lives. Most importantly, Christian’s laborious journey from 
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the City of Destruction to the Celestial City signifies the process that believers must go through in the 
process of Christian salvation. Inasmuch as this corresponds to religious process in the real world, The 
Pilgrim’s Progress can be characterized as an allegorical novel. 
 The matching between the fictional world and the real one is facilitated by elements embedded within 
the story itself. The names of both characters (“Evangelist,” “Christian,” etc.) and places (“the City of 
Destruction,” “the Celestial City,” etc.) signal that the novel intends to be more than a literal description of 
Christian’s journey. References to the Bible such as in (9) explicitly add to the story’s potential for 
intertextual reading. An allegorical interpretation of The Pilgrim’s Progress is thus suggested in the story 
itself. 
 Although it is impossible to ignore the allegorical signals in it, The Pilgrim’s Progress only qualifies as 
an allegorical narrative for readers who successfully recognize its references to aspects of the world outside 
the story. That is to say, its status as an allegorical work is not intrinsic to the story itself, but rather depends 
on how each reader interprets it (Crisp, 2001: 7; Semino, 2008: 65-66). According to Crisp (2001: 7), “[an] 
absurdly literal-minded person might read The Pilgrim’s Progress as being about some oddly named people 
going on a journey.” Such a person would merely enjoy Christian’s spectacular journey without paying any 
attention to the allegorical signals, making no connection to the process of salvation in the Christian 
worldview. In essence, The Pilgrim’s Progress only attains the status of an allegorical novel through the 
reader’s interpretive work. 
 To sum up, allegorical works of fiction can be characterized as being narrative oriented. Only a 
narrative text is provided, with no prior context. Second, analogies are implicit: the allegorical signals are 
embedded within the story with no explicit guidance on how to interpret them outside the story framework. 
Allegorical fiction is thus interpretive, not argumentative. How to take (the point of) story largely depends on 
the interpretive work of individual readers. 
2.8 Allegory and Allegorical Genres 
 In this chapter, we have shown how the rhetorical strategy of allegory works as a resource to realize 
different kinds of discourse. Let us now integrate our findings and consider how the different domains of five 
can be positioned in a single picture. 
 The five allegorical genres of discourse differ along three dimensions: (i) whether they are oriented to 
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talk-exchange or to story-telling; (ii) to the extent that analogies are made explicitly or implicitly; and (iii) 
whether analogies are aimed at argumentation or leave some room for interpretation. Allegorical 
argumentation (as in (3)) is clearly the most interaction-oriented, explicit, argumentative kind of discourse. It 
is oriented to interaction because analogy is realized through conversational talk-exchange; it is explicit in 
that the speaker presents the analogical correspondence specifically; and it is argumentative because the 
analogy reflects the speaker’s perspective on the topic. Proverbial utterances (as in (4)) are both interaction-
oriented and argumentative, as the wise sayings are generally quoted for persuasive purposes in 
conversational interaction. On the other hand, analogies drawn from proverbs are left less explicit than in 
allegorical argumentation, because their status as socially shared phrases allows speakers to anticipate that 
their interlocutor(s) will recognize the analogy successfully, with no need for additional cues to help them 
understand the specific correspondences. The narration of parables (as in (5)) is basically interactive because 
they are shaped through direct talk-exchange between Jesus and his audience in the Gospels. At the same 
time, they are partly oriented to story telling in that Jesus himself tells a story as a means of constructing an 
analogy. Parables are also argumentative in that the author lets Jesus narrate the stories in order to convey his 
message to his audience. The analogy is sometimes drawn only roughly with terms such as likewise or in the 
same way, which invite readers to interpret the analogical correspondences by themselves. In this sense the 
discourse of parables is interpretive as well as argumentative. Fables (as in (6)) represent another kind of 
allegorical discourse realized through a written mode of communication. They can hardly be characterizable 
as interactive, because the analogy is shaped solely through indirect communication between the fabulist (or 
the text) and the reader. Nevertheless, the epigram can sometimes be introduced with expressions that sound 
like the writer is speaking directly to the reader. Fables are narrative-oriented: the central part of one is an 
animal story. In addition, they are interpretive in that the analogical correspondence is not usually specified 
in detail, hence requires some interpretive work on the part of the reader. Finally, allegorical fiction (e.g., The 













Figure 1 The genres of allegorical discourse
discourse. It is narrative-oriented inasmuch as the whole text consists of one long story; it is implicit in that 
nothing outside the narrative leads to an analogical interpretation. As a result, its status as an allegorical text 
depends on how individual readers interpret it. All five genres of allegorical discourse can thus be 
characterized one set of three dimensions. Figure 1 graphically represents their features. 
 The discussion so far has focused on the inter-genre relationship of allegorical texts without regard to 
intra-genre variation — i.e., texts or strips of discourse — in each of them. In fact, there are divergent 
instances with various characteristics, as we will see in the following chapters. Proverbs are deployed and 
interpreted in a variety of manners in conversational talk-exchange, for instance (Chapter 4), and fables 
diverge structurally in how they relate an animal story and a moral lesson (Chapter 6). Nor can the borders 
between allegorical genres be drawn in a clear-cut way — rather, they overlap at the edge. In some fables, 
for example, only a story is narrated without a lesson at the end. Because they are narrative-oriented, implicit 
and interpretive, such fables are equivalent to works of allegorical fiction (6.4). Moreover, just as the 
allegorical strategy makes a claim in conversational talk-exchange, it is also possible to characterize parables 
as an allegorical argument. This chapter therefore serves only to sketch an overall picture of allegorical 
discourse in terms of three consistent measures: (i) whether they are oriented to talk-exchange or to story-
telling; (ii) to the extent that analogies are made explicitly or implicitly; and (iii) whether analogies are aimed 
at argumentation or leave some room for interpretation. 
 With this in mind, let us now consider each of the five discourse genres in more detail. The following 
four chapters examine how each rhetorical discourse genre is realized. 
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3. Drawing an Analogy in Conversation: Allegorical Argumentation 
3.1 Introduction 
 This chapter aims to investigate how the rhetorical strategy of allegory is employed in conversational 
interaction.  As outlined in Chapter 2 (Section 2.2), previous studies have mainly paid attention to 31
allegorical texts that are realized in the form of a story, in written discourse (parables, fables, allegorical 
novels). In fact, however, the story form is not the only format that shapes allegorical discourse, nor is 
written discourse the only context in which the strategy can be utilized. Conversational talk-exchange also 
offers a setting for allegory. This chapter focuses on this long-neglected domain of allegorical discourse, and 
specifies two central ways of talking allegorically in conversational settings. 
 The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 3.2 describes how allegorical talk is shaped in different 
ways of conversation: (i) with the form of a story (3.2.1); and (ii) through dynamic talk-exchange with an 
interlocutor (3.2.2). Section 3.3 attempts to understand how those two options are available in conversational 
settings, referring to the basic working mechanisms of conversation itself. Section 4 sums up the chapter and 
provides some future prospects for rhetorical research in general. 
 Before detailed analysis and discussion, it should be noted that the data used in this chapter are taken 
from two-party conversations from films and novels. There are two reasons for this choice. First, these media 
are a useful source for allegorical talk in that all one needs to do is to watch or read them. Second, they 
provide crucial background information necessary for understanding the dynamics of a given scene. Simply 
put, everything needed to analyze a conversation is offered in the movie/novel. On the other hand, if records 
of naturally occurring conversation were used, there would be huge difficulties in gathering instances of 
allegorical talk. One could never be sure whether speakers would produce allegorical utterances before 
recording. Focusing on natural conversation is thus quite difficult for collecting proper data. Although 
fictional conversations are somewhat different from those that occur in the real world, but it does not 
necessarily mean that such talk will not suffice for present purposes. The focus here is on the different ways 
of realizing allegory, and their relationship with the basic mechanisms of conversational talk-exchange. 
Conversational scenes sufficiently fulfill these basic requirements. Still, one could argue that the various 
ways of realizing allegorical utterances in fictional conversation are different from those in natural 
conversation, and hence cinematic data might seem inappropriate. Such potential differences do not make 
our proposed investigation valueless, however. Rather, if we find that fictional allegorical talk is produced in 
 The analysis and discussion in this chapter is based on Hirakawa (2018b).31
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distinct manners from the real world, it would be natural to pose the question: Why do such differences 
exist? In a sense, our analysis is a starting point for a broader study of conversational allegory. This idea will 
be further developed in the final section (3.4). 
3.2 Two Ways of Talking Allegorically 
 As defined in the introduction, allegory is a method of talking about a certain topic by analogically 
drawing on the structure of another concept. Even though the notion itself does not specify the context in 
which it is utilized, it has traditionally been exemplified with literary texts in story form, such as The 
Pilgrim’s Progress and Gulliver’s Travels. The rhetorical strategy of allegory is employed in conversational 
interaction, however. Allegorical utterances are in fact constructed in two ways in this type of setting. This 
section offers a detailed analysis of how speakers use each way of “talking allegorically.” 
3.2.1 Monological Direction 
 The first line of constructing allegorical talk is monological: the speaker builds his/her utterance 
allegorically by him/herself. This type of allegorical construction of talk is achieved through various 
means.   32
 One major resource for shaping allegorical talk in conversational interaction is narrative.  According 33
to Labov (1972: 359-360), narratives can be typically characterized as “[a] method of recapitulating past 
experience by matching a verbal sequence of clauses to the sequence of events which (it is inferred) actually 
occurred.”  Consider the example below: 34
 Note that this section does not attempt to present an exhaustive list of resources for monological realization of allegorical talk. 32
Because allegory is not confined to particular sorts of resource, it is theoretically expected that allegorical discourse is constructed 
with a variety of devices. What is presented in this section is a couple of procedures for allegorical production of talk with some 
kinds of resource.
 This suggests affinity between allegorical talk in conversation and written, allegorical novels, because both discourse genres are 33
equivalently realized in the narrative format.
 Whereas Labov (1972) observes interviewed narratives of personal experience in defining the concept, reporting past experience is 34
one of many different goals of story telling. Stories are sometimes told with hypothetical settings as in (6) below, or in order to create 
a fantasy world with imaginary characters and events. The Labovian definition is, therefore, not the only option for formulating 
narrative. For a variety of definitions given from different perspectives, cf. De Fina & Georgakopoulou (2012: ch.1).
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(10) (What was the most important fight you remember?) 
 When I was in fourth grade—no—it was third grade—there was this boy, he stole my glove. 
 He took my glove, and say that his father found it downtown on the ground. I told him that he—
it’s impossible for him to find downtown, ‘cause all those people were walking by, and just his 
father is the only one that find it? So he get all upset. 
 Then I fought him. I knocked him all in the street. So he say he give. And I kept on hitting him. 
Then he start crying and run home to his father. 
 And his father told him, he ain’t find no glove. (Labov & Waletzky, 1997: 10-11) 
Asked to tell a story of his most important fight, the narrator begins by describing his experience, setting the 
scene in the initial paragraph. At the outset, the time, place, persons, and their activities and/or situation are 
usually identified to allow the hearer to properly understand the description of events that follows (Labov, 
1972: 364). Such a set-up is essential, because a narrative concerns events that happened apart from the ‘here 
and now’ of the story-telling (Yamaguchi, 1998: 137-138).  In other words, it is quite hard to understand 35
what is narrated without a set-up. After the “orientation” (Labov, 1972: 364-365), the story-teller produces 
several clauses in sequence, which signal the chronological order of what happened. In the above instance, 
the time shift is indicated with devices such as “Then,” “So,” and “And.” A narrative thus mainly consists of 
two parts: a set-up and a sequence of events/actions.  36
 This way of discourse realization is sometimes employed to shape allegorical talk. Let us consider the 
example below, cited from the film The Dark Knight. The billionaire Bruce Wayne has a secret identity as a 
masked vigilante, Batman, to protect his hometown, Gotham City, from mobs and criminals. As Batman, he 
successfully cuts off the gangs’ money supply, but it urges them to strive to bring a corrupt city back again by 
terminating him. For that purpose, they decide to use a psychopath with crown-like makeup, Joker. He 
threatens Batman to reveal his true identity through a video footage where he brutally murders a police 
officer and declares to keep on killing one person of legal profession a day until the vigilante takes off his 
mask. Given the situation, Wayne talks about how to deal with Joker with his long-serving butler, Alfred. 
 In Chafe’s (1994) term, story-telling shapes the “displaced mode” of discourse.35
 In fact, orientation and a sequence of events/actions (which Labov (1972) calls “complicating action”) are not the only components 36
of a full-fledged narrative. For more details of narrative structure, cf. Labov (1972), Labov & Waletzky (1997), and De Fina & 
Georgakopoulou (2012: ch.2).
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(11) [WAYNE and ALFRED are watching video screens. Each plays the JOKER’s video with different 
image treatments and sound tunings.] 
WAYNE: Targeting me won’t get their money back. I knew the mob wouldn’t go down without a 
fight, but this is different. They’ve crossed a line. 
ALFRED: You crossed the line first, sir. You squeezed them, you hammered them to the point of 
desperation. And in their desperation, (a)they turned to a man they didn’t fully understand. 
[WAYNE stops his monitors and walks toward the bat-cabinet.] 
WAYNE: (b)Criminals aren’t complicated, Alfred. (c)We just need to figure out what he’s after. 
ALFRED: (d)With respect, Master Wayne, perhaps this is a man you don’t fully understand either. 
[Looks at WAYNE.] (e-1)A long time ago, I was in Burma. [Starts walking slowly toward 
WAYNE.] (e-2)My friends and I were working for the local government. They were trying to 
buy the loyalty of tribal leaders by bribing them with precious stones. But their caravans 
were being raided in a forest north of Rangoon by a bandit. [Faces WAYNE.] (e-3)So we went 
looking for the stones. (e-4)But in six months, we never met anyone who traded with him. 
(e-5)One day I saw a child playing with a ruby the size of a tangerine. (e-6)The bandit had been 
throwing them away. 
WAYNE: (f)So why steal them? 
ALFRED: (g)Oh, because he thought it was good sport. (h)Because some men aren’t looking for 
anything logical, like money. [WAYNE looks at JOKER in the monitor.] (i)They can’t be 
bought, bullied, reasoned or negotiated with. [Leans forward slightly. WAYNE looks back.] 
(j)Some men just want to watch the world burn. 
[WAYNE stares at JOKER who is insanely smiling in the monitor.] (Nolan, The Dark Knight) 
In order to demonstrate that Joker is a man whom Wayne cannot fully understand, Alfred tells a story from 
his past, marking its beginning with a tense shift from the present to the past (“is” in (11d); “was” in (11e-1)). 
He sets up the scene — spatially as well as temporally (11e-1) — and describes the situation that he and his 
friend were facing (11e-2). He recounts what happened logically, in chronological order (11e-3-6).  The 37
initial “So” in (11e-3) signifies that the raid by the bandit not only preceded their search but also caused them 
to go on it. This implies that the failure of the bribes is unacceptable. “But” in (11e-4) likewise characterizes 
 The term “logically” is used here loosely. It roughly captures the fact that Alfred clarifies why the characters in his story (including 37
himself) took particular actions that they did.
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the search as a failure, equating the length of time spent (“six months”) to the amount of effort. Alfred brings 
the story to an end with the news that he had unexpectedly found one of the stones stolen by the bandit 
(11e-5). In the final clause (11e-6), he reveals why he and his friend could never follow their tracks. Alfred 
effectively realizes his utterance (11e) in the form of a narrative, as it consists of a set-up and a logical/
temporal sequence of events. 
 The story of the bandit is allegorical in that it functions as a basis for drawing structural 
correspondences. The relationship between Wayne and Joker is analogically captured through that between 
Wayne and the bandit. In the former, Joker is claimed to be a criminal whom Wayne cannot completely 
understand (11d); in the latter, the bandit turns out to be beyond Wayne’s understanding when he asks about 
the robber’s reasons for stealing the valuable stones (11f). Joker and the bandit are characterized as the same 
in that both are equally incomprehensible to Wayne. Their equivalence is even further specified after the 
story-telling (11g-j). Alfred answers Wayne’s question (11f) by referring to the bandit’s mindset in order to 
disclose his motivation for stealing the jewels (11g). He then explains why the bandit thought that way (11h) 
by pointing to a certain characteristic of criminals. This move contradicts Wayne’s characterization of 
criminals in general (11b-c, f). Alfred then elaborates criminal characteristics in more detail (11i), eloquently 
describing the principles that such criminals follow (11j). Although Alfred does not mention Joker explicitly 
in the post-narrative talk (11g-j), the phrase “some men” includes Joker as well as the bandit. Wayne’s gaze 
at the psychopath in the monitor clearly corroborates this. Joker and the bandit are thus both portrayed as two 
‘chaos-loving’ criminals, ones whom Alfred argues are difficult for Wayne to understand. With this common 
feature, Wayne’s relationship with the bandit analogically corresponds to his relationship with Joker. 
 As told in an ongoing talk-exchange, the allegorical story constitutes an interactional move. Against 
Wayne claiming that criminals are simple enough to understand (11b-c), Alfred argues allegorically that he 
cannot understand Joker well enough, as he cannot understand the bandit in the story. The point here is that 
Alfred executes the narrative with a little twist: in the end, the precious stones unexpectedly lose their status 
as a target in the raid without further explanation (11e-6). Alfred designs his utterance (11e) in a way that 
leaves vague what the thief was after. Consequently, it invites Wayne’s question about the bandit’s true 
intentions (11f), which entails a failure to grasp the principle which the robber followed. The initial “So” 
indicates an assumption of the stones themselves as the practical aim of the robbery. This way of conceiving 
crimes or criminals coordinates well with his standpoint in (11b-c), which Alfred argues against (cf. (11d)). 
As a consequence, Wayne doubts the reason for stealing the jewels if indeed they were not the target, and 
provides a clear-cut example of criminals acting on a ‘strange’ principle. Realizing this, Alfred points out that 
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some men just enjoy bringing chaos to the world for its own sake, i.e., without any practical purpose (11g-j). 
By so doing, he demonstrates that he has a wider, deeper knowledge of criminals than Wayne, thus 
establishing some authority on the subject. Moreover, he does not verbally elaborate the relevance of this 
statement to the topic prior to the story-telling. The analogical correspondence between the two culprits 
underling the discourse implies that Alfred is talking about Joker via the bandit — as  justified by Wayne’s 
gazing at the psychopath in the monitor. Alfred arguably points out that Joker is someone who commits a 
crime just for fun, not unlike the bandit he once tried to deal with. It is therefore incomprehensible to Wayne, 
based on the latter’s failure to grasp the bandit’s aim (11f). This is in clear contradiction to Wayne’s position 
concerning Joker (11b-c), and supports Alfred’s position (11d). A narrative allegory thus serves to show 
Wayne’s failure to grasp the bandit’s aim, supporting the authority of the narrator’s argument. 
 It is also important to understand how Alfred connects the narrative to his opinion of Joker. First, his 
claim (11d) is difficult to prove in a logical way: He has as little information as Wayne does about the culprit 
at this point, and ‘proof’ would logically require him to define what a full understanding of Joker really is. 
This would take the argument from the current topic to a more complex, abstract discussion. What Alfred 
does instead is skillfully connect his opinion and the narrative, using a typical strategy of initiating and 
closing a story. 
 Initially, he provides no explicit introduction to the narrative (11e-1). The position after expressing an 
opinion (11d) does, however, offer some support to his argument (cf. Canary & Sillars, 1992: 746). This 
means of initiating narrative starkly contrasts with cases that have an explicit preface, as in (12) and (13) 
below: 
(12) (Were you ever in a situation where you thought you were in serious danger of being killed?) 
I talked a man out of—Old Doc Simon I talked him out of pulling the trigger. (Labov, 1972: 363) 
(13) ROGER: Speakin about forties. I worked on a k-o::n Morganelli’s Forty. (Jefferson, 1978: 221) 
In (12), the story-teller provides a sequence which encapsulates the point of the story in reply to the 
interviewer’s question (Labov, 1972: 363). In (13), the narrator links the upcoming story to the previous talk: 
speaking about X. Oral stories are often prefaced with such sequences to establish relevance in current talk 
(De Fina & Georgakopoulou, 2012: 87-88; Labov, 1972: 370; Ochs, 1997: 194-195). This starkly contrasts 
with Alfred’s way of launching the story (11e-1). Hiding his true intentions leads Wayne to focus on the 
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story, obscuring the non-logical transition from the claim to the narration. 
 After finishing the story, Alfred states a general principle about criminals (11h-j), derived from the 
bandit’s case (11g). Notably, however, Alfred does not explain how he knows the bandit’s aim. It is unlikely 
that he even has such knowledge, as he would not have a chance to ask the raider himself.  The statement 38
(11g) thus amounts to nothing more than speculation, even though it is portrayed as a fact in the simple past 
tense (“he thought”). All along, his status as the narrator keeps his thoughts to seem reasonable enough. 
Alfred further classifies the bandit as the kind of criminal who “[isn’t] looking for anything logical” (11h) as 
a means of explaining why he “thought” that way. He then proceeds to elaborately describe the character of 
such a criminal (11i). This classification preemtps Wayne’s belief that criminals usually have a practical goal 
(11b-c). Evan so, it lacks a proper foundation.  Ending his turn, Alfred paraphrases more concisely the 39
principle in a metaphorical expression (11j). The expression “watch the world burn” represents the joy of 
seeing people struggle in chaotic situations. With this destructive image, the sentence vividly illustrates what 
such criminals aim for in committing their crime, giving a strong impression of their abnormality. Thus 
although principle (11h-j) may seem to derive from the story of the bandit, it actually lacks a proper 
foundation. Nevertheless, with the authority he has gained by questioning the bandit’s goal (11f), Alfred 
effectively advances his perspective on criminal types, supporting his evaluation of Joker (11d). 
 The example above shows how a narrative can encompass allegorical talk, providing a basis for 
allegorical correspondences, and the characters and events described in the story are designed to have an 
allegorical effect. Based on its correspondences, an allegorical story can then function as an argumentative 
device in the ongoing talk-exchange: it is not narrated for its own sake, but is rather aimed at persuading the 
hearer in a broad sense; it expresses the speaker’s perspective on the topic, but also at urging the hearer to 
accept it. 
 Whereas a story of the teller’s own experience may provide a basis for allegorical argumentation, its 
narrative format can also be utilized for different purposes.  Consider the following example from the film 40
 In a similar vein, the bandit throwing away the jewels he raided is not the only option possible to explain how the child got the 38
giant ruby (2e5), from a logical point of view. In addition, it is not logically inevitable to recognize the ruby as one of the stolen 
stones, either. This obviously indicates that Alfred shapes the closing of the narrative for the argument’s sake.
 In order to make a logically appropriate classification, Alfred needs to enumerate other examples of such ‘illogical’ criminals. In 39
addition, it would be necessary to clarify the relation between their illogicality and the impossibility of buying them, bullying them, 
reasoning with them, or negotiating with them. Third, he would also need to explain how he could argue that such criminals cannot 
be treated in those ways based on the bandit’s case, and how it is applicable to Joker.
 In fact, although Labov (1972) defines narrative as a method to recapitulate one’s past experience, it is not confined to recounting 40
actual events that the story-teller underwent. Stories in fact vary in content and structure (De Fina & Georgakopoulou, 2012: ch.2; 
Hyvärinen, 2015; Norrick, 2000).
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Red Lights. In this film, the physicist Tom Buckley works as an assistant for a veteran paranormal researcher, 
Margaret Matheson. One day, his student Sally asks him about his job. 
(14) SALLY: So why do you do this? 
TOM: Do what? 
SALLY: Investigate fake paranormal stuff. Don’t you think it’s a bit weird? 
TOM: I just try to help Margaret. 
SALLY: I mean, what for? (a)If someone claims to have powers and actually don’t, who cares? Why 
bother? 
TOM: Why bother? (b)If your mom was one of those people who went to see a psychic because, 
um, her stomach was bothering her and (c)the psychic told her that it was nothing, that it was 
just a, a touch of gastritis. (d)But then later on, you find out it was stomach cancer and it’s too 
late to treat. (e)Do you think then you’d say “Why bother?” 
SALLY: Did, did that happen to you? (Cortés, Red Lights) 
Here we see that Sally supposes that dealing with a psychic is not a physicist’s business, as the word 
“someone” implies (14a). In response to her question, Tom establishes a hypothetical setting (14b-d), 
aligning Sally’s mother with a bothersome stomach with a believer of a psychic (14b). He then addresses the 
ability of the psychic’s ‘diagnosis’ to relieve her trouble (14c). The choice of her mother as the main 
character in this narrative serves to make Sally take the situation seriously as her own problem, which is 
further enhanced by the casual wording “your mom” instead of “your mother.” In addition, specifying a 
seemingly minor ailment as a reason to see the psychic, Tom implies that anyone could be in that position. 
With a time shift (“then later on”), Tom then discloses the ‘real’ cause of her condition (14d), contrasting it 
with Sally’s initial evaluation of a psychic through the use of “But.” Having said all this, Tom asks Sally if 
she would still not consider claiming to have ‘powers’ in this setting (14e). Through his narrative, Tom 
structurally compares the relationship between himself and believers of psychics with the one between Sally 
and her mother, offering his perspective on them, and answering her question about why he took this job. All 
of this is based on allegory. 
 In the above instance, the speaker (Tom) does not literally narrate a story, yet his utterances do share 
important features with typical story-telling. As previously noted, he establishes a certain setting in (14b-c), 
briefly characterizing the people involved: Sally’s mother with a bothersome stomach, and a psychic, and 
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their corresponding relationship (her mother’s faith in the psychic, and his ‘diagnosis’). A time shift is also 
indicated in the setting. Crucially, the sequential order of the two clauses (14c-d) correlates with the 
chronological order of the events they describe, i.e., Sally’s mother first going to the psychic, and afterwards 
to the doctor. In an allegorical way, Tom’s final question (14e) is positioned after her serious medical 
condition is made clear. At the same time, however, (14d) can be interpreted as a part of the hypothetical 
situation, i.e., it can be included in the preceding if-clause. Nevertheless, as a whole, Tom’s utterance is like a 
narrative in that he constructs it in accordance with the time line of the events. As such, he draws on typical 
story-telling style as a resource for building the allegorical talk. A narrative format can thus be partially 
utilized in allegorical construction of talk. 
 Consider next a similar example where allegorical talk is realized in conversation, taken from the film 
Swordfish. Here, a US senator, Reisman aims to make his fortune by cooperatiing with an underground 
terrorist, Gabriel. He realizes that the FBI has detected their secret relationship. He calls Gabriel in order to 
shut down their plan and hide for a while, but Gabriel rejects it and declares his determination to achieve 
their original goal. The following excerpt is from a scene in which Reisman talks to his secretary Kaplan 
after hanging up the phone. 
(15) REISMAN: Son. (a)Let’s just say you’ve got a 200-pound Rottweiler. (b)Now he loves you. It’s his 
job to protect you. (c)But if he ever bites you, even once, you gotta put him down. (d)You can 
never tell who he might bite next. You understand? 
KAPLAN: Yes, I do understand, Senator. 
REISMAN: I think we got a team on the West Coast. Uh, Fort MacArthur. Maybe they should pay 
our friend a visit. (Sena, Swardfish) 
In the scene, Reisman tells a story about a hypothetical hound, Rottweiler. He mostly constructs the narrative 
in the second-person, inviting the listener, Kaplan (as well as the audience) to imagine the setting. Using this 
strategy, Reisman first introduces the Rottweiler as Kaplan’s servant (15a). A Rottweiler is known to be a 
strong and dangerous type of dog, often used as a guard dog (Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English, 
5th ed.). Moreover, it is stocky and strongly built, standing at approximately 22 to 27 inches (56 to 68.5 cm) 
and weighing between 90 and 110 pounds (41 and 50 kg).  Given this, a 200-pound Rottweiler would be 41
quite exceptional in size and accordingly very powerful and dangerous. Reisman adds some other 
 Encyclopaedia Britanica Online (https://www.britannica.com/animal/Rottweiler).41
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characteristics (15b) to this hypothetical hound: it has affection for its master, and will use its strength to 
protect him. In this constructed scene, however, the hound turns against his master. Reisman then states what 
Kaplan would do in such a case (15c). The dog’s bite would likely cause severe injury, putting him down 
sounds reasonable and acceptable, even if it is the only time it ever happened. Reisman further offers a 
reason for this treatment (15d): if a dog attacked the master he had once loved, there is no reason to assume 
that he would not do the same to other people — in which cases it is the owner who is responsible for any 
injury. In this way, Reisman shapes his talk through story-telling, designing it to enhance the listener’s 
involvement. 
 The concise, imaginary story of a giant hound describes through allegory how Reisman wants to deal 
with Gabriel and why. The narrative comes after an unsuccessful conversation with Gabriel, hence the link 
between the story of the dog and what it means for terrorists is easy to discern. In his role as a ‘protecter,’ the 
Rottweiler corresponds to Gabriel, whom Reisman expects to be loyal. The fact that the Rottweiler is a male 
(e.g., “he” in (15b)) also hints at the parallelism. In the overall correspondence, the inferred strength and 
danger of the Rottweiler is mapped onto Gabriel, suggesting that he too is potentially dangerous. The parallel 
mapping also serves as a resource on which to draw in interpreting the following sentence where the senator 
had to put down his otherwise faithful guardian just as the previously loyal Rottweiler bit his master (15c). 
Note that the senator’s break with Gabriel following the latter’s ‘rebellion’ is still not quite like a dog ‘bite’ in 
that it has not yet caused any actual damage the latter would result in instant carnage. The correspondence 
between Gabriel and the Rottweiler creates the impression that their separation really caused harm to their 
relationship, implying that quick, appropriate retaliation may be necessary. In line with this, the stated reason 
for putting down a defiant dog (15d) thus works as an unstated one for terminating Gabriel. However, 
whereas a vicious dog might bite people at random, Gabriel will not likely cause any harm to people with no 
intent, because hurting people is not the main objective. Terrorist though he is, he does not commit 
unnecessary crimes. Reisman’s use of allegory skillfully hides this fact, and gives the impression that he is 
responsible for preventing his guardian from harming innocent people. The allegorical matching of a 200-
pound Rottweiler with Gabriel is really just a clever way of dealing with him in a subtle manner. 
 The examples above clearly show that a story does not have to be told in complete form for allegorical 
utterances in conversational talk-exchange. Rather, its core features can be only partially exploited. Nor does 
the speaker have to tell a true story: instead s/he can establish a setting with imaginary characters to qualify 
as allegorical talk. It is also possible to describe a stative situation allegorically, i.e., without narrating a chain 
of events in chronological order. The narrative format is thus quite flexible in shaping allegorical talk. 
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 The narrative format is a useful framework, but it is not the only option for shaping allegorical talk in 
conversational discourse. Allegorical talk can be launched with similes and metaphors, too. Consider (16) 
below, taken from Chris Karlsen’s novel, Heroes Live Forever. Set in 1356 Poitiers, France, two English 
knights, Basil and Guy, are making a small talk while preparing for battle. 
(16)  Guy broke the silence. “Do you think the battle will be as bad as Crecy, or worse?” he asked, as 
he studied their enemy who continued to form up on the opposite plateau.  42
 “We’ll be lucky if it’s only as bad as Crecy. I imagine it will be much worse. You shouldn’t 
worry too much,” Basil said, eyeing the favors decorating Guy’s arm. “Half the ladies at court have 
lit candles for your safe return.” 
 “I’m not worried, not about the French. (a)I worry about the ladies. When I return, I must pace 
myself and some are bound to be disappointed.” Guy said with a broad grin. 
 “(b)You’re like a fine gardener. (c)You go from flower to flower, cultivating the ladies. (d)I envy 
you and your garden. At least there’ll be one who will weep for you.” 
 “You speak as though there are none who would mourn you.” 
 “Only my brother,” Basil said. “I’m not like you. I never saw women as delicate flowers for me 
to gather. I gave them a rousing tumble or two and then put them from my mind.” 
(Karlsen, Heroes Live Forever) 
In reply to Guy’s remark about the ladies (16a), Basil compares him — allegorically — to a good gardener. 
He starts with a simile, “You’re like a fine gardener” (16b), establishing a correspondence between Guy and 
a kind of caretaker. He then specifies in what sense Guy is similar to a gardener (16c), focusing on his 
manner of treating ladies at the court. This line both elaborates and supports the prior statement with detailed 
correspondences. The one in (16b) evokes the image of Guy visiting a group of ladies, and “cultivating” 
them implies that he takes good care of them. This in turn gives rise to the image of Guy maintaining 
intimate relationships with many women of the court. To this, Basil adds another allegorical detail (16d), 
where “garden” stands for the ladies waiting for Guy to return safely. Even a simple simile thus can serve to 
launch allegorical talk by establishing an overarching correspondence followed by elaborative and/or 
 Crecy is the place where “a battle between the English and the French in 1346 near the village of Crécy-en-Pouthieu in Picardy, at 42
which the forces of Edward III defeated those of Philip VI. It was the first major English victory of the Hundred Years War” (Oxford 
Dictionary of English, 2nd ed.).
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supporting remarks.  43
 Like similes, metaphors can also launch allegory in a copular construction. Consider the following 
passage, taken from the film Mission: Impossible: III. In it, Ethan Hunt, an agent of the Impossible Mission 
Force, gets caught by an underground arms dealer, Owen Davian. After Davian finishes torturing Ethan, the 
IMF’s chief officer Musgrave shows up and reveals that Musgrave has betrayed the intelligence unit, secretly 
cooperating with Davian. The chief officer explains his intentions to Ethan. 
(17) MUSGRAVE: You grab Davian like he wanted, then what? (a)Davian’s a weed. (b)You cut him out, 
two or more spring up just like him the next day. Arrest him? Then what? You use him. 
Collaborate with him. And it’s Christmas. (Abrams, Mission: Impossible: III) 
In explaining why he has collaborated with Davian, Musgrave portrays him as a weed, asserting that it is 
pointless to grab him (17a). He characterizes Davian as a weed-like person at an abstract level, leaving 
aspects of comparison vague. He then refines his definition, claiming that Davian is merely one of many 
criminals of the same kind by using phrases related to weeds: “cut out” and “spring up.” Given this 
characterization (17a), “cut[ting] him out” stands for isolating him from underground activities by arresting 
him, and “two or more spring up just like him” implies that similar arms dealers will take over his position. 
“[T]he next day” further illustrates how quickly and effortlessly he can be replaced by other dealers. Such 
elaboration makes the initial assertion more specific: grabbing Davian will lead to nothing because he is not 
the only agent contributing to the underground arms market, hence it is better to collaborate with him than 
take him down. (17b) thus serves both to enhance allegory and support the metaphor (17a). Allegorical talk 
thus arises from a copular metaphor establishing an overall correspondence, followed by elaboration of the 
 This pattern of allegorical talk can be described with a central focus on the simile as a construction. Cuenca (2015: 163) concludes, 43
based on a survey of a Catalan corpus for similes, “A [copulative] simile is a three-slot comparative construction, including a target 
and a source belonging to different conceptual domains, and an optional but frequent and highly significant elaboration.” In a similar 
vein, Dancygier & Sweester (2014: 145) state, “The primary feature of broad-scope [i.e., copulative] similes is that the simile 
statement itself does not provide enough information to let the hearer/reader identify the selected aspect of the frame. The nature of 
the projection is typically explained in the following discourse.”
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analogy involved.  44
 In addition to establishing similarity, metaphors and similes also contribute to the speaker’s opinion on 
the topic at hand. Arguments in conversation often follow a basic pattern. According to Canary & Sillars 
(1992: 746), “[a] primary development sequence [occurs] when an agreement or a potential arguable (i.e., 
assertion or proposition) is immediately followed by support of the initial statement.” Consider (3) below, 
where a wife (W) asserts that she and her husband (H) do not communicate well with each other: 
(18) 1 W: (a)That’s a big problem too. 
2  (b)We don’t have good communication, probably none at all. 
3 H: I would disagree. (adapted from Canary & Sillars, 1992: 747) 
The wife first states her opinion in (18a) and supports it in (18b). The claim-support sequence becomes 
clearer if we paraphrase her utterance with a conjunction: “That’s a big problem too, because we don’t have 
good communication, probably none at all.” It is possible to connect the two sentences causally, as because 
serves as a reason for the former. The claim-support sequence is a basic pattern of conversational talk-
exchange. It is followed in monological allegorical argumentation, too. In (17), Musgrave tries to persuade 
Ethan to collaborate with Davian, first by casting him as “a weed.” In (16), Basil evaluates how his friend 
treats ladies by characterizing him as a gardener. In each case, the following elaboration supports an initial 
metaphor or simile which can be demonstrated through simple paraphrase: Davian is a weed, because you 
can cut him out, and two or more will spring up just like him the next day; You’re like a fine gardener, 
because you go from flower to flower, cultivating the ladies. The causal conjunction because naturally 
 Previous studies have focused on the difference between simile and metaphor. Dancygier & Sweetser (2014: 146) states, “we could 44
not use these similes as metaphorical predicative constructions, without like (Life is a box of chocolates or Living is opening a tin of 
sardines). It appears that expressions such as Life is a journey [...] trigger the connections between the source and the target without 
much contextual support, but Life is a box of chocolates does not.” In a similar vein, Cuenca (2015: 147) says, “Similes are preferred 
to express unfamiliar analogies, while “A is B” metaphorical expressions tend to equate more conventionally related entities.” 
Although they highlight differences between the two strategies, their functions are not so easy to distinguish. Compare (8) with (i) 
below, taken from the film Batman v Superman: Dawn of Justice, where the speaker talks about a type of person in terms of a weed. 
(i) WAYNE: Criminals are like weeds, Alfred. Pull one up, another grows in its place. This [=the fight with Superman] is about 
the future of the world. It’s my legacy. You know, my father once sat me down right here. Told me what Wayne 
Manor was built on. 
Whereas the initial copulative sentences function as a similarity establisher in both cases, they differ in the choice of metaphor/
simile. Metaphor and simile are, therefore, not always distinct in function. The relation between the two strategies would be an 
important and interesting topic in future research.
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connects two sentences: the second one backs up the initial presentation of the first. Allegorical talk 
involving metaphors and similes thus draws on the basic pattern of argumentation. 
 It is necessary for some elaboration to follow a metaphor or simile in order to specify which aspect of 
analogy the speaker is focusing on. The absence of elaboration or further specification may cause the hearer 
to miss the intended meaning of the speaker. Consider an example of this below, a scene from the film (500) 
Days of Summer. Here, Tom and Summer (a female character) have been dating for a while. One day while 
waiting for dinner, Summer suddenly suggests that they stop seeing each other, claiming that all they do is 
argue. 
(19) SUMMER: This can’t be a total surprise. I mean, (a)we’ve been like Sid and Nancy for months. 
TOM: Summer, (b)Sid stabbed Nancy seven times with a kitchen knife. (c)We’ve had some 
disagreements but I hardly think I’m Sid Vicious. 
SUMMER: (d)No. I’m Sid. 
TOM: [Beat] (e)Oh so I’m Nancy? 
[The waitress comes out with the food. TOM and SUMMER stop their discussion until the meal is 
served and the waitress leaves. SUMMER starts to eat.] (Wbb, (500) Days of Summer) 
Summer compares their relationship to that of the punk-rock bassist, Sid Vicious and his girlfriend, Nancy 
Spungen to support her suggestion (19a). That is to say, she references the destructive relationship of the 
rock-star couple to illustrate their own. This correspondence makes her talk allegorical. Tom reacts with 
admonition, stating what he knows about the couple (19b). He claims that he is not the same to Summer as 
Sid is to Nancy (19c). Summer then reveals that it is she — not Tom — that corresponds to Sid in her view 
(19d), much to Tom’s surprise (19e). 
 In this scene, Summer’s intended meaning and Tom’s mis-interpretation of the allegorical matching 
turn out to be inconsistent with each other. It is important to note that the misunderstanding occurs because 
the analogy is only roughly drawn in (19a). Summer’s allegorical construction offers two open positions to 
fill with an NP referent, but it is not followed by further elaboration as with the ones seen in (16-17). Such 
underspecification entails that Tom (and the audience) must figure out which NP refers to Sid or Nancy. 
Based on gender, Tom pairs himself with Sid and Summer with Nancy (19b), but fails to see how he could be 
like Sid (19c), as he has done nothing as brutal as stabbing his partner seven times (even though they did 
have some disagreements). On her intended meaning, however, Summer matches herself with Sid and Tom 
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with Nancy; her analogy does not align with gender, but rather to a relation of abuse between them. She 
states that she is Sid (19d), but does not address the issue of Sid’s violence (19b). From her own point of 
view, she has hurt her partner in a way that is similar to what the bassist did to his girlfriend: that is what she 
intends to claim with the allegory. Perhaps because she did not elaborate or specify the correspondence, Tom 
misunderstands the intended analogy. This example clearly shows that elaboration is needed after a simile or 
metaphor to ensure that an allegory is properly interpreted. 
 In this section, we have observed how a speaker can realize allegorical talk in monological ways 
through various linguistic devices. Metaphors and similes with elaboration and the method of narrative are 
two useful resources for allegorical construction of talk. The former serves as a simple format for launching 
an allegorical utterance in a top-down manner, while the latter provides a structural framework that invites 
the hearer to allegorically ‘experience’ a situation or event. These patterns of allegorical talk are designed by 
the speaker alone, but the intended effect is always anchored in ongoing interaction, as will be discussed in 
Section 3.3. 
3.2.2 Interactive Direction 
 So far, we have observed a couple of examples of allegorical talk which speakers shape in a 
monological manner in their own words. It is not the only way to talk allegorically, however. Allegorical talk 
can also be formed more interactively.  This section analyzes how speakers invite their interlocutor to 45
engage in allegorical construction of talk in conversational discourse. 
 The first example is taken from a movie, Shallow Hal. Hal evaluates women based exclusively on 
their physical appearance. One day, he is put into a hypnosis that makes him see others’ inner personality as 
appearing on their looks and falls in love with Rosemary, an amazingly beautiful lady to his eyes. Although 
he does not realize it due to the hypnosis, Rosemary is in fact quite flabby, a type of women he normally 
would never fall in love with. In order to show him the true figure of Rosemary, his best friend, Mauricio, 
gets him out of the hypnosis. Forced to be unable to see the beautiful Rosemary, Hal becomes furious at 
Mauricio. 
 This does not mean, however, that allegorical talk is shaped non-interactively in the monological way. In fact, we observed 45
dialogical aspects in the examples in the previous section: the use of you in (6-8) and interrogatives in (5-6). The interactive nature of 
the monological realization of allegorical talk will be further discussed in Section 3.3.
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(20) HAL: You screwed me, man! I had a beautiful, caring, funny, intelligent woman, and you made her 
disappear! 
MAURICIO: Oh, no, I didn’t. I just made Rosemary appear. There’s a difference. It’s called reality. 
HAL: Hey, (a)if you can see something and hear it and smell it, what keeps it from being real? 
MAURICIO: (b)Third-party perspective. Other people agreeing that it’s real. 
HAL: (c)OK, let me ask you a question. (d)Who’s the all-time love of your life? 
MAURICIO: (e)Wonder Woman.  46
HAL: (f)OK. Let’s say Wonder Woman falls in love with you, right? (g)Would it bother you if the 
rest of the world didn’t find her attractive? 
MAURICIO: (h)Not at all. (i)Cos I know they’d be wrong. 
HAL: (j)That’s what I had with Rosemary! I saw a knockout! I don’t care what anybody else saw! 
MAURICIO: Jeez, I never thought about it that way. Hey, I guess I really did screw you, huh? 
(Farrelly & Farrelly, Shallow Hal) 
At the core of the argument is the difference in the definition of ‘reality’ between the two. Against Mauricio’s 
claim that he merely disclosed the ‘real’ Rosemary, Hal asks him what defines the reality apart from first-
person experience (20a). Behind this question lies his view that one’s own feeling defines what s/he 
perceives as ‘real’ for him/her. Mauricio answers the question by stating third-party perspective is crucial, 
which starkly contrasts with Hal’s belief. 
 Given the opposition, Hal compares his relationship with Rosemary to Mauricio’s relationship with 
Wonder Woman. Notice that he establishes allegorical correspondences not by himself but through 
continuous interaction with his interlocutor. He first briefly accepts Mauricio’s opinion with “OK” and a 
preliminary imperative (20c) (cf, Schegloff, 1980, 2007: 120-123), and asks him his “all-time love” (20d). 
The question elicits Mauricio’s words (20e), inviting him to contribute to the allegorical talk. When his 
friend replies (20e), Hal accepts it (“OK”) and establishes a fictive setting based on it: Mauricio and Wonder 
Woman fall in love (20f). He then asks him another question to see if he wants others to share his evaluation 
of her (20g). Mauricio confidently denies that he would care what others say about his lover (20h), and adds 
that it is because he is right in properly finding Wonder Woman attractive (20i). The reasoning obviously 
suggests that Mauricio places more importance on his own feeling about his love than on agreement of other 
people as he initially insisted (20b). Hal quickly captures this and restate how he feels about Rosemary (20j). 
 Wonder Woman is a female superhero that appears in comic books and graphic novels by DC Comics.46
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In this way, Hal invites Mauricio to the allegorical construction of talk through taking turns with a chain of 
asking (strategically designed) questions and accepting answers. Since Hal composes his talk of Mauricio’s 
own words, he cannot resist his argument. 
 The persuasive force of Hal’s talk also comes from his wording. In the first question (20d), the choice 
of the phrase “all-time love of your life” not only narrows down possible answers for Mauricio to give, but 
also assigns a special value to it: the answer could not be someone he just love in an ‘ordinary’ degree but 
must be someone he has always been in love with in his whole life. In addition to this, in the second question 
(20g), the intensive phrase “the rest of the world” most sharply contrasts Mauricio’s evaluation of Wonder 
Woman with others’. From a logical point of view, the question could be answered either positively or 
negatively. It actually guides Mauricio to a negative reply within the allegorical framework, however, 
because Wonder Woman is characterized as the special one for him. A positive answer to the question would 
downgrade the special status attached to her, even though it does not lead to a logical contradiction. Since 
Wonder Woman is the all-time love of his life, it is consequently quite hard for Mauricio to admit that the 
disagreement with others would bother him. The lexical design of interrogative utterances of Hal, thus, 
rhetorically serves to frame Mauricio for accepting the subjective criterion of reality. 
 Let us look at another instance of this highly interactive way of realizing allegorical talk. The excerpt 
below is cited from Dan Brown’s novel, Angels and Demons. In Vatican City, a new Swiss Guard, Lieutenant 
Chartrand comes across the camerlengo on a stroll. Invited to accompany him, the young guard starts a 
casual talk with the clergyman. 
(21)  “Father,” Chartrand said, “may I ask you a strange question?” 
 The camerlengo smiled. “Only if I may give you a strange answer.” 
 Chartrand laughed. “I have asked every priest I know, and I still don’t understand.” 
 “What troubles you?” The camerlengo led the way in short, quick strides, his frock kicking out 
in front of him as he walked. His black, crepe-sole shoes seemed befitting, Chartrand thought, like 
reflections of the man’s essence…modern but humble, and showing signs of wear. 
 Chartrand took a deep breath. “I don’t understand this omnipotent-benevolent thing.” 
 The camerlengo smiled. “You’ve been reading Scripture.” 
 “I try.” 
 “You are confused because the Bible describes God as an omnipotent and benevolent deity.” 
 “Exactly.” 
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 “Omnipotent-benevolent simply means that God is all-powerful and well-meaning.” 
 “I understand the concept. It’s just…there seems to be a contradiction.” 
 “Yes. The contradiction is pain. Man’s starvation, war, sickness…” 
 “Exactly!” Chartrand knew the camerlengo would understand. “Terrible things happen in this 
world. Human tragedy seems like proof that God could not possibly be both all-powerful and well-
meaning. (a)If He loves us and has the Power to change our situation, He would prevent our pain, 
wouldn’t He?” 
 The camerlengo frowned. “Would He?” 
 Chartrand felt uneasy. Had he overstepped his bounds? Was this one of those religious questions 
you just didn’t ask? “(b)Well…if God loves us, and He can protect us, He would have to. It seems 
He is either omnipotent and uncaring, or benevolent and powerless to help.” 
 “(c)Do you have children, Lieutenant?” 
 Chartrand flushed. “(d)No, signore.” 
 “(e)Imagine you had an eight-year-old son… (f)would you love him?” 
 “(g)Of course.” 
 “(h)Would you do everything in your power to prevent pain in his life?” 
 “(i)Of course.” 
 “(j)Would you let him skateboard?” 
 Chartrand did a double take. The camerlengo always seemed oddly “in touch” for a clergyman. 
“Yeah, I guess,” Chartrand said. “(k)Sure, I’d let him skateboard, (l)but I’d tell him to be careful.” 
 “(m)So as this child’s father, you would give him some basic, good advice and then let him go off 
and make his own mistakes?” 
 “(n)I wouldn’t run behind him and mollycoddle him if that’s what you mean.” 
 “(o)But what if he fell and skinned his knee?” 
 “(p)He would learn to be more careful.” 
 The camerlengo smiled. “(q)So although you have the power to interfere and prevent your child’s 
pain, you would choose to show your love by letting him learn his own lessons?” 
 “(r)Of course. (s)Pain is part of growing up. It’s how we learn.” 
 The camerlengo nodded. “Exactly.” (Brown, Angels and Demons) 
The conversation between the two characters pivots around a question Chartrand poses (21a-b). He doubts 
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that God is both omnipotent and benevolent, because there are a lot of painful events and situations in human 
society. His skepticism, consisting of three key terms as its crucial components: love, power and pain, is 
rooted in his recognition of the God-human relationship only from the humans’ side, which is apparent in his 
use of us to refer to humans (21b). Aiming to dissolve the doubt, the camerlengo analogically compares the 
relationship between God and humans with that between a father and his eight-year-old son. That is, the 
camerlengo resolves Chartrand’s confusion by talking allegorically. The allegory is constructed strategically 
in terms of three dimensions. 
 First, the camerlengo builds up the allegory in a way that makes Chartrand shed light on the topic in 
question from a different angle. His suspicion is rooted in the perspective he takes to see the relationship 
between God and humans, i.e., humans’ perspective.  Given this, the camerlengo makes Chartrand see the 47
God-human relationship from God’s perspective by placing him in the father’s position (cf. (21e)). In this 
regard, the camerlengo’s choice of the age of eight plays a significant role of evoking an immature image of 
the child. This naturally invites Chartrand to “do everything in your power to prevent pain in his life.” In 
contrast, if he portrayed him as, for example, 18 years old, the camerlengo would be unable to ask Chartrand 
whether he would do such a thing to his son, because an 18-year-old child would normally be expected to be 
matured enough to act more or less independently of his parents (moreover, it seems unconventional to call 
such a person a ‘child’). Consequently, as a hypothetical father, Chartrand “would choose to show [his] love 
by letting [his son] learn his own lessons” (21p) even if it may cause pain to him, which means that he would 
not always prevent his son’s suffering just because he loves him. In other words, he admits that the son’s pain 
does not necessarily prove that his father has either no power to help him or no affection for him. Together 
with the overarching correspondence between the God-human relationship and the father-son relationship, it 
follows that the same is true about human tragedy and God’s benevolence and omnipotence. Chartrand thus 
ends up solving his own question (21a-b) by seeing it through the allegory. Put diffrently, the camerlengo 
successfully invites the Swiss guard to take into consideration God’s intention of letting humans learn their 
own lessons through undergoing painful experience, and thereby convinces him that the deity’s benevolence 
and omnipotence are compatible with each other, even given the fact that humans experience a lot of pain 
(21p & r). Through the father-son allegory, the camerlengo thus changes Chartrand’s vantage point from 
which to understand humans’ relationship with God. 
 Second, the camerlengo does not draw the father-son analogy by himself in his own words alone, but 
 The comparison of the God-human relationship with the father-son relationship would also be familiar to most readers of the novel, 47
especially those with a certain familiarity with the Bible, where God is repeatedly described and called as “Father in Heaven” or 
simply “Father” (e.g., Matthew, 6: 9; Luke, 23: 34).
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realizes it step by step through interacting with his interlocutor. After a preliminary question-answer 
sequence (21c-d) and an initial set up of the imaginary scene (21e), the camerlengo asks a couple of 
questions (21f & h), to which Chartrand gives a positive reply (21g & i). Thus he establishes cooperatively 
with Chartrand a bond of love between the guard and his imaginary son, and confirms that he would be 
willing to use the power he has to prevent his child from suffering. Based on the setting, the clergyman 
further asks Chartrand if he would let his son skateboard (21j). Though with a double take, the Swiss guard 
gives a positive answer again (21k), adding that he would give some practical advice (21l). Behind the 
specification lies his supposition that skateboarding may likely cause him injury. The camerlengo then asks 
another question about letting the child skateboard (21m), characterizing it as a summary of what his 
interlocutor has said up to this point, with the initial “So.” Chartrand in reply puts a restriction on how the 
camerlengo takes his prior utterances (21n), separating what he could do to his child and what he would 
actually do to him. Given that his summary is basically accepted, the camerlengo asks still another question 
(21o) to point out the possibility that allowing Chartrand’s son to skateboard might cause him to suffer a 
certain pain. The Swiss guard replies that skinning his knee would lead to learning to be more careful (21p), 
referencing the advice he would give to his son (21l). Then again, as in (21m), the camerlengo asks a 
summarizing question about Chartrand’s attitude to his son’s skateboarding (21q). Chartrand readily accepts 
it (21r) and makes a complementary comment (21s). At this point, he evaluates pain positively in regard to 
the process of learning/growing up in general, although it was the very cause of his confusion (cf. (21a & b)). 
Thus, Chartrand ends up dissolving his own doubt, in the lead of the allegorical interrogation by the 
camerlengo. To put it differently, he was guided by the clergyman to a new understanding of the 
contradiction between God’s omnipotence and benevolence, and as a result to understand that they are 
compatible with each other. In this way, the camerlengo incrementally makes his interlocutor understand the 
topic at hand from a new perspective through asking him a series of questions and summing up his answers, 
i.e., through inviting him to shaping the allegorical interaction. 
 Third, the camerlengo’s wording also plays a crucial role in persuading his interlocutor through the 
allegory-shaping utterances (questions and summaries). Most importantly, he employs the three key concepts 
in Chartrand’s doubt in his utterances. He constructs the first question (21f) with love, which serves to create 
an intimate relationship between Chartrand and his imaginary son with the bond of love. Also, he shapes the 
second question (21h) with power and pain, which attributes watchful attitude to Chartrand as an affectionate 
father to his immature child. In addition, the camerlengo asks him if he would do “everything” to prevent his 
child from suffering. This tacitly presupposes that he could do everything, in other words that he is powerful 
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enough to protect his child. Since a father is normally expected to love his child and do what he can to 
prevent him from suffering, Chartrand has no other option but gives a positive reply to the questions (21h). 
The father-son relationship constructed through the talk-exchange up to this point clearly suggests the basic 
relation between the deity and humans as typically described in the Bible. That is to say, Chartrand is 
positioned as a counterpart of God in the backdrop of the allegorical matching. On this foundation, the 
camerlengo proceeds to “skateboarding” (21j). The question also shows preference for a positive answer, 
because it is unlikely to lead to deadly consequences and hence it would usually be hard for a father to find a 
reasonable reason to forbid his child to enjoy such an activity. As a consequence, Chartrand cannot help but 
confirm that he would let his son skateboard (21k), only with some cautious advice (21l). In this regard, 
“skinn[ing] his knee” is a functional choice as possible injury Chartrand’s child might have. Although the 
scrape works in the allegory as a representative of the cause of pain humans experience, the counterparts are 
logically different on other aspects. In particular, a skinned knee may usually cause only a little bit of pain 
and heal up quite easily, whereas the human tragedy Chartrand mentions in the beginning, namely 
“starvation, war, sickness” will definitely cause a lot of pain and vital consequences. Given this, “skinn[ing] 
his knee” functions to avert his eyes away from those severe situation and put them under the simple term of 
‘pain,’ thereby allegorically characterizing the tragedy in human society nothing more than a little cost to pay 
for learning. Following this, in the end, the three key concepts in Chartrand’s suspicion are referenced again 
when the camerlengo sums up his stance toward his son (“the power,” “your child’s pain” and “your love” in 
(21q)). By so doing, while superficially talking only about a father-son relationship, the clergyman lexically 
connects what Chartrand has said about how he would treat his child with his doubt to God’s benevolence 
and omnipotence. Here, he uses the term choose. It serves to confirm that letting his son make mistakes, even 
with the power to protect him, is Chartrand’s intentional choice. In addition, he characterizes the choice as an 
act for the sake of his love to him (“choose to show your love”). Here, the camerlengo indicates that a son’s 
pain is the result of his father’s choice and therefore compatible with being both powerful and affectionate, 
which provides an allegorical claim that humans are let suffer by the omnipotent and benevolent God. In this 
way, the camerlengo equips his utterances with devices that serve for persuading Chartrand through the 
allegorical talk-exchange. 
 So far, we have examined how speakers invite their interlocutors in the realization of allegorical talk. 
This may be accomplished by asking questions, but it is not the only option. Questions require the 
interlocutor to answer as the second part of a Q-A adjacency pair (Levinson, 1983: 303). This makes it easy 
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for the listener to participate in producing allegorical utterances.  From a rhetorical point of view, questions 48
represent an effective strategy in that the interlocutor can be held partly responsible for any allegorical talk 
that may ensue. This is only possible in contexts where participants are taking turns. It is therefore not 
surprising that simple exchanges are excellent places to look for allegorical talk. 
3.2.3 The Relation between the Two Directions 
 This section has observed how the rhetorical strategy of allegory can be deployed in a conversational 
talk-exchange. It turns out that there are two general directions in which this type of allegorical talk is 
produced. In one, the speaker can choose to talk allegorically using his/her own words alone, without asking 
the interlocutor for substantial commitment to it. The method of narrative and the copulative similes or 
metaphors with elaboration that follows are useful in this regard. It is also possible for the speaker to elicit 
words from the interlocutor that can be employed as a resource for drawing allegorical correspondences. In 
this direction, asking questions is a major method for drawing the interlocutor into an allegory construction 
of talk. 
 These two directions can be clearly differentiated in terms of their working mechanisms. They are 
rooted in various aspects of the context in which the speaker employs the strategy: conversational talk-
exchange. This type of discourse has two basic features: (a) it is initiated and maintained by the reciprocal 
interaction between participants (Sacks, Schegloff & Jefferson, 1974); and (b) the course of interaction 
depends on what the speakers say in each turn and how they say it (cf. Johnstone, 2008: 157). Of these, the 
latter (b) is deployed in a monological direction. Because the speaker is allowed to speak freely in each turn, 
even being influenced by the preceding discourse, s/he can choose to build up an utterance with the strategy 
of allegory.  On the other hand, the former aspect of conversation (a) is drawn on in the interactive way. 49
Since the speaker can expect a certain response from the interlocutor in the course of talk-exchange, it is 
possible to invite him/her to contribute to the allegorical construction of talk. The two directions of 
 More accurately speaking, an interrogative utterance constitutes the first part of the question-answer adjacency pair, and hence 48
contextualizes the next turn as relevant to it (Schegloff, 2007: 13-14). This means that the next speaker does not necessarily have to 
answer it. The next speaker can instead choose to refuse to answer or counter-ask a question, for example (cf. ibid: 16-19). 
Nevertheless, a direct answer is normally expected when a question is made.
 The content and composition of utterances are freely chosen not only in conversation but also in any occasion of language use. The 49
freedom therefore pertains to how the other allegorical discourse are realized, and more generally, to the nature of rhetoric. The issue 
of choice of expressions and creativity will be further discussed in the final chapter.
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allegorical construction of talk is thus licensed by the discursive characteristics of conversation in different 
manners. In addition, they also differ as to how they contribute to argumentation/persuasion. In the 
monological direction, it is easy for the speaker to draw exact correspondences as s/he aims. The speaker can 
totally regulate the process of association, as well as the whole argument. The interactive direction has 
stronger argumentative/persuasive force in that in the process of allegorical construction of talk, it utilizes the 
words elicited from the hearer as an (often pivotal) constituents in the whole association (cf. Wonder Woman 
in (20)). It does not mean, however, the speaker can always get the words or responses from the interlocutor 
exactly as s/he attempt. Since the interlocutor’s reply is intrinsically independent of the speaker’s rhetorical 
intention, it is certainly possible that an attempt to draw a specific response may fail, and an elicitation 
failure could possibly lead to a failure in the whole argument — as will be discussed in the next section. The 
two directions in shaping talk allegorically in conversational discourse are thus basically different from each 
other in discursive functioning. 
 On the other hand, the two are not completely disconnected. Rather, they overlap in that a certain 
situation, whether actual or imaginary, is depicted as a foundation of drawing allegorical correspondences. In 
Section 3.2.1, we observed that the situation establishment is achieved in the form of a story. A full-fledged 
story — with a setting and events/actions in it — can be told as an allegorical basis (cf. (11)), and it is also 
possible to draw on the narrative method merely as a resource to establish a situation (cf. (14-15)). The 
establishment of a situation as an allegorical basis is not peculiar to the monological direction. The questions 
the speaker asks in the interactive production of allegorical talk concerns the (often cardinal) components of 
the setting s/he is attempting to create. In (20), Hal’s question about the all-time love of his friend seeks the 
counterpart of Rosemary, the love for his life, in the whole correspondences. In (21), similarly, the sequence 
of the camerlengo’s questions focuses on the attitude and action Chartrand would take to his imaginary eight-
year-old son, which allegorically represents human beings in the relationship with God. Thus, the 
monological and interactional directions are not separate but intersect with each other in that both establish a 
certain situation as an allegorical foundation. 
3.3 Allegory and Interaction 
 An essential feature of allegorical talk is that it is, in any case, a product of joint action between 
interlocutors. In order for a use of the strategy to succeed, not only does the speaker use it, but also the hearer 
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needs to recognize his/her words as allegorical in the way that speaker intends, even when the monological 
direction is taken.  Whereas this works as a constraint for the speaker to talk allegorically, the interactive 50
nature of conversational discourse allows him/her to monitor in the course of interaction whether his/her talk 
fails to gain a proper allegorical understanding by the hearer, and if it does, s/he can correct the 
misunderstanding. Recall the scene from (500) Days of Summer, where Summer insists that she and Tom 
should stop seeing each other, which surprises him: 
(22) (=(19)) 
SUMMER: This can’t be a total surprise. I mean, (a)we’ve been like Sid and Nancy for months. 
TOM: Summer, Sid stabbed Nancy seven times with a kitchen knife. We’ve had some 
disagreements but (b)I hardly think I’m Sid Vicious. 
SUMMER: (c)No. I’m Sid. 
TOM: [Beat] Oh so I’m Nancy? 
[The waitress comes out with the food. TOM and SUMMER stop their discussion until the meal is 
served and the waitress leaves. SUMMER starts to eat.] (Webb, (500) Days of Summer) 
Summer’s initial simile (22a) provides two slots to fill in: Sid and Nancy. Tom associates the former with 
himself and the latter with Summer, with which he disagrees (22b), while her intention is that Sid should be 
seen as Summer, but not Tom (22c). The point is that the manifestation of the misunderstanding and the 
repair of it both take place right in the course of the talk-exchange between the two. Summer noticed that her 
partner fails to get the initial remark as she intended, when he showed disagreement with it (22b), and Tom 
realized his mistake when his girlfriend pointed it out (22c). It is characteristic of conversational discourse 
that the speaker can immediately monitor how his/her words are interpreted by the interlocutor and repair the 
wrong understanding if necessary (Schegloff, 2007: 100ff). In typical written discourse, on the other hand, 
such monitoring is not possible, because the writer is “more detached and impersonal” (Jahandarie, 1999: 
139), and hence does not have an instant way to check if his/her words get across to the reader properly (cf. 
 As is mentioned above (footnote 14), any utterance in conversation intrinsically has an interactive aspect. For more general 50
discussion about the interactional nature of conversation, see Du Bois (2010), Jacobs (1987), Mazeland (2013), Nishizaka (2005a, 
2005b), Schaeffer & Maynard (2005), Schegloff (1996), etc.
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Chafe, 1994: ch.4).  As a consequence, engaging in real-time interaction makes it possible to spot and 51
correct understandings immediately. In this way, the use of the allegorical strategy in conversational talk-
exchange is accomplished through cooperative sense making activities between speaker and hearer. 
 Another consequence of allegorical talk in conversational discourse is that it is open for denial, 
extension, or modification by the interlocutor. The excerpt below is cited from the film, A Dangerous 
Method. Two famous psychologists, Freud and Jung, talks about their analytic method and devastating 
criticisms it has caused: 
(23) JUNG: But, might that [=criticisms to their psychoanalysis] not be caused by your insistence on the 
exclusively sexual interpretation, of the clinical material? 
FREUD: (a)All I’m doing is pointing out what experience indicates to me must be the truth. (b)And I 
can assure you that in a hundred years’ time, our work will still be rejected. (c)Columbus, you 
know, had no idea of what country he’d discovered. (d)Like him, I’m in the dark. (e)All I 
know is I’ve set foot on the shore and the country exists. 
JUNG: (f)I think of you more as Galileo. (g)And your opponents as those who condemned him, 
while refusing to put their eye to his telescope. 
FREUD: (h)In any event, I simply opened a door. (i)It’s for the young men like yourself to walk 
through it. 
JUNG: (j)I’m sure you have many more doors to open for us. (Cronenberg, A Dangerous Method) 
The seminal point in the sequence above is that Freud uses the allegorical strategy in his talk. In reply to 
Jung mentioning the possibility that Freud’s interpretive attitude might be the cause of the criticisms to them, 
the founder of psychoanalysis states that he simply derives the ‘truth’ from the materials based on experience 
(23a), and points out with confidence (cf. “assure”) that the situation will be the same even after as long as 
100 years later (23b). Following this, Freud refers to Columbus, focusing on the well-known fact (cf. “you 
know”) that he believed that he had finally reached India, although in fact he had reached different land 
 This applies to traditional modes of written communication in which the writer and the reader are separate both spacially and 51
temporally such as books and letters. This will require the writer to craft allegorical sentences more carefully than in conversation. 
Meanwhile, in modern electronical media such as e-mail and SMS, interlocutors are able to interact with each other quite as in real-
time conversation, even though they are spacially separate (cf. Maynor, 1994; Miyake, 2005, 2012). This will allow the speaker to 
talk allegorically in more interactive manners.
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(23c).  He then describes himself as being “in the dark” (23d). The initial comparison marker (“Like him”) 52
bases this on the similarity between him and the historical explorer, while leaving it unspecific what exactly 
being in the dark represents, on the other hand. In this similarity framework, he further claims to know that 
he reached “the country” that actually exists (23e). Even though the allegorical counterparts of “the shore” 
and “the country” is unclear, the psychoanalyst obviously maintains that he did find something new that no 
one had never even noticed, whatever it is. The claim is characterized as a mere fact with the verb know, 
which basically requires a factual object clause (cf. Huddleson & Pullum, 2002: 1008-1009). In addition, the 
verb in the formulaic phrase “All I know” suggests his confidence that he has at least discovered something 
new. In short, Freud thus puts forward his opinion about himself as a reasonable analyst while he may not be 
aware of what he has inferred from his materials, based on the allegorical correspondence between himself 
and Columbus. 
 In response to this, Jung provides a different allegorical perspective to see him, though not directly 
denying his allegory. He says Freud is more similar to Galileo than to Columbus (23f), and in the same vein, 
compares his critics with the people against the astronomer (23g). Here, the term opponent manifests his 
view about the hostile attitude of the people who criticizes Freud, and condemn calls to mind his quarrel with 
the Roman Church (cf. Minois, 2011: chs. 3-4). In the comparison, Jung mentions the condemners’ refusal to 
“put their eyes to his telescope” (23g). Note that the personal pronoun his is chosen here. With it, the phrase 
not only points to the fact that they did not literally look through the telescope as a scientific instrument 
Galileo developed (cf. Ito, 2013: ch.1), but also signifies that his condemners refused to observe the stars in 
the same way as he did, which clearly demonstrates that they criticized him and the results of his research 
without even considering his methodology. Simply put, their criticisms were inadequate. Given the 
correspondence between the astronomer and Freud, the claim applies to the psychoanalyst. That is to say, his 
opponents criticizes him without even considering his analytic methodology in a scientifically proper way, 
and therefore their arguments lack reasonable basis. Jung thus portrays the relationship between Freud and 
his opponents in allegorical comparison with the relationship between Galileo and his condemners. 
 The counter-allegory is in turn evaluated by Freud in the next turn (23h). With the phrase “In any 
case,” he affirms it, though only reluctantly in the sense that it does not deny the similarity. In addition, he 
further describes his achievements allegorically with an image of the door. In the literal sense, the door 
works as a kind of barrier for those who want to get to the other side, especially when it is locked, and 
 For the general functions of you know as a discourse marker, see Erman (1987), Holmes (1986), Östman (1981), and Schiffrin 52
(1987: ch.9).
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therefore opening it makes it possible to pass through it. Given this, the door symbolizes a methodological 
obstacle in the field, and hence opening it evokes an image of a breakthrough that can lead to new directions 
of research. The adverb simply signals Freud’s view that what he has done is no more than opening up new 
possibilities in the field of psychology, in accordance with the previous remark (23e). Following this, he 
leaves the task of walking through the door, i.e., developing his methodology and gaining new insights, to 
young researchers including Jung (23i). Through the door image, Freud thus expresses his attitude toward his 
position as a psychoanalyst. 
 His suggestion, however, is not accepted by Jung, drawing on the metaphorical image of the door. The 
young researcher insists with confidence (cf. “I’m sure”) that Freud should open more doors for young 
researchers (23j). In other words, he should continue to show them further directions of analysis. Such an 
extension is possible as a consequence of the fact that it is produced in conversational talk-exchange, as 
described in recent research (e.g., Cameron, 2008, 2010, 2011; Musolff, 2011; Sugimoto, 2014; Sugimoto & 
Nabeshima, 2015; Sugimoto et al., 2017, etc). Seen from a rhetorical perspective, drawing on the 
metaphorical image created by the conversation partner constitutes a kind of argument by quotation 
(Mullholand, 1994: 297-299). Jung borrows the image Freud created and extends it, it is difficult for Freud 53
to deny the extension. His attempt of denial would make him inconsistent, because he is the one who 
launched the metaphor, and there is no sound reason to forbid Jung to employ the same image. He cannot 
deny the young researcher’s quotation of the metaphorical image, because speakers are generally required to 
be consistent in their argumentation (cf. Walton, 1996: 56; Walton et al., 2008: 134). Jung’s request to Freud 
to continue research for young people like him is thus rooted in the basic principle of argumentation as well 
as the reciprocity of conversational interaction. 
 The example above obviously shows how an allegorical remark made by one speaker can be received 
by another in conversational discourse. It is not closed within the turn(s) of the speaker, but rather, once an 
allegorical utterance is produced, it is open for evaluation by the hearer. That is to say, s/he is required to 
show his/her stance on it (acceptance or rejection), if not in an extreme manner. S/he could modify or extend 
the given allegorical talk, or introduce a different allegory on the same topic. How the strategy of allegory 
works in each context, therefore, depends on how the hearer makes a response to it. In this sense, the use of it 
in conversational discourse is necessarily interactional. 
 To summarize, there are two consequences in the use of the rhetorical strategy of allegory in 
 The argument by quotation of the metaphorical image created by the interlocutor can also be characterized as a weak version of 53
what Kozai (2000:180) calls the “argument by drawing the opponent’s claim to absurdity.”
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conversational discourse. Since talk-exchange is intrinsically interactional, an allegorical utterance is 
necessarily evaluated by the other participant(s). It may sometimes be understood and accepted as the 
speaker intends, while it may also be rejected in other cases. On the other hand, the speaker can immediately 
monitor how his/her allegorical talk is received by the interlocutor, and make amendments if necessary, 
exactly through the talk-exchange, which is beneficial for persuasive purposes. In any case, allegorical talk is 
realized on the fundamental mechanisms of conversational talk-exchange in which it is shaped. 
3.4 Conclusion 
 This chapter described how the rhetorical strategy of allegory is utilized in realization of talk in 
conversational discourse, based on fictional dialogues as data. It turned out that the speaker has two general 
directions to follow: (i) to complete an allegorical utterance in his/her own words alone; and (ii) to elicit 
certain responses with which to draw allegorical correspondences. The ways are equivalent in that (a) both 
are rooted in the basic mechanisms of conversation, where participants exchange talk, taking turns, and (b) 
they realize allegorical talk by establishing a certain situation as a basis for the correspondences. 
 The description and analysis contribute to the study of rhetoric in general, in that it focused on the use 
of the strategy in conversational discourse. The traditional rhetorical study has prioritized written texts as a 
central target of investigation. It is inevitable, however, to observe how rhetorical strategies are used between 
two (or more) speakers in order to sufficiently grasp their relationship with argumentation and persuasion, 
acts that intrinsically presuppose and are oriented toward communication with another person. Indeed, it 
must be admitted that the data examined in this study, i.e., dialogues in films and novels, are not 
conversational in the true sense, because novels are obviously a typical example of written genres, and films 
are created based on written scripts. Although these sorts of discourse may not provide ideal data, however, 
this does not mean that they are not conversational at all. As long as characters engage in talk-exchange with 
each other, the scenes are conversational and therefore, analysts can approach the aspect. The insight gained 
in this chapter should therefore be recognized as a first step to understand the functioning and mechanisms of 
allegory in conversational discourse. Though as such, this study is valuable in that it opened up a new field 
of rhetorical research by focusing on the conversational use of the strategy. 
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4. Citing a Conventional Wisdom: Proverbs  54
4.1 Introduction 
 This chapter focuses on the deployment and interpretation of proverbs in conversational discourse. In 
previous studies, several ways of using proverbs have been offered, but there is one kind of proverb usage 
that has gone unnoticed. This chapter refers to it as the ‘receptive use,’ and explores its characteristics from a 
rhetorical point of view. To take a brief grasp of the new usage, let us look at an example. 
 Below is an excerpt taken from Goldfinger, a film in the 007 series. The boss of an underground 
organization, Goldfinger, captures James Bond, a British secret service agent, who infiltrated his syndicate. 
While talking with his right-hand subordinate, Pussy, about the money he and his organization are planning 
to gain, he receives a report that a few of Bond’s associates are maintaining surveillance over them. 
Goldfinger orders her to pretend to be spending some enjoyable time with the spy, in order to send them 
away by showing them as if his infiltration were going fine: 
(24) GOLDFINGER: We were quite right to spare Mr. Bond’s life in Switzerland. If those gentlemen 
are his friends, let us convince them he needs no assistance. For their benefit, Pussy, let’s 
make him as happy as possible. I suggest you change into something more suitable. 
PUSSY: [smiling] Certainly. Business before pleasure. 
[PUSSY stands up to leave. GOLDFINGER chortles.] (Hamilton, Goldfinger) 
Citing the underlined proverb, Pussy indicates that she understood Goldfinger’s instruction. In conversation, 
proverbs can be used in such a receptive way, i.e., to show how the speaker has received the opinion or 
assertion of the interlocutor. 
 The receptive use starkly contrasts with other usage types that have been described in previous studies, 
which all display the speaker’s own perspective on the situation or discursive topic. To reach a fuller 
understanding of proverbs’ functioning in conversation, it is necessary to examine the characteristics of this 
new usage, and its relation to the existent types. The main features of this usage are: (i) that the speaker 
applies a proverb to his/her interlocutor’s utterance/opinion in order to demonstrate how s/he received it; (ii) 
s/he attributes the social authority of the proverb to the utterance/opinion; and (iii) the proverb use is further 
evaluated by the producer of the original utterance/opinion as to whether the speaker’s understanding of it is 
 An earlier version of this chapter were presented in Hirakawa (2017).54
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appropriate. Significantly, it sheds light on the receptive aspect of talk-exchange, in contrast to earlier studies 
focusing almost exclusively on the speaker of the proverb. This clearly illustrates how different ways of 
proverb use reflect different dimensions of conversational discourse, where two or more people interact 
interchangeably in real time on a certain topic in a particular situation. 
 The discussion proceeds as follows. The next section (4.2) reviews previous research on how proverbs 
are used in conversation. Section 4.3 describes the receptive use through detailed data analysis, pointing out 
that the usage type is different from the ones previously illustrated. Section 4.4 shows the relationship 
between the receptive use and the others, presenting a schematic model to characterize all the usage types 
that appear in conversational discourse. Section 4.5 discusses the significance of the receptive use to 
paremiology (the study of proverbs) and the study of rhetoric in general. The final section sums up the whole 
analysis and discussion, and provides future prospects. 
4.2 Literature Review 
 Before examining the receptive use, this section reviews what is known about the use of proverbs in 
conversational discourse. Overall, proverbs pertain both to the expression of the speaker’s perspective on the 
situation or the discursive topic, and to the organization of the talk-exchange the speaker is engaging in. 
Focusing on the former aspect, Sections 4.2.2 and 4.2.3 illustrate two existing usage types in order to 
demonstrate that the receptive type does not belong to either of them. In the process, it is also discussed what 
allows for those ways of proverb use, as a preparation for clarifying the relationship between the receptive 
use and the other two. The final section shows, with the focus on the latter of the two aspects, that the 
receptive use leads to the same discursive structure. 
4.2.1 Affirmation with Proverbs 
 The first class of proverb use in conversational discourse is what Norrick (1985: ch.2) calls “direct 
application.” It refers to cases where the speaker applies a proverb to the situation at hand, without putting an 
emphasis on evaluating it (Norrick, 1985: 16). By quoting a proverb without evaluative tone, the speaker 
points out that the specific situation s/he is facing corresponds exactly to the proverb’s “base meaning” 
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(Kirshenblatt-Gimblet, 1973/1981: 119). Below is an example that Norrick (1985: 17) cites from Hain (1951: 
52):  55
(25) Das Bauernmädchen M. tritt in das Haus der Freundin, wo gerade einige Mädchen zusammensitzen 
und allerlei Dorfneuigkeiten austauschen. Soeben hat man von M.’s Liebschaft erzählt und 
empfängt nun die Ahnungslose mit schallendem Gelächter. Auf ihre Frage tönt es ihr mehrstimmig 
entgegen: Wammer vom Hoas schwätzt, kimmt er aus de Hegge. (Wenn man vom Hasen Schwätzt, 
kommt er aus der Hecke.) (Hain, 1951: 52) 
[Farm girl M. enters the home of a girl-friend, where several girls are sitting together exchanging 
the newest gossip from the village. They had just been talking about M.’s current liaison and now 
greet her with resounding laughter. Her question is answered in chorus with: Speak of the hare and 
he comes out of the hedge.] (Norrick, 1985: 17) 
The underlined proverb corresponds to the English proverb, Speak of the devil, and he will/shall appear 
(Norrick, 1985: 17; Takeda, 1992a: 52). “speak of the devil” corresponds to the girls’ talk about M, and “he 
comes out of the hedge” to her appearance on the spot, with “and” signifying the temporal order between the 
two events. Their proverbial utterance shows that their laughter was triggered by the emergence of a situation 
to which the proverb is typically applicable. That is, they laughed because M showed up exactly while they 
were talking about her. In the process, the proverb is referenced as a framework to construe the situation that 
emerged in front of the speakers. The girls recognized — maybe coincidentally — the appearance of M 
through the same proverb as a cognitive lens, and that is why they were able to cite it in chorus. The focus is 
thus on affirming the proverb’s applicability to the situation at hand. Given this, let us call this type of 
proverbial utterance the “affirmative use.” 
 The applicability of proverbs in general is rooted in their status as a kind of resource to classify 
situations. The essence of proverbs is that they “serve to interpret situations that are reasonably complex, 
equivocal, and either adversarial or potentially so, resolving their ambiguities by classifying them as being of 
a certain sort. Proverbs, thus, are used to disambiguate complex situations and events” (Lieber, 1994: 101). 
 Italicization in the German data originates in Hain (1951), while the English translation is by Norrick (1985). With the help of the 55
translation, however, Norrick’s illustration of the usage types is in fact quite difficult to understand. This is because he cites 
conversational data in German with his English translation, without providing any further contextual information or supplementary 
comments on the proverbs in the data. The following review and discussion on Norrick’s classification, therefore, inevitably depends 
on my own interpretation of the data and his brief commentary.
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In this sense, they are typological “strategies for dealing with situations” (Burke, 1973: 296-297; emphasis 
original).  This works as the foundation for their applicability to new situations. It allows for the 56
characterization of a particular situation as one of many other cases of the same kind, rather than as a unique, 
one-time-only event. By applying a proverb to the situation in front of him/her, therefore, the speaker can 
describe it as “one of many other cases under a more general principle” (Sato, 1987: 238). The affirmative 
use is a way to typologically recognize and characterize the situation with proverbs. 
4.2.2 Assertion with Proverbs 
 The general applicability of proverbs can also be deployed for assertion with various degrees of 
persuasive force. This usage type includes, first of all, what Norrick calls “evaluative comment,” cases where 
proverbs are applied to the situation or the interlocutor’s remark in order to display the speaker’s evaluation 
(Norrick, 1985: 13). The following is an example of this usage that Norrick (1985: 14-15) cites from Hain 
(1951: 32-33): 
(26) Zwei ältere Bäuerinnen unterhalten sich über den Junglehrer des Dorfes, seine Leistung in der 
Schule und sein karges Gehalt. Besonders Frau X. weiß Bescheid, sie kennt ihn und seine 
bescheidenen Verhältnisse. X.: Er ess hoard gescheit! (Er ist sehr klug.) K. lauscht zunächst 
nachdenklich und sagt dann langsam: Aich saan als, wer de Hoawwern vvedint hot, kritt en näid. 
(Ich sage immer, wer den Hafer verdient hat, kriegt ihn nicht.) Darauf X. lebhaft zustimmend: Joa, 
so ess! Das Thema ist damit endgültig abgeschlossen, der Einzelfall ist ins Allgemeine erhoben. 
(Hain, 1951: 32-33) 
[Two elderly farm women are talking about the new teacher in the village, what he has 
accomplished in the school and his meager wages. Especially Mrs. X. is informed. She knows him 
and is familiar with his modest living conditions. X.: He’s very bright! K. listens at first reflecting 
and then says slowly: I always say, he who earns the oats doesn’t get them. X. agrees energetically: 
Yeh, that’s right! The topic is thus closed for good, the individual case has been raised to the 
general level.] (Norrick, 1985: 14-15) 
 The proverbs’ status as a framework for typological recognition of situations is also discussed by Goodwin & Wenzel (1981: 142), 56
Seitel (1981: 130) and Takeda (1992b: 213).
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The underlined proverb seems to mean that working harder may not necessarily lead to a wealthier life. In 
this interpretation, “he who earns the oats” corresponds to the new teacher in the village, and “doesn’t get 
them” to K’s comment that he receives a pitiful salary in spite of his brilliant academic career. By using the 
proverb, “K. makes an evaluative comment with didactic tone on the topic of conversation” (Norrick, 1985: 
15). Proverbs can thus allow the speaker to make an evaluation. 
 In addition, it is also possible to use proverbs as a support for an argument. This sort of proverb use is 
one sub-type of Norrick’s “evaluative argument.” Look at the example Norrick (1985: 16) cites from Hain 
(1951: 48): 
(27) Familienehre verteidigt die alte Großmutter D., die von der “Mußheirat” eines Mädchens erzählt, 
dessen Eltern den Schwiegersohn ablehnen. Däi Aale schenn. Däi wenn den ned huu. Mr derf sech 
näidd uffs Maul haje. Des batt naud. Bei uns woar’s aach suu. (Die Alten schimpfen. Die wollen 
den nicht haben. Man darf sich nicht selbst aufs Maul schlagen. Das nützt nichts. Bei uns war’s 
auch so.) (Hain, 1951: 48) 
[Old grandmother D. defends the honor of the family; she is talking about the “shotgun wedding” 
of a girl whose parents reject the son-in-law. The parents grumble. They don’t want to have him. 
You shouldn’t hit yourself in the mouth. That doesn’t help. The same thing happened to us.] 
(Norrick, 1985: 16) 
The underlined proverb seems to mean that you should avoid doing things that may be likely to bring about 
negative results to yourself. In this interpretation, “You” corresponds to the bride’s parents who rejects the 
bridegroom, and “shouldn’t hit yourself in the mouth” to the speaker’s claim that the denial will not bring 
peaceful results to them, respectively. Based on the allegorical correspondences, D employs it as a support 
for her claim that if the pregnant girl’s parents refuse to welcome him into their family, it will not help them 
lead a happy life. Proverbs can thus be employed to back up the speaker’s opinion, displaying his/her stance. 
 Moreover, proverbs are available for putting forward an opinion, as well as just a support for an 
opinion. Consider (28) below, an excerpt from the film Some Kind of Wonderful. Keith wants to get close to 
Amanda, the most popular girl at his high school, and talks to Watts, his closest friend, about his affection for 
her. She states that it is impossible for him to have such a relationship. In fact, Watts is in love with Keith, 
but he does not even imagine her feeling. Against Keith claiming that Watts would never know how he feels 
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about Amanda, she argues back that she does: 
(28) WATTS: I know how you feel. 
KEITH: Oh, you do, really? You’ve been in love before? 
WATTS: There’s a lot of things you don’t know about me. 
KEITH: Really? (a)Who have you ever been in love with? 
WATTS: (b)Huh! You want to abuse yourself, be my guest. 
KEITH: Hey, Watts, (c)nothing ventured, nothing gained, right? 
WATTS: Keith, (d)once a fool, always a fool, right? (Deutch, Some Kind of Wonderful) 
Keith tries to find Watts’ past love (28a), but she warns that it will hurt him (28b). Still attempting to make 
her confess the guy, he cites a proverb (28c). In reply, Watts also employs another proverb to counter-argue 
him (28d). 
 Keith’s proverb is aimed at persuasion of Watts, in which “nothing ventured” corresponds to avoiding 
the risk that she warns he has to take to hear her romantic experience, and “nothing gained” to the failure to 
know the name of the guy in question. That is, his proverbial remark can be paraphrased like this: if he 
avoids taking the risk of getting hurt as Watts warns, he cannot make her speak. Based on the allegorical 
matching, Keith claims to be willing to know her past love and ready to get hurt as a consequence. To 
counter-argue, Watts employs another proverb, which is allegorical in two ways. First, “once a fool” 
corresponds to her confession of her romantic experience (and its results), and “always a fool” to the future 
conditions it will likely produce. In addition, the first half represents Keith’s taking the risk of getting hurt, 
and the second stands for her opinion that the wound will not heal quite long. On this doubly-allegorical 
foundation, she resists changing her mind, suggesting that it is also better for him that she keeps silent.  57
Thus, the two proverbs (28c & d) crucially contributes to claim-making itself, rather than just supporting 
each speaker’s opinion. Like this, proverbs are available as a persuasive device. 
 The three examples above are different in how forcefully the speaker attempts to make the interlocutor 
accept his/her perspective by using proverbs. In (26), the proverb merely displays K’s stance, with little or 
almost no persuasive force. In (27), the proverb is used to support D’s opinion, as a part of the whole 
argument. In (28), each proverb is cited in conflict to put forward the speaker’s claim, in an attempt to 
 Together her previous remark (12b), Watts’ proverb (12d) serves not only to make a claim to her immediate interlocutor, but also to 57
provide the audience with an interpretive cue to notice that she is teasing him about his insensitivity to her feeling, suggesting that “a 
fool” in fact refers to Keith.
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persuade the opponent to change his/her mind and accept the speaker’s opinion. This does not mean, 
however, that they should be recognized as distinct usage types. Rather, all of them can be grouped in the 
same group because in all of them, proverbs equivalently serve to display the speaker’s perspective (i.e., 
stance, evaluation, or opinion) on the situation or discursive topic. The apparent difference between them can 
be seen as a matter of degree: how strong persuasive force proverbs carry. In the most persuasive cases, 
proverbs forcefully contribute to the persuasion of the hearer to accept the speaker’s view, while in less 
persuasive contexts, they function as an evaluative frame of reference to express the speaker’s stance. Given 
the same basic function, this study categorizes all such uses as a single usage type, the “assertive use.” 
 The foundation of the assertive use resides in intimate relationship between proverbs and social 
authority. Proverbs are unlike simple constatives in that their utterances invoke an authority beyond that of 
individual speakers (Cram, 1994: 86). As noted above, in general, proverbs are applicable to various 
situations as a frame of reference through which to typologically recognize and characterize them, based on 
the presupposition that similar situations have occurred countless times before. They are not just a cognitive 
lens, however. As “traditional item[s] of the folklore of the community” (Norrick, 1985: 149), they 
encapsulate traditional wisdom to deal with typological situations that regularly occur (Burke, 1973: 
296-297; Takeda, 1992a: ch.2). More generally, proverbs recommend accepting what happened with 
resignation, claiming “That’s just the way things are, and that’s all there is to it” (Cram, 1994: 90; also cf. 
Seto, 1988: 115-120). Simply put, proverbs “serve as secular past precedents for present action” (Arewa & 
Dundes, 1964: 71).  As such, proverbs are assumed to “carry the force of time-tested wisdom, and the 58
speaker can draw on this traditional authority” (Norrick, 1994: 149), and treated as permanent truisms in 
actual use (Barajas, 2010: 104; Sacks, 1992: 110; Yankah, 1994: 3386). Citing proverbs therefore allows the 
speaker to “add authority and credibility to his [/her] utterance by identifying himself [/herself] with 
traditional wisdom, beliefs and prejudices of the community at large” (Norrick, 1985: 28), thereby placing 
him/her in “a one-up position vis-à-vis his [/her] hearer” as a consequence (Norrick, 1994: 150). The 
assertive use of proverbs is, therefore, a way of showing the speaker’s perspective on the situation on the 
basis of their social authority.  59
 One significant consequence of the authoritative character of proverbs is that they are fundamentally 
 This is why the use of proverbs counts as the argument by precedent, or argumentum ad verecundiam (Lanham, 1991: 21).58
 Note, however, that “the logic or message in the speaker’s viewpoint and that in the proverb may not necessarily be identical, but 59
the speaker here exploits the traditionality of the proverb, its flexibility and metaphorical character; he in fact exploits the wisdom of 
many to assert his personal wit” (Yankah, 1994: 133).
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irresistible.  Since proverbs are recognized as carrying “‘anyone’s knowledge,’ part of the stock of ordinary 60
taken-for-granted common sense,” to question or argue against them is “to run the risk of challenging the 
shared cultural membership” (Kitzinger, 2000: 128; also cf. Mullholland, 1994: 287). For example, consider 
the following excerpt from (500) Days of Summer. In the scene, McKenzie and Paul attempt to soothe their 
best friend, Tom, when they heard from him that his girlfriend wanted to leave him: 
(29) McKENZIE: So, you’ll meet somebody new. Point is, you’re the best guy I know. You’ll get over 
her. 
PAUL: (a)I think it’s kind of like how they say. It is uh, (b)there’s plenty of other fish in the sea. 
TOM: (c)No. 
PAUL: (d)They say that. 
TOM: (e)Well, they’re lying. I don’t want to get over her. I want to get her back. 
(Webb, (500) Days of Summer) 
In the process of soothing Tom, Paul cites a proverb (29b), in which “fish” represents women and “the sea” 
symbolizes the society or the world at large. Based on the matching, he points out that his girlfriend is not the 
only woman in the world with whom Tom could have a relationship. Notice that he prefaces the proverb with 
the phrase “how they say” (29a), attributing the statement to general public.  That is, Paul is attempting to 61
convince his friend that it is possible for him to start a new relationship with another woman, with the 
authoritative support of the proverb. His attempt does not succeed, however: Tom simply rejects his 
proverbial assertion (29c). Paul then emphasizes the proverb’s trueness, showing it is what ‘they’ say but not 
his personal, idiosyncratic opinion, and that it is a general statement in the present tense (29d). Given this, 
however, Tom still does not accept the proverbial wisdom, insisting that it is a lie (29e), and tacitly restrain 
himself from committing to the time-tested knowledge. Although Paul’s assertion with the proverb might 
seem to be resisted, Tom’s insistence does not count as a substantial resistance against it. What Tom does in 
the sequence above is nothing more than stating that the proverb tells a lie. He denies the trustworthiness of 
the statement, but does not provide support for the negative claim. Tom’s attempt to resist Paul’s proverb is, 
therefore, not successful. It is important to notice at this point that Tom’s failure is inevitable. In order to 
 Resisting proverbs is not impossible in any way, however. One, or perhaps the only, way is to employ another, as in (28).60
 Other discourse markers for proverb use include ‘they say’ ‘as the saying goes’ ‘it is said’ ‘you know’ etc. (Takeda, 1999a; Yankah, 61
1994a: 3388).
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deny the proverbial assertion, it is required to prove that Tom cannot fall in love with any other women in the 
world, providing compelling reasons for each woman. This is impossible, of course.The general assumption 
that proverbs encapsulate true knowledge thus makes it impossible to resist assertion supported with them. 
4.2.3 Proverb Use and Discursive Structure 
 In conversation, proverbs can be utilized to organize talk-exchange. In the following instance from 
Hain (1951: 33, (2), b) quoted in Norrick (1985: 15), a proverb is cited to conclude a story: 
(30) Die etwa fünfzigjährige Kleinbäuerin B. erzählte, wie sie viel Unglück mit den Kühen hatte. Als 
aber im letzten Jahr wiederum eine verkalbte, wurden alle Tiere versichert. Sie schloß ihre erregte 
Erzählung ruhig, fast resigniert: Wann’s Kend gehowwe ess, gitt’s Gevadderlaut! (Wenn das Kind 
aus der Taufe gehoben ist, gibt’s Gevatterleute.) (Hain, 1951: 33, (2), b) 
[The approximately fifty year old farm woman B. was talking about the trouble she had had with 
her cows. But when last year another lost its calf, she had had all the cattle insured. She ended her 
narrative quietly, almost resignedly: Once the child’s been baptized there are godparents!] 
(Norrick, 1985: 15) 
The underlined proverb seems to mean that anything signals the cause of it. In this understanding, “the 
child’s been baptized” corresponds to the fact that B insured all her cattle, and “there are godparents” to the 
trouble she had faced before that, respectively. Given the allegorical matching, B seems to illustrate that she 
had insurance on her cattle exactly because she had trouble that caused her to make such a decision, just as a 
child has a baptized name exactly because s/he has godparents. By quoting the proverb at the end of the 
story-telling, B not only evaluates her experience but also close the narration up to the point. Proverb use 
thus contributes to sum up a narrative. 
 More generally, proverbs as well as idiomatic expressions in general are cited for closing current topic 
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and move to a next one.  Consider the example below:  62 63
(31) 01 P: .hhh But I think it’ll iron itself out, 
02 Q: I sure hope [so. 
03 P: [I’ll see you Tuesday. (Drew & Holt, 1988: 506) 
In the first line, P summarizes what she has narrated so far by using a figurative expression, “it’ll iron itself 
out” (“it” refers to P’s trouble), evaluating the recounted event. Her evaluative summary is accepted by by Q 
(line 02). The agreement with the evaluation/summary suggests that she has nothing to offer to the topic 
(Drew &Holt, 1998:505). Given this, P closes the topic (i.e., the trouble she has talked about up to this point) 
and turn the interaction to the end (line 03). Idiomatic expressions including proverbs, thus, are available for 
topic closure and transition (Drew & Holt, 1998: 502). 
 In general, the closure and transition of topics is done in the following procedure: 
(32) 1→ Speaker A:  Figurative summary 
2→ Speaker B:  Agreement (or other expression of contiguity) 
3→ Speaker A:  Agreement/confirmation 
4→ Speaker A/B: Introduces next topic (Drew & Holt, 1998: 506) 
(32) schematically represents how interaction proceeds when an idiom or proverb is used. Speaker A uses an 
idiomatic phrase as an evaluative summary (arrow 1), detaching from the specific details of the topic (Drew 
& Holt, 1998: 503-504). B’s agreement with A’s assessment (arrow 2) does not develop the prior talk. This, 
together with A’s confirmation, draws the topic to a conclusion. The prior topic is thus left, and then either 
speakers can introduce a new one (arrow 4).  64
 It might seem unreasonable to treat proverbs and idioms in the same manner. Indeed, Drew & Holt (1998) focus on idiomatic, 62
figurative expressions in general. Their description, however, naturally applies to proverbs. First of all, they categorize proverbs as a 
kind of figurative expressions (Drew & Holt, 1988: 398; Drew & Holt, 1998: 497). In addition, proverbs and idioms are equivalent in 
that both of them are figurative, evaluative, and generic in meaning (Takeda, 1999b: 24). They can be employed as a resource to 
detach from specific details of talk, and display assessment to them. Given these commonalities, their analysis can be extended to 
proverbs.
 In (3), “.h” represents inhalations, underlining (I) indicates emphasis, a comma (,) symbolizes a continuing intonation, not 63
necessarily between clauses of sentences, a period (.) indicates a stopping fall in tone, not necessarily the end of a sentence, and a 
left-hand bracket ([) marks the point at which an ongoing utterance is joined by another (Atkinson & Heritage, 1984: ix-xvi).
 It is possible for Speaker A to confirm B’s agreement (arrow 3) by moving to a next topic, as P does in (31).64
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 The sequence above illustrates how participants organize conversation through interaction when an 
idiom or proverb is introduced in ongoing discourse. The use of these devices, though itself is the speaker’s 
act of summarizing current topic, leads the talk-exchange in a certain direction, involving all the participants. 
This does not mean, however, that the use of idiomatic phrases always contributes to topic closure/transition. 
Because conversation develops and proceeds based on the participants’ actions on the spot due to its 
interactive nature (Schegloff, 2007, 2015), one of the participants may change the course of talk even when 
an idiom or proverb is provided. For instance, P could have continued to stick to the same topic after line 03, 
after Q’s agreement to her assessment in line 02 in (31). In addition, the use of idioms or proverbs may fail to 
lead current topic to the end, due to disagreement between the interlocutors (Drew & Holt, 1998: 510-518). 
The formulation above captures a standard procedure for topic closure/transition by using figurative 
expressions (Drew & Holt, 1998: 506). On the other hand, (32) can also be recognized as a structure that 
appears in discourse as a result of following the basic procedure. The schemata can thus be doubly 
characterized as a procedure that brings about a certain structure in discourse, and as the structure that 
emerge from the procedure.  65
 Topic closure/transition with proverbs, however, should not be recognized as a distinct usage type 
from the affirmative use and the assertive use. Rather, the sequence emerges as a consequence of the use of 
the device carrying social wisdom. In the figurative summary of current topic with proverbs (arrow 1 in 
(32)), is not neutral but evaluative, displaying the speaker’s perspective on the subject. In (31), for instance, 
P makes a prediction — her opinion about what things will go — with an idiomatic summary (“it’ll iron 
itself out”). That is to say, topic summarization is achieved through assertion. Put differently, if the speaker 
cites a proverb to make an assertion or to affirm the situation at hand, it may lead ongoing topic to an end. In 
fact, in (25), the girls’ collaborative proverb answers M.’s question about their laughter, affirming its 
applicability. Their utterance shapes the second pair part of the Q-A adjacency pair, which seems to conclude 
the topic, i.e., the reason why they laughed on the appearance of M. In (28), an argumentative exchange of 
proverbs leads the conflict to an end.  Since proverbs are recognized as permanent truism as noted in the 66
previous section, both affirmation and assertion with the proverb requires the hearer to agree with it. An 
 This does not mean, however, conversation is the only context in which proverb use is connected to discursive structure. According 65
to Takeda (1999b), proverbs appear in the structural position where current topic is summarized in the readers’ column in the 
newspaper and TV interviews.
 This does not mean that the use of the proverbs resolved the disagreement between the interlocutors (Keith and Watts). In addition, 66
the proverbs used here (nothing ventured, nothing gained and once a fool, always a fool) are not conflicting or contradictory in 
themselves. They are deployed to advance opposing views in this specific discourse. For more detailed analysis of the relationship 
between proverbs, see Yankah (1994).
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agreement by the hearer gives the topic a shared evaluation, and thereby leads it to a conclusion. The closure 
and transition of current topic is thus a consequence of the affirmative and assertive uses of proverbs, rather 
than a different way of proverb use. 
 This also applies to the receptive use of proverbs. That is, using proverbs to receive the interlocutor’s 
opinion serves to initiate the topic closure/transition sequence as described in Drew & Holt (1988, 1998). 
Recall (24) in the previous section: 
(33) (=(24)) 
GOLDFINGER: We were quite right to spare Mr. Bond’s life in Switzerland. If those gentlemen 
are his friends, let us convince them he needs no assistance. For their benefit, Pussy, let’s 
make him as happy as possible. I suggest you change into something more suitable. 
PUSSY: Certainly. (a)Business before Pleasure. 
[PUSSY stands up to leave. (b)GOLDFINGER chortles.] (Hamilton, Goldfinger) 
Pussy’s proverbial utterance (33a) is located in the position at the end of a topic (and a scene). By 
summarizing Goldfinger’s order with the proverb, she shows that she has understood his intention, i.e., she 
agrees to act upon the command. Her reaction provokes him to chortle (33b), which indicates that he is 
satisfied with her acknowledgment. The two characters thus agree on what she should do, thereby closing the 
ongoing talk. In this way, the receptive use of proverbs contributes to closure and transition of current topic, 
and therefore this new usage type is not different from other ones in terms of the organization of interaction 
and the resultant discourse structure. Given this, the following discussion compares the receptive use with 
the affirmative use and the assertive use. 
4.3 Receptive Use: A New Usage Type 
 So far, we have seen that the use of proverbs in conversational discourse is categorized into two 
different types. By citing them, the speaker can frame the situation at hand into a certain typology (the 
affirmative use), or assess the situation with more or less persuasive force toward the hearer through the 
framing (the assertive use). In both ways, proverbs contribute to advance the speaker’s own view on the 
situation s/he is facing. Given this, they are characterizable as ‘subjective’ usage types. 
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 Neither of the subjective types does not include examples like (33), where the speaker shows how s/he 
understood the interlocutor’s utterance. In the affirmative use, proverbs are deployed as a cognitive frame 
through which to characterize the situation typologically, affirming their applicability. Pussy, however, 
clearly does not aim to describe Goldfinger’s order with the proverb, or point out that the event matches its 
base meaning. Rather, she accepts it with the proverb. Her utterance is therefore different from the 
affirmative use. In addition, it is also distinguished from the assertive use, where proverbs are employed to 
advance the speaker’s opinion on the situation, leading the hearer to accept it, especially for persuasive 
purposes. In (33), Pussy does not show her view. In the first place, she does not evaluate Goldfinger’s 
command from her own point of view. Hence, her utterance in question is not classified as an assertive use. 
The proverb use in (33), an example of the receptive use, is thus different from both the affirmative and 
assertive uses. 
 Given this, a more detailed description is necessary in order to characterize this new usage type. This 
section then analyze it in detail, describing three aspects of it. In addition, it is also discussed what allows for 
this way of proverb use. 
4.3.1 Demonstration of Understanding 
 Let us begin our analysis by focusing on the instance from Goldfinger again. In the scene, while 
Goldfinger is talking with Pussy about the money they are planning to get, he receives a report that they are 
still under surveillance by Bond’s colleagues. To send them away, Goldfinger orders Pussy to pretend as if 
Bond’s infiltration has been successful: 
(34) (=(24) & (33)) 
GOLDFINGER: We were quite right to spare Mr. Bond’s life in Switzerland. If those gentlemen 
are his friends, let us convince them he needs no assistance. For their benefit, Pussy, let’s 
make him as happy as possible. I suggest you change into something more suitable. 
PUSSY: (a)Certainly. (b)Business before Pleasure. 
[PUSSY stands up to leave. GOLDFINGER chortles.] (Hamilton, Goldfinger) 
Given Goldfinger’s order, Pussy shows that she has understood it in a quick reply (34), and quotes a proverb 
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(34b). Seeing her going to prepare for the camouflage, Goldfinger chortles. 
 The point in the example is that Pussy cites the proverb to trace Goldfinger’s intention. In (34b), 
“business” corresponds to the camouflage, and “pleasure” to the money they are planning to eventually 
obtain. The conjunction “before” matches the priority of the disguise to their success. This apparently 
accords with what Goldfinger has just told her: to deceive the agents into believing that Bond’s espionage is 
proceeding properly, in order to prevent them from disturbing their plan for a big money. The proverb (34b) 
does not represent the speaker’s perspective, but the interlocutor’s. In short, Pussy attributes the proverb 
along with the persuasive force it carries to Goldfinger. By putting the proverb into his mouth, Pussy 
“demonstrates” (Sacks, 1992, vol. 2: 141-142) that she has properly understood Goldfinger’s intention. The 
receptive use is thus the way of attributing a proverb to the interlocutor to demonstrate how the speaker has 
accepted what s/he said.  67
 The receptive use of proverbs is different from receiving the interlocutor’s opinion in other ways. 
Recall that proverbs — or the wisdom encapsulated in them — are accepted and guaranteed by a countless 
number of people, and socially authorized as a result (cf. sec.4.2.2). By attributing a proverb to the 
interlocutor, therefore, the speaker not only demonstrates how s/he understood his/her view, but at the same 
time acknowledges that it is compatible with traditional wisdom. Put differently, the proverb’s authority is 
granted to the interlocutor. This becomes clear when it is compared with simple replies. Suppose that Pussy 
only said “Certainly” in response to Goldfinger’s command. Although it also makes clear that she accepted 
the order, it would neither display how she understood it nor authorize it in any way. It would be just a claim 
of understanding, but not a demonstration of it. The demonstration of understanding through the receptive 
use of proverbs thus characteristically attributes their social authority to the interlocutor. 
 As such, this usage type contrasts with the subjective uses in terms of management of proverbial 
authority. In the gradient cases from the assertive use to the affirmative use, the speaker subjectively deploys 
a proverb to represent his/her own perspective, attributing the proverb’s authority to him/herself as a basis of 
his/her assessment. Such licensing with a proverb works most obviously when the speaker cites proverbs for 
persuasive purposes: it contributes to make the interlocutor accept his/her opinion. The authority of proverbs 
functions as a foundation for the speaker’s claim-making. In the receptive use, in contrast, the speaker cites 
proverbs to capture the interlocutor’s perspective, not to advance his/her own. By so doing, s/he 
demonstrates that s/he has willingly accepted his/her opinion, adding that it is also compatible with the 
 It is significant to distinguish between “demonstration” and “claim” of understanding (Sacks, 1992, vol. 2: 141-142; also cf. 67
Heritage, 2007: 255), in relation to the quality of our data. For further discussion, cf. sec.4.
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traditional wisdom carried by the proverb. The authority of proverbs works as a symbol of agreement. The 
receptive use of proverbs is thus clearly different from the subjective uses in that their authority is attached to 
the interlocutor. 
4.3.2 Evaluation by the Interlocutor 
 As we saw in (34), the receptive use is a way to demonstrate how the speaker understood the 
interlocutor’s utterance. It is important to note in this regard that what is demonstrated with proverb use is 
nothing more than the speaker’s way of understanding. That is to say, his/her understanding may not be 
correct, from the point of view of the interlocutor. 
 Consider the following scene from the movie It’s a Wonderful Life. In it, George is in love with Mary, 
but hesitates to pursue her in the belief that she prefers Sam to himself. Being aware of this, his mother (Mrs. 
Bailey) implies that Mary adores George, not Sam: 
(35) MRS. BAILEY: Well, I’ve got eyes, haven’t I? Why, (a)she lights up like a firefly whenever you’re 
around. 
GEORGE: Oh... 
MRS. BAILEY: And besides, (b)Sam Wainwright’s away in New York, and you’re here in Bedford 
Falls. 
GEORGE: And (c)all’s fair in love and war? 
MRS. BAILEY: [primly] (d)I don’t know about war. 
GEORGE: (e)[laughs] Mother, you know, I can see right through you. To right back to your back 
collar button. Trying to get rid of me, huh? 
MRS. BAILEY: Uh-huh. 
[They kiss. MRS. BAILEY puts GEORGE’s hat on his head.] (Capra, It’s a Wonderful Life!) 
Mrs. Bailey explains why she thinks that Mary is in love with George (35a & b). To her estimation, George 
responds with a proverb (35c), linking it to her utterance with the conjunction “And” and in a rising 
intonation. Designing his utterance in this way, he attempts to confirm his mother’s intention. That is to say, 
he invites her to judge whether it is acceptable for her to understand her opinion according to the proverb. 
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The reason for the invitation is that Georges is not so much confident of the appropriateness of his 
interpretation. If he were sure of it, such an attempt for confirmation would not be necessary. What is 
demonstrated in the receptive use of proverbs is thus nothing more than the speaker’s own understanding, 
which may possibly be different from the interlocutor’s intention. 
 One important consequence of this is that the receptive use of proverbs derives an evaluative response 
from the interlocutor. When a proverb is cited receptively, the understanding demonstrated in the utterance is 
evaluated by the interlocutor. It varies how individual receptions with proverbs are perceived. In (11), 
Goldfinger’s chortle indicates that he is satisfied with Pussy’s response with the proverb (“Business before 
pleasure.”) which appropriately captures the intention behind his command. In (35), on the other hand, Mrs. 
Bailey partly accepts George’s proverb (35d), noting that she does not know about war, whereby implying 
that all is fair as to love indeed. In addition, as is the case in (36) below, an interpretation shown through the 
receptive use of a proverb is sometimes rejected by the interlocutor. Since the receptive use of proverbs 
demonstrates how the speaker understood the interlocutor’s opinion, the understanding draws an assessment 
from him/her as a consequence. 
 The receptive use is different from the subjective uses at this point. When the speaker advances his/her 
opinion with a proverb (the assertive use), or when s/he characterizes the situation at hand as an instance of 
proverbial typology (the affirmative use), the proverbial utterance does not require the interlocutor to judge 
its appropriateness. The receptive use provokes the interlocutor to evaluate it, because it displays the 
speaker’s understanding of the interlocutor’s utterance/opinion.  68
4.3.3 Critical Exploitation of the Receptive Use 
 In the above examples of the receptive use, the speaker cites a proverb to agree with his/her 
interlocutor. The usage type, however, is not necessarily confined to such cases where the speaker shows a 
favorable stance. It is also available when s/he attempts to confront and criticize the interlocutor. 
 Let us consider an instance of such critical receptive use. Cited below is an excerpt from Murder on 
the Orient Express by Agatha Christie. One man is murdered on the Orient Express, a sleeper express bound 
for Paris. Hercule Poirot, a Belgian private detective who happened to be on the train, begins to interrogate 
 The evaluation from the interlocutor corresponds to Arrow 2, “Agreement (or other expression of contiguity)” in Drew & Holt’s 68
(1988; 1998) description (9). This indicates that the receptive use contributes to the closure and transition of topics.
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the passengers to help find the murderer(s). As he enters the cabin of a British lady, Mary Debenham, for 
investigation, he gets Greta Ohlsson, a woman who has been there with her, out of the room. 
(36)  Miss Debenham had put her book down. She was watching Poirot. When he asked her, she 
handed over her keys. Then, as he lifted down a case and opened it, she said: 
 “(a)Why did you send her away, M. Poirot?” 
 “I, Mademoiselle! (b)Why, to minister to the American lady.” 
 “(c)An excellent pretext — but a pretext all the same.” 
 “(d)I don’t understand you, Mademoiselle.” 
 “(e1)I think you understand me very well.” She smiled. “(e2)You wanted to get me alone. Wasn’t 
that it?” 
 “(f)You are putting words into my mouth, Mademoiselle.” 
 “(g)And ideas into your head? No, I don’t think so. The ideas are already there. That is right, 
isn’t it?” 
 “(h)Mademoiselle, we have a proverb —” 
 “(i)Qui s’excuse s’accuse — (j)is that what you were going to say? (k)You must give me the credit 
for a certain amount of observation and common sense. (l)For some reason or other you have got it 
into your head that I know something about this sordid business — (m)this murder of a man I never 
saw before.” 
 “(n)You are imagining things, Mademoiselle.” 
 “No, I am not imagining things at all. But it seems to me that a lot of time is wasted by not 
speaking the truth — by beating about the bush instead of coming straight out with things.” 
(Christie, Murder on the Orient Express) 
When asked by Debenham why he get Ohlsson out of her cabin (36a), Poirot replies that it is to have her 
look after Mrs. Hubbard (“the American lady”), who is feeling ill (36b). She does not accept it, and calls it “a 
pretext” (36c). As Poirot says he is unable to understand her intention (36d), Debenham asserts that he must 
have intended to make her alone in the cabin (36e). In reply to this, the detective retorts that she is trying to 
make him say what she wants him to say (36f). The woman, however, argues that he actually had the exact 
intention as she identified (36g). As Poirot is about to cite a proverb in response (36h), but Debenham 
interrupts the utterance (36i). 
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 Qui s’excuse s’accuse is a French proverb which can literally translate into “he who excuses himself 
accuses himself” and usually used to point out “making excuses reveals a guilty conscience” (Merriam-
Webster.Com, s.v. Qui s’excuse s’accuse). In this scene, “Qui s’excuse” corresponds to Debenham’s words 
that she has uttered to Poirot, and “s’accuse” to (what she claims to be) Poirot’s opinion that her hostility to 
him comes from her guilt. 
 Notice that Debenham cuts in on Poirot’s turn (36h-i), and “preemptively completes” (Lerner, 2004: 
226-229; Kushida, 2007: 160) his utterance.  Although she superficially attempts to confirm that the proverb 69
she has just cited matches what he actually wanted to say (36j), she continues to talk without giving him the 
floor (36k-l). By shaping her talk in this way, Debenham attributes the proverb (36i) to Poirot. The proverbial 
utterance is, therefore, characterized as a receptive use in that a proverb is cited as if on behalf of the 
interlocutor. On the other hand, Debenham does not aim to agree with Poirot, but rather to claim that she 
knows his ‘true’ intention. In her view, the detective sent Ohlsson to Mrs. Hubbard because he wanted 
Debenham alone with him in her cabin (36e), and her utterances should have sounded to be a “pretext,” 
given that he hides such intention. This is what she argues for with the proverb (36i), which is also 
transparent in the fact that she explains why she can be so sure (36k). A reason or support being given right 
after a claim is a typical pattern in everyday argument (Canary & Sillars, 1992: 746). In this way, the proverb 
Debenham utters by taking the floor from Poirot serves to make a claim that she can read his mind, and not a 
demonstration of agreement with him. 
 Subsequent to the proverb, Debenham further elaborates her argument about Poirot’s ‘true’ intention. 
After claiming her ability to identify the proverb that (she believes) he was actually about to say (36k), and 
then explains why she arguably knows that Poirot wants to make her alone for interrogation (36l). That is, 
she argues here that he must be attempting to maker her tell him what she knows of the man’s death. Note 
that the woman strategically insists not only that he suspect her of the murder, but also that his doubt has no 
firm grounds (“For some reason or other”). In addition, she also adds another claim to her description of the 
event (“this sordid business”), a claim that she has never seen the victim before he was killed (36m). In this 
way, citing the proverb by taking the floor from Poirot, Debenham maintains that she has nothing to do with 
the murder — her innocence. At the same time, the claim also works as a retort to (what she believes to be) 
Poirot’s doubt for her that she captured with the proverb (36i). To sum, her proverb is characterized as a first 
step for her to criticize the opponent, Poirot. In this sense, Debenham’s proverbial utterance counts as an 
 An utterance is not always preemptively completed in such a critical attitude. For examples in which the conversational move is 69
done as a cooperative act, cf. Hayashi (2017).
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example of the critical receptive use. 
 The receptive use of the proverb can be exploited in this way, because it is indeed based on attributing 
a proverb — or the evaluation or argument with a proverb — to the interlocutor. The attribution of the 
proverb is equivalently done in the cases where the speaker takes a sympathetic stance towards the 
interlocutor, where the focus is on demonstrating how s/he has aceepted his/her opinion. Recall that, in (34), 
Pussy first simply accepts Goldfinger’s order by saying “Certainly,” before citing a proverb, “Business 
before pleasure.” When the receptive use is exploited in a critical manner, in contrast, the speaker expresses 
his/her own view of the interlocutor’s opinion as if it were a given fact that s/he thinks that way. That is, the 
focus is on attributing (the evaluation or argument carried by) the proverb to the interlocutor itself. In (36), 
Debenham not only cuts in on Poirot’s utterance (36h-i), but also, after citing the proverb, explains why she 
is so confident that it is his true intention (36k-l). Since the proverb is uttered on behalf of the interlocutor in 
the receptive use, it is also possible to make use of the usage as a strategy for criticism. It does not mean, 
however, that it is the only way to put one’s evaluation or opinion into the interlocutor’s mouth; the same is 
possible with quotatives (cf. Ihara, 2017: 32-36; Yamaguchi, 2009: 54−57). The critical exploitation of the 
receptive use of proverbs is, therefore, one of several ways to speak in others’ voice. 
 Among the ways to attribute a judgment or claim to the interlocutor, the use of proverbs exhibit a 
special characteristics which comes from one of proverbs’ general features. As we discussed in Section 4.2, 
proverbs are a kind of idiom that has been repeatedly used and shared in society, as means to typologically 
capture and show attitudes to situations (Burke, 1967: 296-297; Takeda, 1992b: 213). Being typological can 
mean, from a different point of view, to be stereotypical and platitudinous (Sato, 1987: 239-240). The critical 
deployment of the receptive use of proverbs is thus a rhetorical strategy to characterize the interlocutor’s 
opinion as platitudinous, while keeping a distance from it. This rhetorical feature is most obvious in (36), in 
which Debenham chooses a French proverb, even though she is talking in English. Whereas she is an 
English, Poirot is from a French-speaking society in Belgium. “Qui s’excuse s’accuse” is therefore what the 
French-speaker would be likely to say, and by imprinting such a stereotypical image on him, she skillfully 
keep distant from the attitude it encapsulates. The strategy of utilizing the receptive use to criticize the 
interlocutor’s opinion, thus, serves to negatively characterize it as stale, which is the strength of the 
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technique.  70
 It is now apparent that the receptive use has two facets. In the standard, sympathetic receptive use, 
such as (34), the speaker attributes the authority carried by proverbs to the interlocutor — or his/her opinion 
— without evaluating it as stereotypical or platitudinous. In contrast, when exploiting the usage for 
argumentation, the speaker negatively characterize it as a platitude, instead of giving the interlocutor the 
proverbial authority. The two cases differs in which of the two aspects of the proverb the speaker connects 
with the interlocutor, its authority or its banality. The two ways of employing the receptive use stems from 
the different ways of characterizing the time-tested ideas that proverbs generally carries. 
 This section analyzed how proverbs are deployed as a means to receive the interlocutor’s opinion. In 
this usage type, the speaker employs a proverb to demonstrate how s/he has received the interlocutor’s 
opinion. As the proverb represents the interlocutor’s (and not the speaker’s own) opinion, the social authority 
— or the banality — of the proverb is added to him/her. 
4.3.4 Summary 
 This section clarified how proverbs are employed and interpreted in receptive manners. The most basic 
feature of the receptive use is that the speaker attributes proverbs to the interlocutor, demonstrating how the 
former understood the latter’s utterance/opinion. Such attribution associates the interlocutor with the social 
authority — or stereotypical or platitudinous attitude — of proverbs. In addition, the speaker’s interpretation 
through the proverb use derives from the interlocutor a reaction as to whether the proverb appropriately 
captures his/her original intention. 
4.4 A Systematic Model of Proverb Usage Types  71
 On the other hand, the critical exploitation of the receptive use also has a disadvantage which is rooted in attributing a proverb that 70
accords with the speaker’s opinion to the interlocutor: the interlocutor can immediately deny the attribution — or the attributed voice. 
In (13), right after Debenham’s utterance with a proverb (13i-m), Poirot refuses to accept it as true at once (13n). This disadvantage is 
simple to understand from the viewpoint of the receiver of the proverb. Suppose your opponent in a dispute claimed with a proverb, 
“You must be thinking that way.” Even if it was much to the point, you would not willingly choose to admit it. If you did, it could 
probably lead you to defeat. The argumentative attribution of an opinion with a proverb, thus, does not necessarily make the 
interlocutor accept it. This is a negative aspect of the rhetorical deployment of the receptive use.
 The discussion in this section is based on Hirakawa (2014).71
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 Given the detailed characteristics of the affirmative use, the assertive use, and the receptive use, it is 
now possible to consider how they are related with each other. Overall, the three usage types can be 
characterized as extremes of two convergent continua, with the assertive use at the intersection. 
 The first continuum consists of the affirmative use and the assertive use. As I call them subjective 
usage types, in these usage types, proverbs are cited to advance the speaker’s view on the situation s/he is 
facing. On the other hand, they are distinguishable as to how persuasively proverbs are employed. At the 
affirmative end, the speaker exclusively focuses on portraying and characterizing the event or situation 
before him/her according to proverbs. This type of proverbial utterance characterizes the event or situation as 
“one example under a general principle,” based on the proverb’s “extensive applicability to a variety of 
events and situations” (Sato, 1987: 238). Simply put, the speaker names the situation with proverbs. 
Persuasion is therefore little, or almost not intended in that proverbs are referred to as a framework through 
which to construe and characterize the situation. At the assertive extreme, the focus is on convincing the 
interlocutor of his/her judgment. That is to say, s/he aims to advance an opinion and persuade the interlocutor 
with proverbs. The persuasive force of this usage type is rooted in “a tacit approval by a countless number of 
people” (Sato, 1987: 239). These cases are highly persuasion-oriented, in that proverbs serve to change his/
her mind and perceive the situation in the same way as the speaker does. Between the two extremes lies a 
variety of intermediate cases that vary as to how strongly the speaker attempts to make the interlocutor 
accept his/her evaluation of the situation at hand by applying a proverb to it. In these cases, proverbs are 
cited to display a certain evaluation of the situation. They are persuasive insofar as the assessment is 
expected to be understood by the hearer who may have a different opinion. The first continuum thus captures 
the diversity in persuasive force exerted in proverb use. 
 Affirmation and assertion might seem so different that it is not adequate to place the affirmative and 
assertive uses of proverbs on a single cline. There are cases, however, where a single use of a proverb serves 
both speech acts at the same time. For example, look at (37) below, an excerpt from the movie The Dark 
Knight Rises. In the scene, an entrepreneur Daggett plans to take over Wayne Enterprises, in collaboration 
with the masked villain, Bane. Bane betrays him, however, and consequently Daggett’s rival Tate grasps the 
track on the board instead of him. Daggett gets fierce and orders his secretary Stryver to bring Bane to him: 
(37) DAGGETT: How the hell did Miranda Tate get the inside track on the Wayne Board? I mean she 
been meetin with him? She been sleeping with him? 
STRYVER: Not that we know of. 
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DAGGETT: Clearly you don’t know much of anything, do you? (a)Where’s Bane? 
STRYVER: (b)We told him it was urgent. 
DAGGETT: (c)Where is that masked... 
BANE: (d)Speak of the devil, and he shall appear. 
DAGGETT: What the hell is going on? 
BANE: The plan is proceeding as expected. 
DAGGETT: Oh, really? Do I look like I’m running Wayne Enterprises right now? 
(Nolan, The Dark Knight Rises) 
Right at the moment when Daggett and Stryver are arguing about Bane (37a-c), the villain shows up, uttering 
a proverb (37d). His proverbial utterance captures his timely appearance on the spot, which accords exactly 
with the “base meaning” (Kirshenblatt-Gimblet, 1973/1981: 119) of the proverb, Speak of the devil, and he 
shall appear: “If you discuss someone when they are not present the chances are that they will unexpectedly 
appear” (Pickering, 1997: 262).  Here, “Speak of the devil” corresponds to Daggett and Stryver’s preceding 72
talk about Bane and “he shall appear” to his appearance on the spot. The conjunction with “and” corresponds 
to the temporal sequence of the two events, connecting them as if the former caused the latter. 
 Speak of the devil, and he shall appear would normally be uttered by the ones who have been talking 
about the timely appearer, welcoming him/her into the talk by suggesting that s/he was the topic of the 
preceding conversation (Speake, 2017: 438; Toda, 2003: 689; also cf. (2)). In (37), it would be possible for 
Daggett or Stryver to cite the proverb when Bane shows up. In that case, the proverbial utterance would 
constitute an affirmative use, with the focus on portraying the situation as exactly the same as the proverb’s 
base meaning. On the other hand, in the scene, the proverb is cited by the one who comes into the scene (i.e., 
Bane), which means that he exploits its normal usage, or alternatively as he preempts a proverb that the other 
two could quote. The function of (37d) is therefore based on the possible affirmative use by Daggett or 
Stryver. Through quoting the proverb in this way, Bane shows his attitude to the businessmen. Although 
Daggett is most clearly furious at his betrayal, Bane shows himself in front of him with the proverb, as if he 
had shown up just because Daggett wanted him there (cf. 14a-c). His appearance in this way indicates his 
readiness to face the man in a rage. Simply put, Bane asserts that Daggett’s anger is no great concern to him. 
Bane’s proverbial utterance (37d) thus contributes to both affirmation and assertion. 
 As is often mentioned in paremiology, it is usual for proverbs to have several different ‘versions’ (Smith & Wilson eds., 170: iv; 72
Takeda, 1992a: 196-198). Other such versions of Speak of the devil, and he shall appear include Talk of the Devil and he is bound to 
appear, Speak of the devil and he always appear, Think of the devil and he appears, etc. (Pickering, 1997: 262; Toda, 2003: 689).
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 In order to properly capture proverbial utterances like (37d) which serve both affirmation and assertion 
at the same time, the two usage types should be seen as two extremes of a continuum with various strength of 
persuasive force. While in all the uses placed along the cline, proverbs carry the speaker’s own perspective 
on the event or situation s/he is dealing with, individual cases differ as to how persuasively proverbs are 
cited. 
 The second continuum consists of the assertive use and the receptive use. The two usage types are 
basically contrastive in terms of the management of the persuasive force that proverbs encapsulate. In the 
assertive use, what proverbs display is the speaker’s perspective, and their persuasive force is directed 
toward the interlocutor. In the receptive use, on the other hand, proverbs are cited in accordance with the 
interlocutor’s opinion. Through receptive proverb use, the speaker shows that s/he has accepted the 
interlocutor’s view. In other words, s/he declares that s/he was persuaded. Given that the receptive use is 
available for argument as well as for display of one’s understanding (cf. (36)), however, it should be 
continuously linked to the assertive use. Even though typical cases of the receptive use are clearly opposite 
the assertive use, cases like (36) where the receptive use is exploited for persuasive purposes pertains to both 
assertion and reception. It follows from this that the two usage types should be related to form a continuum, 
rather than seen as opposing directions of persuasion. The assertive use and the receptive use are therefore 
placed at the two ends of a persuading vs. persuaded continuum. 
 The two continua converge at the assertive use. It is related to both the other two types, though in 
different ways. Together with the affirmative use, the assertive use forms a cline that captures various 
degrees of persuasive force exerted in proverb use. With the receptive use, on the other hand, it is contrastive 
as to whether proverbs are used to persuade or to be persuaded. Still, the two usage types are the same in that 
they are closely connected to the act of persuasion. The three usage types of proverb in conversational talk-
exchange can thus be represented as a two continua crossing at the assertive use, as in Figure 2. 
 Characterizing the ways of proverb use in this way reveals that the assertive use, the receptive use, and 
the affirmative use reflect different aspects of conversational discourse. The most fundamental mechanism of 
this context is that participants exchange words with each other, taking turns one after another (Sacks et al., 
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[ Assertive Use ] ————————— [ Affirmative Use ] 
 Persuade the interlocutor 　  Construe and characterize the situation 
[ Receptive Use ] 
 Receive the interlocutor’s opinion 
Figure 2 Two-Continuum Model of Proverb Use
1974). In the course of interaction, each speaker shows the interlocutor his/her opinion, evaluation, or stance. 
Meanwhile, s/he also hears the interlocutor’s remarks, showing his/her opinion, evaluation, or stance. 
Proverbs are available for either direction of the exchange of utterances. The assertive use is the cases where 
they are used to put forward an opinion, serving as an authoritative resource to support the speaker’s 
perspective. The receptive use is when proverbs are employed to accept the other’s perspective, serving as a 
resource to ascertain the plausibility of the interlocutor’s opinion. The assertive use and the receptive use 
thus emerge in the backdrop of opinion exchange between participants in conversation. As such, the two 
usage types are closely tied to communication with others. Unlike these two, in the affirmative use, the focus 
is on the perception of the situation. In conversation, participants may want or need to topicalize the event or 
situation around them, for which proverbs are an option. In such cases, proverbs function as a device for 
typologically construe and characterize the situation. The affirmative use is thus rooted in the fact that 
conversation takes place in a particular environment.  The tripartite classification of proverb use clarifies 73
how each usage type is rooted in the characteristics of conversational discourse. 
4.5 The Receptive Use and Rhetoric 
 The significance of this study lies in the fact that it has discovered and described the receptive use, a 
new usage type of proverbs in conversational discourse which has gone unnoticed in previous research. This 
section argues that the present investigation also has several important implications. 
 The first concerns the methodology of proverb research. A massive amount of inquiries have been 
conducted concerning how the allegorical units are used.  Most of the previous studies, however, focus on 74
 One consequence of the situation reference of the affirmative use is that it can appear in monologue. For example, look at the 73
following excerpt from the film White House Down. Here, the US president talks to himself as the helicopter he is in is landing in 
front of the White House: 
(i) PRESIDENT SAWYER: [Looking out the window] Be it ever so humble. 
His remark comes from a proverb, Be it ever so humble, there’s no place like home. It affirms that he is feeling exactly as the proverb 
says. The affirmative use is thus possible without an interlocutor, because it is not oriented to communication or opinion exchange 
unlike the other two usage types.
 Traditionally, central attention has been paid to the formal structure and semantic contents of proverbs (e.g., Dundes, 1975a; 74
Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, 1973; Milner, 1969; Rothstein, 1969; Silverstein-Weinrich, 1978; among others), while noting several features 
of them shared with other idiomatic expressions (cf. Drew & Holt, 1988, 1998; Kitzinger, 2000; Takeda, 1999a). Based on this, in 
fact, the proverb can be defined as a genre of verbal art by comparing it with some related genres such as jokes, curses, clichés, 
riddles and aphorisms (Barajas, 2010: sec.3.5; Norrick, 1985: ch.3).
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the relationship between proverb use and static social structure, based on data collected in particular 
linguistic communities, mainly from anthropological and/or ethnographical perspectives (e.g., Agbájé, 2002; 
Arewa & Dundes, 1975b; Barajas, 2010; Briggs, 1985; Finnegan, 1970; Gossen, 1973; Kuusi, 1967; Lister, 
1874; Parker, 1963; among many others). Those studies have revealed general features of proverb use across 
languages and societies. For instance, Seto (1988: sec.3.3) states that proverbs are basically used by older 
members against younger ones in society, recommending accepting the situation as it is — i.e., resignation. 
Yankah (1994: 3387) points out that proverbs are recognized in several communities as devices used by 
elders for didactic purposes. Arewa & Dundes (1964) describe that in Yoruba society, different proverbs are 
available depending on the speaker’s status in the society and his/her relationship with the hearer(s) in a 
given context, while Lieber (1994) illustrates how social ranking determines the proverbs available for each 
member in Ponape tribe. Previous studies, thus, have paid central attention to the social context in which 
proverbs are used. 
 It is possible to approach the receptive use in the same way. For instance, it could be analyzed in 
reference to the “‘from superior to inferior’ rule” (Seto, 1988: 116). According to the rule, proverbs are 
fundamentally utilized to teach inferior people — most typically, children. In (34) and (35) in contrast, 
inferior speakers (a henchwoman; a son) use proverbs against superior hearers (her boss; his mother). Given 
this, those instances might seem to be exceptions to the rule. What the speakers do here, however, is 
ascertain their interlocutor’s utterance and opinion, rather than advance their own claim and persuade them. 
In that the proverbs represent the superior’s opinion, the examples are the same as the cases where the 
superior speaker argue with proverbs against the inferior hearer. The receptive use is, therefore, characterized 
as a way of following the “‘from superior to inferior’ rule” from the standpoint of the inferior. This way of 
description is valuable to some extent. It properly reveals the unique feature of the receptive use, i.e., the rule 
still holds although the inferior speaker cites proverbs for the superior interlocutor. The traditional approach, 
however, cannot provide a “thick description” (Geertz, 1973) as we gained in Section 4.3. Even though it is 
possible to describe the receptive use by referring to the social structure in which proverbs are used, 
therefore, that method is insufficient for satisfactory, detailed analysis. 
 This study, in contrast, adopted a discourse analytic approach in examining how proverbs are deployed 
and interpreted. We paid central attention to the dynamic process when the speaker uses proverbs for certain 
purposes in ongoing discourse, rather than regard proverb use just as a consequence of static environment 
surrounding the speaker (i.e., his/her status in the society and the relationship with the interlocutor). What we 
have discovered as to the receptive use is nothing but a product of our discourse analytic approach. This 
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study therefore contributes to the methodology of proverb studies in general. 
 In addition, this investigation also has an implication for the study of rhetoric. Rhetoric is, partly, the 
art or technique of language use for argumentation and persuasion (Nouchi, 2002: 5-6; Yanagisawa et al., 
2004: i-ii; Reboul, 2000: 12-13). To advance opinions in an attempt to change others’ mind is quite ordinary 
and pervasive, which indicates that it is essential to unveil mechanisms of rhetorical strategies as 
argumentation/persuasion techniques in actual discourse. Despite its importance, discursive functioning of 
the tactics, however, has not been a central target of previous research. Traditional rhetorical studies have 
mainly focused on figures of speech in literary texts (Sato, 1992a: 47-50; Seto, 1992: 250). Cognitive 
linguists have been increasing their significance in the field of rhetoric, but their focus is predominantly on 
the relationship between human beings’ cognitive abilities and figurative expressions like metaphors and 
metonymies (Dancygier & Sweetser, 2014: 1-3), without considering rhetoric as argumentative and 
persuasive strategies. Informal logicians and argumentation theorists recognize the use of rhetoric as patterns 
of claim-making. Still, they tend to illustrate the patterns’ strengths and weaknesses from somewhat 
prescriptive point of view, rather than describe how the strategies are deployed and interpreted in actual 
discourse (e.g., van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; van Eemeren et al. eds., 1987; Walton, 1987, 1995). 
Previous studies, thus, have not paid sufficient attention to the discursive functions of rhetorical strategies. 
To thoroughly observe and specifically describe how people talk rhetorically is a valuable direction in the 
study of rhetoric.  The analytical stance taken in this study to approach proverb use can therefore be taken in 75
investigating rhetorical strategies in general. 
 Regarding the direction and methodology in the study of rhetoric, the receptive use of proverbs sheds 
new light on argumentative talk and text. Previous research, defining rhetoric as the art of argumentation and 
persuasion (e.g., Aristotle, 1991; Kozai, 2010, 2016; Perelman, 1982; Prelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; 
Cockcroft et al., 2014), have catalogued a variety of schemes and devices with their strengths and 
weaknesses. Although they have provided a lot of insights into the strategies, the focus has always been on 
the speaker’s command of them, i.e., how s/he should control the strategies in order to accomplish successful 
persuasion. This is clearly reflected in the fact that previous studies have often, if not exclusively, analyzed 
discourse genres in which the speaker is more or less detached from audience, such as political speech, print 
advertisement, and newspaper articles (e.g., Borchers & Hundley, 2018: ch.5; Cavender & Kahane, 2010; 
Corbett & Connors, 1999; Leith, 2011; Walton, 2017). Simply put, traditional rhetoric deals with one-way 
 The interest in “rhetoric in action” (Hayashi & Kuno, 1974: ch.13) is beginning to be shared by some researchers (e.g., Cameron, 75
2008, 2010, 2011; Musolff, 2004, 2011; Musolf & Zinken eds., 2009; Semino, 2008).
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argumentation. In the monological genres, the speaker is not usually exposed to immediate criticisms from 
audience, which allows him/her to focus on how s/he devise his/her own talk or text. Carefully designing 
one’s speech is indeed vital for changing the hearer’s mind. Those with poor skill in constructing persuasive 
talk could not be successful arguers. In argumentative talk-exchange, however, the production of talk is only 
half of what the speaker is required to do. S/he also needs to deal with the interlocutor’s utterances. Just as 
the speaker attempts to persuade the interlocutor, the interlocutor strives to make the speaker accept his/her 
claim. Given the interactive nature of conversational discourse, it is inevitable for the speaker to respond to 
the interlocutor. That is, it is impossible for him/her to focus only on the design of his/her own speech. In 
order to persuade the interlocutor successfully, the speaker needs not only to advance and support opinions of 
his/her own but also to counter-argue the interlocutor, in sufficient ways. In other words, both ‘offense’ and 
‘defense’ are equally required in interactive arguments. This type of discourse, however, is not targeted in 
previous studies (cf. ch. 2 & 3). As a consequence, little — or almost nothing — is known about the 
defensive aspect of argumentation. In addition, given that rhetoric is originally a system of techniques for 
persuasion (Nouchi, 2002: 5-6; Yanagisawa et al., 2004: i-ii; Reboul, 2000: 12-13), it is essential for the 
study of rhetoric to search conversational talk-exchange for data to analyze. The dynamic development of the 
most basic context (cf. Sacks et al., 1974; Schegloff, 2015) will be a fruitful source for new insights into 
rhetorical phenomena. The analysis of the receptive use of proverbs is a good example of this direction in 
rhetorical research. As a way to deal with the interlocutor’s opinion (cf. sec. 4.3, esp. sec. 4.3.3), it sheds 
light on the receptive aspect of talk-exchange. The analysis of the receptive use of proverbs therefore marks 
the beginning of the defensive rhetoric, demonstrating the value of this line of research. 
4.6 Conclusion 
 This chapter described the receptive use, a kind of proverb usage that has gone unnoticed, from a 
rhetorical point of view. The main characteristics of this usage are: (i) that the speaker applies a proverb to 
his/her interlocutor’s utterance/opinion in order to demonstrate how s/he received it; (ii) s/he attributes the 
social authority of the proverb to the utterance/opinion; and (iii) the proverb use is further evaluated by the 
producer of the original utterance/opinion as to whether the speaker’s understanding of it is appropriate. 
Based on the insight into this usage, this chapter also provided a two-continuum model for systematic 
understanding of various ways of proverb use in conversational talk-exchange by classifying them into three 
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basic types with sufficient characterization. In addition, it was argued that the receptive use sheds light on the 
defensive side of conversational arguments, in contrast to earlier studies focusing almost exclusively on the 
offensive aspect of the interaction. 
 In addition to the findings, it should be noted that the data analyzed here is not fully authentic, thereby 
limiting the generality of the results. The analysis of the receptive use is based on conversations between 
fictional characters, i.e., artificial discourse. This does not deny the possibility that the way of proverb use 
only appears in fictional conversation, but not in natural, everyday talk-exchange.  According to Sacks 76
(1992, vol.2: 141-142), the speaker can choose between claiming that s/he has understood what the 
interlocutor said and demonstrating that s/he has. Heritage (2007: 255-259) argues against this, however, 
claiming that people rarely choose the latter option in daily conversation, because the demonstration of 
understanding interrupts the natural progress of ongoing interaction. It is generally preferred, according to 
Heritage, to proceed talk-exchange to demonstrating their understanding, suspending the flow of 
conversation. The receptive use of proverb therefore may not be dispreferred option, and hence not 
observable so frequently, because it is a way of demonstration of understanding (cf. sec.4.3.1). This 
refutation is stimulating in regard to our analysis of the receptive use. It is true indeed that there is a great 
gap between participating in actual conversation and constructing fictional interaction between characters. 
The criticism above is therefore unavoidable as long as we employ fictional data. 
 Still, the description and discussion in this study are not valueless. It is a fact that proverbs serves as a 
resource for demonstrating how the speaker has received the interlocutor’s opinion, even if such receptive 
uses can only be observable in fictional discourse. In addition, if understanding is not often demonstrated in 
daily conversation, this does not entail that demonstration of understanding is impossible in the context. 
Rather, it is possible for the speaker to utilize proverbs receptively in everyday talk-exchange. Given this, our 
endeavor to describe the ‘minor’ usage type of proverbs as well as its mechanisms is also significant. 
Although based on fictional data, this study remains valuable for providing the insights into the receptive 
use. 
 The following objection comes from a reviewer of the Japanese Journal of Language in Society, as to an unpublished manuscript. 76
The critical comment greatly helped me improve my thinking about the validity of my data and description.
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5. Narrating a Story to Teach: Parables 
5.1 Introduction 
 This chapter examines parables as an allegorical genre from a discourse analytic perspective, focusing 
on the ones that appear in the Synoptic Gospels.  To grasp the phenomenon, consider the example below 77
from Mark (4: 1-10): 
(38) Again Jesus began to teach by the lake. The crowd that gathered around him was so large that he 
got into a boat and sat in it out on the lake, while all the people were along the shore at the water’s 
edge. He taught them many things by parables, and in his teaching said: “(a)Listen! A farmer went 
out to sow his seed. As he was scattering the seed, some fell along the path, and the birds came and 
ate it up. Some fell on rocky places, where it did not have much soil. It sprang up quickly, because 
the soil was shallow. But when the sun came up, the plants were scorched, and they withered 
because they had no root. Other seed fell among thorns, which grew up and choked the plants, so 
that they did not bear grain. Still other seed fell on good soil. It came up, grew and produced a crop, 
some multiplying thirty, some sixty, some a hundred times.” 
Then Jesus said, “(b)Whoever has ears to hear, let them hear.” 
(c)When he was alone, the Twelve and the others around him asked him about the parables. 
(Mark, 4: 1-10) 
In this scene, Jesus explains his religious view by telling the story of seeds that fell on four kinds of ground 
(38a). It seems that the seeds represent Jesus’ words, and each ground symbolizes different types of people 
who take different stances to his teachings. The whole story cannot be taken simply as a recount of certain 
events, but as an allegory that forms part of the explanation. The Synoptic Gospels describe several scenes 
like the above where Jesus narrates stories in conversations and arguments with other characters. Those 
narratives are the topic of this chapter, parables. 
 Widely recognized as a key feature of Jesus’ preaching, parables have been studied by a huge number 
 The Synoptic Gospels are the first three books in the New Testament, i.e., Matthew, Mark, and Luke. They each portray Jesus’ 77
origin, his journey of preaching, the Crucifixion, and the Resurrection, in the form of a story. The books are “so similar in structure, 
content, and wording that they can easily be set side by side to provide a synoptic comparison of their content” (Encyclopædia 
Britannica Online, s.v., ‘Synoptic Gospels’). For further details about the texts, see e.g., Burnet (2005), Johnson (2010), Nakamura 
(2010), and Tagawa (1997).
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of scholars, mainly in theology (e.g., to name only a few, Dodd, 1935; Drury, 1973; Iverson, 2012; Jeremias, 
1972; Kato, 2006; Thiselton, 1985). Those studies have focused on the interpretation of parables, i.e., what 
Jesus, or the Gospels, is attempting to say through the allegorical stories. Since their interpretive endeavor is 
unavoidably anchored in the specific details of the text, it is valuable to reveal how these stories are shaped 
in the Synoptic Gospels. Given the objective, this chapter will shed light on how Jesus builds up the 
allegorical narratives in order to convey his message to the audience in the text world, and how those scenes 
contribute to deliver his words over to readers of the religious text. 
 The starting point of our exploration is the fact that parables are not composed in reader-friendly ways. 
In (38), for example, even though what happened in the sower story is quite transparent, it requires efforts to 
figure out what Jesus meant by narrating it. One reason for such interpretive work to be needed is that Jesus 
provides no explicit cues to be referenced for interpreting the analogies.  In addition, in recounting Jesus’ 78
parables, the Synoptic Gospels use a rhetorical strategy, namely aposiopesis, which is roughly characterized 
as a method of “Stopping suddenly in midcourse, leaving statement unfinished” (Lanham, 1991: 20). In the 
above example, after Jesus finishes talking (38b), no reaction of the audience is shown before the next scene 
begins (38c), even though it seems quite likely for the preacher’s utterance to have drawn a certain 
response(s). This way of describing conversation — i.e., the use of aposiopesis — also obscures the point of 
the allegorical stories. Thus the text of parables apparently attempt to restrain easy understanding. 
 Why, then, are parables realized in such a way? What effect does that composition have on readers? 
This chapter aims to reveal what Jesus does with parables, how the Synoptic Gospels describe those scenes, 
and what effects it can have on the reader’s interpretation, through detailed examination of the texts. The 
discussion proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 defines the parable with its basic characteristics, and observes in 
detail how the allegorical stories are presented in the Synoptic Gospels. The analysis demonstrates how they 
are demanding for the readers of the texts. Section 5.3 focuses on the use of aposiopesis, and reveals what 
effects it bears in the discourse of the Synoptic Gospels. Given the function of the strategy, Section 5.4 
explicates how the parables shapes the relationship between Jesus and the reader. Section 5.6 concludes the 
whole discussion in this chapter, and considers the relation-building function of rhetorical strategies in 
written discourse in general. 
 Before starting concrete discussion, we must note that the texts analyzed in this chapter are taken from 
the New International Version on the BibleGateway.com (https://www.biblegateway.com), with the section 
 Jesus explains to “the Twelve” what he means by this parable in the scene that follows (cf. (39) below). His deciphering is not 78
completely comprehensive, however. The details of the scene is further examined in Section 5.2.2).
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titles and verse numbers omitted to make the excerpts simpler to read. The arbitrary choice of the version 
does not mean that this edition should be used in parable research, or any kind of study that deals with the 
scripture. What is important in this regard is that different versions of the Synoptic Gospels vary in textual 
features including wording, spelling, punctuation, and paragraph style. Moreover, though originally written 
in Koine Greek (Johnson, 2010: 5; Tagawa, 1997: 314-315), they (as well as the New Testament as a whole) 
are now available in a number of different languages. The specific analysis offered in this chapter based on 
the New International Version, just one of many English translations, therefore should not directly be applied 
to other editions. The generality and significance of the present investigation will be discussed further in the 
final section. 
5.2 Fundamentals of Parables 
 This section examines how the parables are realized in the Synoptic Gospels. Section 5.2.1 defines the 
genre, clarifying some of its fundamental features. Section 5.2.2 illustrates that the parables require intensive 
work for interpretation. 
5.2.1 Definition and Basic Characteristics 
 The term ‘parable’ is loosely used to cover different phenomena found in Jesus’ preachings, such as 
aphoristic metaphors, exemplifying anecdotes, and allegorical stories (Black, 1960; Crossan, 1972, 1992; 
Kyuyaku Shin-yaku Seisho Daijiten Henshu Iinkai ed., 1989). It is certainly interesting and valuable to delve 
into each of them, and consider the relationship among them. With the general interest in allegorical 
discourse, however, this study specifically aims at the allegorical, narrative kind of parable. 
 The parable of this type is traditionally formulated as “a story designed to convey some religious 
principle, moral lesson, or general truth” (Shaw, 1972: 274). Consider the excerpt from Luke (15: 1-7): 
(39) Now the tax collectors and sinners were all gathering around to hear Jesus. But the Pharisees and 
the teachers of the law muttered, “(a)This man welcomes sinners and eats with them.” 
Then Jesus told them this parable: “(b)Suppose one of you has a hundred sheep and loses one of 
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them. (c)Doesn’t he leave the ninety-nine in the open country and go after the lost sheep until he 
finds it? And when he finds it, he joyfully puts it on his shoulders and goes home. Then he calls his 
friends and neighbors together and says, ‘Rejoice with me; I have found my lost sheep.’ (d)I tell you 
that in the same way there will be more rejoicing in heaven over one sinner who repents than over 
ninety-nine righteous persons who do not need to repent. (Luke, 15: 1-7) 
Tax collectors and sinners were recognized as sinful people to avoid in the first-century Jewish society (Kato, 
2006: 107; Takahashi et al. eds., 1991: 344, 689). For this reason, the Pharisees and the teachers of Law of 
Moses make a critical grumble, seeing Jesus having a meal with them (39a). In reply, Jesus tries to explain 
the reason why he is willing to be friendly with them by telling the story of a lost sheep (39b-c). He 
concludes the narrative with a statement (39d) which serves as a literal retort to his interlocutors’ criticism. 
 The example shows the basic features of parables (also cf. Sec. 2.5). First, they take the form of a 
story. In Labov’s model, a narrative is realized in “a verbal sequence of clauses” that is matched “to the 
sequence of events which (it is inferred) actually occurred” (Labov, 1972: 359-360). In (39), the clauses that 
constitute the imaginative story (39b-c) each describe an event in the chronological order. Jesus begins the 
story by establishing a suppositional situation, asking his interlocutors for justification for it (39b). Then he 
illustrates how one would likely to deal with the circumstances (39c). Second, the story of parables works 
allegorically. In the above example, the narrative of a lost sheep is analogically matched with Jesus’ view. 
The linking phrase “in the same way” lays the analogical foundation on which specific correspondences are 
made: the lost sheep stands for the sinner; the other ninety-nine for over ninety-nine good people; and the 
discovery and return of the lost one and the consequent joy represent the sinner’s turn to God and the 
resultant happiness. In this way, what the narrative superficially illustrates (39b-c) structurally represents the 
topic in question, which manifests Jesus’ religious view (39d). Finally, the parables are told in written texts. 
While Jesus first and foremost interacts with other characters, their talk as a whole forms part of the 
description in the Synoptic Gospels. Realized in this mode of discourse, the parables that appear in the talk-
exchange in the story world are delivered to the reader indirectly. In the case of (39), Jesus’ words are 
addressed to the audience in front of him, and readers just observe how their interaction goes along from the 
description of Luke such as (39b). In sum, the parables are allegorical stories that Jesus tells to other 
characters in the written text of the Synoptic Gospels. 
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5.2.2 Interpretive Difficulty of Parables 
 The parables in the Synoptic Gospels might seem fairly plane at first glance. However, clues to 
understand the allegorical stories are not provided sufficiently, which requires intensive interpretive work to 
be done. They contain several kinds of obstacles for allegorical interpretation. This section demonstrates that 
the parables are difficult to understand because (i) some of the elements in the parables do not have a clear 
allegorical counterpart; (ii) some of them deal with abstract topics; (iii) the topic is not clarified. 
 First, some of the characters and events that appear in the parables lack clear allegorical counterparts. 
That is to say, not all allegorical correspondences are easy to draw in parable discourse. In (39) above, for 
example, who the shepherd represents is not shown in the text. Consequently, although the character brings 
the lost sheep back home, this does not make clear who it is that will lead sinners to God. He could possibly 
stand for a holy one such as an angel, or Jesus. The story also leads us to wonder what is represented by the 
act of “joyfully put[ting] it on his shoulders.” Shepherds do not usually carry sheep on his/her shoulders; that 
is, the herdsman treated the lost sheep in a special manner. This suggests that the one who makes sinners turn 
to God — no matter who it is — would act towards them in such a special, perhaps considerate way. This 
further gives rise to another question: how would s/he ‘carry’ wrongdoers to God, which is difficult to 
answer. In addition to these, there is another line of questions. What does the shepherd’s home correspond 
to? Is it meant to represent Heaven? If so, who are the friends and neighbors of the one who leads sinners to 
God? If we consider the shepherd’s home to refer to Heaven, the allegorical counterparts of his friends and 
neighbors could not be those who belong to the place, since neither one’s friends nor neighbors are normally 
supposed to live with him/her. Given this, who are the people who will be invited to Heaven, when a sinner 
is celebrated into the kingdom of God? As this observation clearly shows, although the parables may seem 
simple at a first glance, some of the allegorical correspondences required to understand them are unclear in 
the text. 
 This is not only true in longer parables. In fact, shorter parables are also allegorically complex. In the 
scene below, Jesus heals a woman in a synagogue on a Sabbath day. Because the Jewish law forbids work on 
the Sabbath day, the synagogue leader criticizes him for his act of healing. In reply to the attack, Jesus refers 
to the kingdom of God (Luke, 13: 18-19): 
(40) Then Jesus asked, “(a)What is the kingdom of God like? What shall I compare it to? (b)It is like a 
mustard seed, which a man took and planted in his garden. (c)It grew and became a tree, and the 
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birds perched in its branches.” (Luke, 13: 18-19) 
Jesus begins with clarification of the topic that he is about to discuss (40a). At the same time, he is obviously 
attempting to illustrate the concept of the kingdom of God by comparison (cf. “like” and “compare”). In 
addition, he does this in the form of a question, thereby inviting the audience in the scene as well as the 
reader of the Synoptic Gospels to think about the topic. This way of initiation clarifies the target of the 
upcoming parable (40b-c). On the other hand, this does not make the allegorical story easy to understand. 
Right after (40a), the kingdom of God is first described as a particular seed in an aphoristic simile (40b). 
Along with some characterization (cf. the modification with the relative clause), the simile juxtaposes God’s 
kingdom with the seed, and thereby founds the basis for comparison (cf. ch.2; Cuenca, 2015; Dancygier & 
Sweetser, 2014: sec.6.5; Israel, et al., 2004). Then Jesus narratively shows what the seed becomes in the end 
(40c), and the illustration here evokes the image of a lively tree with birds in its branches. Based on the 
overall correspondence between the seed and the kingdom of God, the latter is apparently required to be 
understood through this tree image. And yet, this only provides readers with a rough guideline for 
interpretation. It is not clarified in what way the story is supposed to illustrate the God’s kingdom. In the 
same vein, the allegorical counterparts of the story elements are similarly unclear. Jesus’ talk above therefore 
gives rise to questions such as who does the sower stand for, what does his garden symbolize, and what do 
the birds represent? Thus, even concise parables are not simple to understand, just like longer ones such as 
(39). 
 The allegorical complexity of the Synoptic parables can exhibit more clearly by comparing them with 
an example of allegorical argumentation in the form of a story. Example (41) is an excerpt from Swordfish 
we analyzed in Chapter 3. The US senator Reisman collaborates with an underground terrorist, Gabriel, to 
steal some of the government’s dormant assets. When he notices that their relationship is known to the FBI, 
the senator directs Gabriel on the phone to suspend their plan and hide out for a while, but he rejects the 
order and hangs up. After putting the phone, Reisman tells a hypothetical story to his secretary, Kaplan: 
(41) REISMAN: Son. (a)Let’s just say you’ve got a 200-pound Rottweiler. (b)Now he loves you. It’s his 
job to protect you. (c)But if he ever bites you, even once, you gotta put him down. (d)You can 
never tell who he might bite next. You understand? 
KAPLAN: Yes, I do understand, Senator. 
REISMAN: I think we got a team of the West Coast. Uh, Fort MacArthur. Maybe they should pay 
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our friend a visit. (Sena, Swardfish) 
Right after the phone call, Reisman’s intention is transparent. He is clearly talking about Gabriel, even 
though the allusion is not made explicit in his talk. Each entity and event in the short, imaginary story has a 
clear allegorical counterpart. The Rottweiler represents Gabriel, with its exceptional size implying its 
strength and danger, and its master, Kaplan (“you”), stands for Reisman himself (41a). The relationship 
between the hound and his master indicates the one between the senator and the terrorist (41b). The “bite” 
represents Gabriel’s revolt, and putting down the dog corresponds to the necessary disposal of him that the 
senator is suggesting (41c). The warrant for the treatment of the Rottweiler also justifies the annihilation of 
Gabriel (41d). Based on the whole correspondence, Reisman argues that Gabriel should be terminated, as a 
dog should be killed if it bites his/her master even once. Allegorical stories are thus simple to understand and 
persuasive when constructed with specific allegorical counterparts of narrative entities and events. 
 The transparent allegory helps spot what makes the parables difficult to understand. In simple story 
allegories, in general, the story usually contains as sufficient particularities as necessary to understand it 
allegorically, just like we saw in (41). In contrast, the stories of the parables are filled with details. Seen from 
an antagonistic point of view, they might even seem to be in much more detail than necessary. The highly 
detailed description results in a number of candidates for allegorical reading, and hence more work is 
required to specify what those entities and events represent in the narrative. Thus, the parables are stuffed 
with narrative details in a way that demands intensive interpretation by readers of the Synoptic Gospels. 
 Second, the Synoptic parables prevents easy understanding due to their abstract topics. This also 
becomes clear by comparing them with allegorical stories. Simple allegorical stories usually concerns 
particular people and actions, mirroring them in the narrative characters and events. The concrete topic 
makes it relatively easy to interpret the story allegorically, with the particular persons and actions in the 
context serving as possible ‘nodes’ for allegorical correspondences. For example, in (41), how to treat 
Gabriel is the topic in question, which is explained through comparison with the expected treatment of the 
defiant Rottweiler. As particular people and actions are compared to a concrete story, every characters and 
events in the story has a clear counterpart (the hound corresponds to Gabriel, the bite matches his betrayal, 
etc.). In addition, the particularity of the situation at hand makes it understandable itself, even without the 
help of the allegorical matching. Given this, allegorical stories functions as a perspective from which to 
recognize the situation. In (41), what happened between Reisman and Gabriel is obvious on its own, and the 
Rottweiler allegory provides an interpretive framework for Kaplan (and the audience of the film as well) to 
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see Gabriel as an ‘defiant hound’ as Reisman claims. Allegorical stories are thus easy to understand when 
dealing with particular situations. In the Synoptic parables, however, the topic is usually a religious concept 
that Jesus attempts to explain, such as the kingdom of God (cf. (40)). Such abstract topics do not have — or 
seem to lack at first glance — a specific structure of its own, and hence they cannot be clearly explained as 
they are. The parables are thus provided as a required framework through which to systematically understand 
the conceptual topics in the teachings of Jesus. Even with the help of them, the abstract concepts are still 
difficult to grasp, because they do not offer possible nodes for allegorical interpretation. The stories of the 
parables are the only material to be referenced to understand what Jesus says. The difficulty of the parables 
in the Synoptic Gospels thus partly emerges as a result of concerning abstract topics. 
 The third obstacle that keeps the parables from simple interpretation is that they are sometimes started 
without the topic being identified. Consider the following excerpt (Mark, 4: 1-10): 
(42) (=(38)) 
Again Jesus began to teach by the lake. The crowd that gathered around him was so large that he 
got into a boat and sat in it out on the lake, while all the people were along the shore at the water’s 
edge. (a)He taught them many things by parables, and in his teaching said: “(b)Listen! A farmer went 
out to sow his seed. As he was scattering the seed, some fell along the path, and the birds came and 
ate it up. Some fell on rocky places, where it did not have much soil. It sprang up quickly, because 
the soil was shallow. But when the sun came up, the plants were scorched, and they withered 
because they had no root. Other seed fell among thorns, which grew up and choked the plants, so 
that they did not bear grain. Still other seed fell on good soil. It came up, grew and produced a crop, 
some multiplying thirty, some sixty, some a hundred times.” 
Then Jesus said, “(c)Whoever has ears to hear, let them hear.” 
(d)When he was alone, the Twelve and the others around him asked him about the parables. 
(Mark, 4: 1-10) 
In this scene, Jesus tells the story of a sower to a multitude. The story is initiated as one of the parables he 
deployed to show his religious view (42a), which obviously requires readers to take the following story as a 
reference frame on a certain topic. What the topic is, however, is not clarified in the text. Also, the parable is 
located at the beginning of the scene. No contextual information, such as prior conversation between Jesus 
and other characters, is therefore available up to this point to reference in order to discover the topic in 
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question. In addition, Jesus does not pinpoint what the story is about, either. He just begins the narration with 
an attention-getting vocative (42b), and finishes it by declaring for whom it is meant (42c). After his talk, a 
new scene is introduced (42d), which provides no helpful hints about the previous story. Thus, without 
substantial clues for allegorical interpretation, what the story represents is kept under cover in the text, 
whereas it is explicitly launched as a parable. As in this case, some of the Synoptic parables are presented 
without a clear topic. 
 This section has revealed that the Synoptic parables are not allegorically simple to interpret, because 
they are constructed in ways that require readers’ involvement in discovering the allegorical correspondences 
offered in the parable discourse in order to firmly grasp Jesus’ view encoded in them.  In short, the parables 79
seems to be intentionally “designed make the audience think” (Cockcroft et al., 2014: 281). Why, then, are 
they realized in such a way? What function does it fulfill to disrupt easy understanding? In order to answer 
these questions, the next section observes how the Synoptic Gospels are constructed. 
5.3 The Use of Aposiopesis in the Gospels  80
 While the use of parables can be recognized as a typical feature of Jesus’ way of preaching, the 
Gospels also employs a noticeable strategy — i.e., aposiopesis, a method of “stopping suddenly in 
midcourse, leaving statement unfinished” (Lanham, 1991: 20) — in illustrating the scenes where Jesus 
interacts with interlocutors. They invariably avoid describing how the audience respond to him, even when 
their response of some sort is expected. What function does the use of aposiopesis fulfill in the Gospels, 
then? To answer the question, let us observe the texts of the Gospels in detail. 
5.3.1 Lack of Responses to Jesus 
 Jesus teaches his doctrine to a variety of people such as Jesus’ disciples, the Pharisees, and the locals. 
 There is a debate over how strictly the Synoptic parables should be interpreted as allegories (Crossan, 1992: 150; McNeile, 1915: 79
186; Ohnuki et al. eds., 2002: 64; Piercy, 1908: 645). Some scholars argue that it is unnecessary to figure out the allegorical 
counterpart of every single element in the allegorical stories (e.g., Jüricher, 1976). Others attempt to analyze analogical 
correspondences in parable discourse quite in detail, paying close attention to specific entities and events described in the stories 
(e.g., Kato, 2006).
 The analysis and discussion presented here is based on Hirakawa (2018).80
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His teaching starts in interaction with a certain interlocutor(s). That is, his words are directed toward the 
specific audience in each situation. On the other hand, how the audience respond to Jesus is not portrayed, 
even though it is apparently possible. Consider several examples. The one below is a scene in which Jesus 
responds to a question by the Pharisees about the low on the sabbath day (Mark, 2:23; 3:1): 
(43) One Sabbath Jesus was going through the grainfields, and as his disciples walked along, they began 
to pick some heads of grain. The Pharisees said to him, “(a)Look, why are they doing what is 
unlawful on the Sabbath?” 
He answered, “(b)Have you never read what David did when he and his companions were hungry 
and in need?  In the days of Abiathar the high priest, he entered the house of God and ate the 81
consecrated bread, which is lawful only for priests to eat. And he also gave some to his 
companions.” 
Then he said to them, “(c)The Sabbath was made for man, not man for the Sabbath. So the Son of 
Man is Lord even of the Sabbath.” 
Another time Jesus went into the synagogue, and a man with a shriveled hand was there. 
(Mark, 2: 23-28; 3: 1) 
Although the Pharisees’ utterance (43a) takes the form of a question, they clearly aim to criticize him, based 
on the Jewish laws. In reply, Jesus’ retort to it (43b-c). The text of Mark, though, does not reveal how his 
response is received by the Pharisees, and instead starts recounting the next scene. Therefore, it is unclear 
whether Jesus’ argument is persuasive enough to the censurers. 
 This way of portraying Jesus’ conversation is likewise observable in the next example, which is cited 
from Matthew (10: 1-5). The Pharisees and the Sadducees attempt to test Jesus’ status as a holy figure. 
(44) The Pharisees and Sadducees came to Jesus and (a)tested him by asking him to show them a sign 
from heaven. 
He replied, “(b)When evening comes, you say, ‘It will be fair weather, for the sky is red,’ and in the 
morning, ‘Today it will be stormy, for the sky is red and overcast.’ You know how to interpret the 
appearance of the sky, but you cannot interpret the signs of the times. A wicked and adulterous 
 David is a king of Israel, and the seeming author of Psalm in the Old Testament. Abiathar is his friend.81
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generation looks for a sign, but none will be given it except the sign of Jonah.”  (c)Jesus then left 82
them and went away. 
When they went across the lake, the disciples forgot to take bread. (Matthew, 10: 1-5) 
Against the Pharisees and the Sadducees who suspect that Jesus is not a true saint (44a), Jesus counter-argues 
to their critical view, evaluating them as “hypocrites” at the same time (44b). Nothing is shown as to how his 
words are taken by the Pharisees and the Sadducees, and the only thing that is clarified in the text is that 
Jesus left them (44c). 
 This omissive method is invariably employed to illustrate scenes where Jesus mentions a variety of 
topics in one preaching. Consider the following example taken from Matthew (5: 1-2; 7: 28-29): 
(45) Now when Jesus saw the crowds, he went up on a mountainside and sat down. His disciples came 
to him, and (a)he began to teach them. 
He said: 
[…] 
(b)When Jesus had finished saying these things, (c)the crowds were amazed at his teaching, 
(d)because he taught as one who had authority, and not as their teachers of the law. 
(Matthew, 5: 1-2; 7: 28-29) 
In the preaching that follows (45a), Jesus mentions as many as 19 different topics: “The Beatitudes,” “Salt 
and Light,” “The Fulfillment of the Law,” “Murder,” “Adultery,” “Divorce,” “Oaths,” “Eye for Eye,” “Love 
for Enemies,” “Giving to the Needy,” “Prayer,” “Fasting,” “Treasures in Heaven,” “Do Not Worry,” “Judging 
Others,” “Ask, Seek, Knock,” “The Narrow and Wide Gates,” “True and False Disciples,” and “The Wise 
and Foolish Builders”.  During his speech, no description is inserted of how the audience reacted to his 83
words. Their reaction is finally portrayed (45c), only when he finishes the long utterance (45b). Notice how 
brief and equivocal it is: what is clear in the text is just that they were “astonished.” There is no information 
provided as to how astonished they were, or which part of Jesus’ doctrine astonished them. In addition, the 
audience were surprised, Matthew illustrates, at the way Jesus has been preaching, and not at his message 
 Jonas is one of the books in the Old Testament.82
 The titles are all taken from the New International Version. It is necessary to note that the counting criterion varies in different 83
versions of the Gospel of Matthew. The number of 19 should therefore be understood as a rough indicator of how long and how many 
topics Jesus talks about in the scene.
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itself (45d). In this way, even though a certain reaction is offered to Jesus’ teaching in the above scene, it is 
still far from providing details of the reaction. 
 To summarize, the Gospels portray how Jesus tells religious message to a variety of people. In the 
description, they systematically avoid showing the response of the audience to Jesus, even though it is a 
possible option. This noticeable feature gives rise to two questions: (i) what function does this way of 
realizing conversation fulfill?; and (ii) what motivates it in the Gospels? 
5.3.2 Definition of Aposiopesis 
 The omissive way of describing Jesus’ conversation adopted in (43-45) is called ‘aposiopesis’ in the 
rhetorical terminology. It is a strategy to signal in some way that there may be something unstated in the text, 
in order to invite the reader to actively participate in meaning construction of the text (Sato, 1992b: 47).  84
For example, consider the following conversational scene between the narrator “I” and an old man in 






[ (a)“I have a boat for you.” The old man shouted at me loudly as if he was talking to a crooked 
 This is not a standard definition of aposiopesis in the study of rhetoric, however. It is traditionally characterized as in (ii) based on 84
examples such as (i): 
(i) What cause withholds you then, to mourn for him? / O judgment! thou art fled to brutish beasts, / And men have lost their 
reason. Bear with me, / My heart is in the coffin there with Caesar, / And I must pause till it come back to me
(Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, 3.2.105-107) 
(ii) a pragmatic figure, signifying a sudden disruption of discourse by omitting the expected end of a clause or sentence, as if the 
speaker/writer were unable or unwilling to proceed. (Sloane, 2001: 29) 
In many studies, aposiopesis is understood in connection to the the speaker’s emotional state such as anger, sadness, and hesitation 
(Nouchi, 1998: 295; Lanham, 1991: 20; Sloane, 2001: 29). The standard conceptualization is quite different from that by Sato (1992). 
Given this till, this study adopts Sato’s view because we equivalently focus on written discourse. Nevertheless, it is indeed a 
theoretical problem that a single phenomenon receives separate definitions. I would like to discuss the matter in a different 
opportunity.
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pine tree which stood as far as two hundred meters away. (b)“It’s a nice boat, and it’s cheap. Don’t 
you wanna buy it?” 
 (c)When I replied to him, he gave no response like he had anticipated how I would answer. And 
after stubbing out his cigarette on the ground and putting the remainder behind his ear, he did a 
farmer’s blow.] 
In contrast to the old man’s remarks (46a-b), the words of “I” are not quoted. It is only stated that “I” reacted 
to his offer (46c), with no specific detail of it (the following conversation is portrayed in the same way). This 
omission requires readers to imagine what “I” said, and invites them to actively participate into the meaning 
construction (Sato, 1992b: 24-25). The use of aposiopesis in the above example tightly connects the text to 
the reader. Aposiopesis is thus a rhetorical strategy that devise the text with some cues to indicate that there 
is something more than what is obviously stated so as to trigger the reader to visualize and ‘restore’ it 
(Nouchi, 1998: 295; Sato, 1992b: 46-47; Sato et al., 2006: 405). 
 Given this, let us go back to the Gospels. Recall that they systematically avoid illustrating how Jesus’s 
interlocutors respond to his teachings. This way of describing conversational scenes is viewed as instances of 
aposiopesis just like (46), because their reply is not provided in the interactional positions where it is 
sufficiently expected. It can serve to trigger the reader to imagine how Jesus’ words are received. Put another 
way, the use of aposiopesis in the Gospels leaves how his doctrine is received in each scene to readers’ 
interpretive work, provoking them to respond to his utterances themselves. Jesus’ preachings, therefore, are 
strongly oriented toward the reader (in addition to other characters), even though they are initiated in 
conversations in the world realized in the text. The strategy serves as a rhetorical means to carry his religious 
messages to the reader, rather than confine them in the text world. 
5.3.3 Description of Responses to Jesus 
 As shown in the above two sections, the Gospels frequently use aposiopesis, which plays the role of 
directing Jesus’ words to the reader. This may suggest that his teachings are invariably described with the 
strategy, and that individual readers can freely decide how to understand his message. In fact, however, these 
are not true. There are several conversations in which the reaction of Jesus’ audience is explicitly shown. 
Also, the reader’s interpretive work is not totally unrestricted, but rather given a certain orientation by those 
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scenes depicted without employing aposiopesis. The point to note here is that there are only two types of 
reactions made to Jesus’ preaching. 
5.3.3.1 Positive responses to Jesus 
 One types of reactions to Jesus is that audience positively accepts his words. Cited below is an excerpt 
from Mark (12: 35-37): 
(47) While Jesus was teaching in the temple courts, he asked, “(a)Why do the teachers of the law say that 
the Messiah is the son of David? David himself, speaking by the Holy Spirit, declared: 
 “‘The Lord said to my Lord: 
  “Sit at my right hand 
 until I put your enemies 
  under your feet.”’  85
David himself calls him ‘Lord.’ How then can he be his son?” 
(b)The large crowd listened to him with delight. (Mark, 12: 35-37) 
In this scene, Jesus’ questions (47a) is received by the people gladly (47b). This response indicates that they 
view Jesus’ words as the cause of such delight. That is to say, it evaluates his utterance as something positive. 
 A similar reaction is seen in the next example, taken from Matthew (9: 1-8): 
(48) Jesus stepped into a boat, crossed over and came to his own town. Some men brought to him a 
paralyzed man, lying on a mat. When Jesus saw their faith, he said to the man, “Take heart, son; 
your sins are forgiven.” 
At this, some of the teachers of the law said to themselves, “This fellow is blaspheming!” 
Knowing their thoughts, Jesus said, “Why do you entertain evil thoughts in your hearts? Which is 
easier: to say, ‘Your sins are forgiven,’ or to say, ‘Get up and walk’? But I want you to know that 
the Son of Man has authority on earth to forgive sins.” So he said to the paralyzed man, (a)“Get up, 
take your mat and go home.” Then the man got up and went home. (b)When the crowd saw this, 
 This is quoted from Psalm (110: 1).85
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they were filled with awe; and they praised God, who had given such authority to man. 
(Matthew, 9: 1-8) 
When Jesus heals a paralyzed man only with words (48a), the people around are amazed and pray for God, 
accepting him as a saint (48b). Their reaction characterizes Jesus as an authoritative figure. In this way, 
positive evaluation is attached to Jesus’ words and acts. It characterizes him as well as his teachings as ‘right’ 
and ‘authoritative’ in the text. 
5.3.3.2 Failure of opponents against Jesus to retort him 
 Another type of reaction given to Jesus is observed in the scenes where he argues with critical 
opponents. The excerpt below is taken from Luke (14: 1-6): 
(49) One Sabbath, when Jesus went to eat in the house of a prominent Pharisee, he was being carefully 
watched. There in front of him was a man suffering from abnormal swelling of his body. Jesus 
asked the Pharisees and experts in the law, “(a)Is it lawful to heal on the Sabbath or not?” (b)But they 
remained silent. So taking hold of the man, he healed him and sent him on his way. 
Then he asked them, “(c)If one of you has a child or an ox that falls into a well on the Sabbath day, 
will you not immediately pull it out?” (d)And they had nothing to say. (Luke, 14: 1-6) 
Jesus asks the lawyers and Pharisees a question of how can one justify healing someone on the sabbath day 
(49a). To this, however, they say nothing (49b). Given their silence, Jesus heals the man with the dropsy in 
front of them although it is a sabbath day, and asks them the same question again (49c), this time by giving a 
different instance of working on the sabbath day. Again, the lawyers and Pharisees cannot answer it (49d). 
 In fact, the lawyers and Pharisees had no other option than keep silent to the question, because they 
could not say either “Yes” or “No.” Since work on the sabbath day is forbidden by the Jewish law, they are 
supposed to answer “No” to the first question (49a). On the other hand, the second one (49c) would naturally 
be answered “Yes,” because leaving the fallen ox in a well will likely lead to a serious consequence. Since it 
is impossible to answer a single question by “Yes” and “No” at the same time, the lawyers and Pharisees 
could do nothing but keep their mouths shut. As long as his religious opponents cannot counter-argue, Jesus’ 
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view is ‘right’ and theirs — i.e., the Jewish law — ‘wrong.’ In this way, illustrating the scenes where Jesus 
wins an argument with critics contributes to proving him as well as his doctrine to be right. 
 Consider another example. Below is a part from Matthew (22: 15-22): 
(50) Then the Pharisees went out and laid plans to trap him in his words. They sent their disciples to him 
along with the Herodians. “Teacher,” they said, “we know that you are a man of integrity and that 
you teach the way of God in accordance with the truth. You aren’t swayed by others, because you 
pay no attention to who they are. (a)Tell us then, what is your opinion? Is it right to pay the imperial 
tax to Caesar or not?” 
But Jesus, knowing their evil intent, said, “(b)You hypocrites, why are you trying to trap me? Show 
me the coin used for paying the tax.” They brought him a denarius, and he asked them, “(c)Whose 
image is this? And whose inscription?” 
“(d)Caesar’s,” they replied. 
Then he said to them, “(e)So give back to Caesar what is Caesar’s, and to God what is God’s.” 
(f)When they heard this, they were amazed. So they left him and went away. (Matthew, 22: 15-22) 
The Pharisees’ disciples and the Herodians demand Jesus’ opinion about tax payment to Caesar (50a). Jesus 
replies with a negative evaluation of them (“ye hypocrites”), and makes a seemingly irrelevant request (50b). 
After confirming that the emperor’s profile is carved in the coin (50c-d), he claims to give what belongs to 
Caesar to him (50e), which also constitutes a reply to the initial requirement (50a). Being astonished by the 
remark, the Pharisees’ disciples and the Herodians leaves him without counter-arguing any more. Their 
reaction suggests that they could not retort to Jesus’ reasoning, and hence retroactively characterizes it as 
‘right.’ 
 In the Gospels, no conclusive criticism is given to Jesus as clearly shown in the above two examples. 
That is, he always wins arguments with those against him. It is important to note that this contributes to 
characterizing Jesus’ teachings to be ‘right’ — or at least ‘righter’ than any other doctrine. Veiling responses 
to Jesus can fulfill the same function. In general, silence in an argument is normally regarded as a sign of 
admission with no objection (Kozai, 2010: 79; Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969: 108). As such, the use of 
aposiopesis signals Jesus’ win and demonstrates he and his doctrine is right. 
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5.3.3.3 An exceptional case: Jesus is rejected 
 We have seen so far that the Gospels systematically portray Jesus and his doctrine as ‘right’ and 
‘authoritative’ through textual evaluation. On the other hand, however, there is one case which seems to be 
an exception. Consider the excerpt below, which is taken from Luke (4: 21-32). Jesus preaches people in his 
hometown. 
(51) He began by saying to them, “Today this scripture is fulfilled in your hearing.” 
All spoke well of him and were amazed at the gracious words that came from his lips. “Isn’t this 
Joseph’s son?” they asked. 
Jesus said to them, “Surely you will quote this proverb to me: ‘Physician, heal yourself!’ And you 
will tell me, ‘Do here in your hometown what we have heard that you did in Capernaum.’” 
“Truly I tell you,” he continued, “(a)no prophet is accepted in his hometown. I assure you that there 
were many widows in Israel in Elijah’s time, when the sky was shut for three and a half years and 
there was a severe famine throughout the land. Yet Elijah was not sent to any of them, but to a 
widow in Zarephath in the region of Sidon. And there were many in Israel with leprosy in the time 
of Elisha the prophet, yet not one of them was cleansed — only Naaman the Syrian.” 
(b)All the people in the synagogue were furious when they heard this. They got up, drove him out of 
the town, and took him to the brow of the hill on which the town was built, in order to throw him 
off the cliff. But he walked right through the crowd and went on his way. 
Then he went down to Capernaum, a town in Galilee, and on the Sabbath he taught the people. 
They were amazed at his teaching, because his words had authority. (Luke, 4: 21-32) 
In this scene, Jesus maintains that prophets are unwelcom in their hometown (51a), and this causes the locals 
to get angry and try to kill him (51b). This definitely seems to be a negative response. Nevertheless, it still 
contributes to Jesus’ ‘rightness’ in the end, because their reaction itself realizes and exemplifies what he has 
just pointed out about prophets. That is to say, the rejection of him consequently makes Jesus a prophet. The 
whole scene in (51) thus works to prove that his assertion is right. In this way, Jesus is invariably 
characterized as a ‘right’ one, which obviously indicates that this scene is not an exception. 
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5.3.3.4 The Gospels and the reader 
 In the Synoptic Gospels, responses to Jesus are only described when they are positive ones. This 
serves to evaluate him and his teachings as ‘right’ and establish his authority in the text. The texts of the 
Synoptic Gospels are entirely oriented toward positive characterization of Jesus. 
 This means that aposiopesis is employed in the middle of the evaluative orientation. As far as the 
Gospels are understood to be coherent texts, the teachings of Jesus are biased to be received affirmatively, 
even when his interlocutors do not explicitly react to him.  Therefore, the reader of the Gospels is not 86
completely free in how to understand Jesus’ words. The use of aposiopesis functions as a means to make 
Jesus right and give him authority, reflecting the evaluative stance of the Gospels. 
5.3.4. The Gospels and Aposiopesis 
 So far, we have clarified that the use of aposiopesis in the Gospels suggests that Jesus is ‘right’ and 
‘authoritative,’ and provides his words with a certain power to appeal to the reader, in the backdrop of the 
evaluative orientation in the whole texts. This function has some advantages in the Gospels. 
 In terms of positively evaluating Jesus, it might seem to be more advantageous to explicitly and 
continuously show that his words are affirmed by a variety of audience. This method would enable the 
Gospels to obviously characterize Jesus as a ‘right’ and ‘authoritative’ figure, indeed (cf. Sec. 5.3.1). On the 
other hand, however, this way of description cannot direct his words to the reader, but rather ends up 
confining them in the story world. Since Jesus is a character who lives in the text of the Gospels, he first and 
foremost talks to other characters. The reader only hears his words indirectly, as if s/he is eavesdropping. As 
a consequence, it is impossible for the text to directly carry his doctrine to the reader and get him/her to think 
about it. 
 The use of aposiopesis, in contrast, directs Jesus’ utterances to the reader, and invites them into active 
engagement in text comprehension. Through giving no explicit remark that evaluates Jesus or his teachings 
in the text, it will trigger the reader to form an opinion of him. That is, the rhetorical strategy make the reader 
‘directly’ face and receive Jesus and his words. This manner of communication between Jesus and the reader 
 Silence in argument can generally be considered as the arguer cannot retort the opponent’s claim any any more (Kozai, 2010: 79; 86
Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969: 108). This supports our view that the interpretation of the absence of the counter-argument by 
Jesus’ antagonists as they cannot support their stance is motivated to be considered as such.
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cannot be realized by explicitly illustrating reactions to his utterances. The use of aposiopesis thus connects 
Jesus as well as his words containing his doctrine ‘straight’ to the reader. Given this function, moreover, 
aposiopesis is also valuable in terms of Christianity. The nucleus of the religious doctrine is the acceptance of 
Jesus as Christ (Messiah) or the Son of God (Nakamura, 2010: 12-14; Matsumoto ed., 2009: 5; Yamaga, 
2014: 61-63). Consequently, bringing his words ‘directly’ to readers through aposiopesis means letting them 
face the religious nucleus. The use of the strategy, thus, contributes to textual realization of the core of 
Christianity. 
 Now, we are ready to answer the couple of questions we posed in Section 5.3.1. The questions and 
answers are summarized below: 
(52) (i) Q: What is the function of aposiopesis in the Gospels? 
 A: Aposiopesis directs Jesus’ utterances to the reader 
   　 establishes Jesus’ rightness and authority in the text 
(ii) Q: What motivates the use of aposiopesis in the Gospels? 
 A: Aposiopesis can get the reader to directly face Jesus, the core of Christianity 
With the use of aposiopesis, the Synoptic Gospels continuously invite the reader to hear the authoritative 
voice of Jesus and deeply think about his message. 
5.4 The Interplay between Parables and Aposiopesis 
 Aposiopesis is also deployed in the scenes where Jesus tells a parable. Together with allegory with 
insufficient clues for interpretation, it contributes to shape a certain relationship with the reader of the 
Synoptic Gospels. For example, consider the passage below from Luke (13: 1-11): 
(53) Now there were some present at that time who told Jesus about the Galileans whose blood Pilate 
had mixed with their sacrifices. Jesus answered, “Do you think that these Galileans were worse 
sinners than all the other Galileans because they suffered this way? I tell you, no! But unless you 
repent, you too will all perish. Or those eighteen who died when the tower in Siloam fell on them 
— do you think they were more guilty than all the others living in Jerusalem? I tell you, no! But 
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unless you repent, you too will all perish.” 
(a)Then he told this parable: “A man had a fig tree growing in his vineyard, and he went to look for 
fruit on it but did not find any. So he said to the man who took care of the vineyard, ‘For three 
years now I’ve been coming to look for fruit on this fig tree and haven’t found any. Cut it down! 
Why should it use up the soil?’ 
“‘Sir,’ the man replied, ‘leave it alone for one more year, and I’ll dig around it and fertilize it. If it 
bears fruit next year, fine! If not, then cut it down.’” 
(b)On a Sabbath Jesus was teaching in one of the synagogues, and a woman was there who had been 
crippled by a spirit for eighteen years. (Luke, 13: 1-11) 
The parable is introduced (53a) in the context where Jesus is talking about repentance and death. Although it 
pivots around a conversation between a vineyard owner and the caretaker on the treatment of a fruitless fig 
tree, the point of the narrative is clearly not the literal plot. Rather, given the context, Jesus is showing his 
view on repentance and death through the story. His talk is thus allegorical. Allegorical correspondences 
between the story and the ongoing topic are not sufficiently clear, however. The allegorical counterparts of 
the entities and events in the story are not provided in the text. This way of allegorical talk provokes the 
reader to find the answers to questions like, “Who do the owner and the caretaker of the vineyard represent?” 
“What do the fig tree and its fruit symbolize?” and “What do digging around the tree and fertilizing it stand 
for?” Thus, with insufficient clues for allegorical understanding, the parable discourse invites the reader into 
active interpretation. Meanwhile, the parable is also devised with aposiopesis. It is crucial to note that the 
allegorical story forms part of a response to those who told Jesus about the Galileans whose blood was mixed 
with sacrifices. When a speaker receives a response from the interlocutor, it is naturally expected for him/her 
to take turn and make a certain reply. In the above scene, however, how the people “present at the time” 
acted in response to Jesus’ utterance is not illustrated, even though it is likely for them to say something in 
response to the parable. Instead, the scene is closed right after the parable, and the next one begins (57b). 
This effectively directs Jesus’ words to the reader, inviting him/her to think about his message. The use of the 
two rhetorical strategies — allegory and aposiopesis — thus functions as effective means to deliver Jesus’ 
words to the reader of the Synoptic Gospels. 
 The combination of allegory and aposiopesis could seem disadvantageous, because they function as a 
kind of obstacle for clear understanding of Jesus’ messages. In other words, it might seem unreasonable to 
leave room for interpretation of his words, especially if one thinks that the purpose of the Synoptic Gospels 
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is to guarantee firm understanding of his views. Indeed, it could have been possible for the writers and 
editors of the Gospels to compose the text in a way that makes it quite simple to understand. Such ‘kind’ 
composition — i.e., with detailed explanation of allegory and no use of aposiopesis — would fail to ensure 
the reader’s engagement to interpretation. Put differently, whereas the parables would be plain to understand, 
it would make Jesus merely one of the characters in the story world, without triggering the reader to figure 
out allegorical correspondences or his intention. Then, the Synoptic Gospels would be nothing more than just 
a record of Jesus’ remarks. On the other hand, by preventing easy understanding through the use of allegory 
with insufficient clues and aposiopesis, the Synoptic Gospels effectively encourage the reader to 
communicate with Jesus himself/herself. The text thus rhetorically presents mysteries in order to shape an 
intimate relationship between Jesus and the reader. The use of allegory and aposiopesis is, therefore, 
beneficial for the Synoptic Gospels. 
5.5 Conclusion 
 This chapter focused on parables, i.e., allegorical stories told by Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels. An 
important characteristics of them is that they are not so easy to understand. Some do not offer sufficient clues 
for understanding allegorical correspondences, while others are told without a clear topic. The design leaves 
more or less room for the reader to interpret the message in the parables. In addition, the Gospels 
consistently employ the rhetorical strategy of aposiopesis when describing conversations between Jesus and 
other characters. Through hiding reactions to his words, it invites the reader to face Jesus, hear his voice as if 
he talks to him/her, and think about his message. The strategy also contributes to authorize Jesus and his 
teachings. Together with the use of aposiopesis, the Synoptic parables functions as a means to effectively 
deliver Jesus’ messages to the reader through inviting him/her to what he attempts to teach, thereby tightly 
connecting Jesus and the reader. 
 The use of allegory and aposiopesis in the Synoptic parables has important implications for rhetorical 
studies. Traditionally, rhetorical strategies have been recognized as means to help and/or enhance the hearer’s 
or reader’s understanding. For example, in arguments, a variety of schemes are utilized to clearly advance 
one’s opinion and persuade the opponent. In literary works, various figures of speech to give a detailed 
account of scenes and characters’ feelings. In this view, rhetoric is for firm understanding of talk or text, and 
interpretive difficulty is expected to be avoided in general. However, recall that in the Synoptic Gospels, 
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allegory and aposiopesis contribute to provide some interpretive puzzles to solve. This obviously indicates 
that rhetorical strategies can be employed to obscure the intended meaning. In addition, the puzzles are not 
offered as unnecessary barricade but for a relationship-building effect. It follows from this that even though 
the talk and text presented in such a challenging manner requires the hearer or reader to put more labor for 
interpretation, it is rhetorical as long as it contributes to function with certain effects. Given this, exploring 
how skillfully a text or talk avoid transparency and what effects it has can be a direction of rhetorical studies. 
The analysis and discussion in this chapter can be characterized as one example of the direction. 
 While centrally focusing on a kind of written discourse, i.e., the Synoptic Gospels, this chapter has 
discussed the relationship the text shapes with the reader. As a consequence, our analysis might seem to aim 
at clarifying how individual readers actually understand (or, how they should understand) the Gospels. 
Interpretive work by actual readers is not the target of this study, however. With the focus on such particular 
aspect of text comprehension, we would have ended up reaching an analytical dead end, because every 
reader can (and probably will) understand more or less different ways. Some readers may be sensitively 
aware that there is a limited kind and number of responses shown to Jesus in the text, for example, while 
others may not even notice at all the possible interactional slots in which the audience could react to him. It 
is extremely difficult — or perhaps almost impossible — to shed light on such particularities. Instead, our 
focus has been on how the text of the Gospels is constructed, and what sort of interpretation can emerge from 
the way they are shaped. Part of the significance of this section lies in the this analytical attitude.  87
 For the expression and function of silence in written discourse, also cf. Ohnuma (1973).87
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6. Exemplifying a Moral Lesson with a Narrative: Fables 
6.1 Introduction 
 This chapter focuses on the discursive genre of the fable . As we saw in Chapter 2, in general, the 88
fable seems to be considered as a moral story such as (54): 
(54) The Fox and the Bunch of Grapes 
A famished fox, seeing some bunches of grapes hanging [from a vine which had grown] in a tree, 
wanted to take some, but could not reach them. So he went away saying to himself: 
 ‘Those are unripe.’ 
Similarly, certain people, not being able to run their affairs well because of their inefficiency, 
blame the circumstances. (Aesop, The Complete Fables) 
The stereotypical understanding of the genre is often found in the literature: previous studies define the fable 
as a story that exemplifies a lesson stated either by the narrator or by one of the characters at the end. The 
traditional formulation might apparently seem to capture the fable’s characteristics adequately. 
 The traditional view, however, does not provide a comprehensive description, because the fable 
actually takes several different organizations in terms of presenting a lesson. First, the sequence of a story 
and a lesson is not fixed. While the majority of fables first narrate a story and then draw a lesson from it, 
there are some which first state a lesson and then tell a narrative to substantiate it. Moreover, there are even a 
small number of instances which present a lesson both before and after narration. Second, whereas the 
narrator may present a lesson as in (54), one of the characters may state it inside the story frame. Although 
this divergence is already mentioned in earlier research, it is not seen as a significant difference within the 
genre. Third, not all fables present a moral lesson obviously. In some fables, neither the narrator nor any of 
the characters states it explicitly but rather the fabulist leave the labor of extracting a lesson from the story to 
the reader’s interpretive work. In this way, the genre of the fable is not as simple as is traditionally 
recognized. 
 The three observations presented above lead us to a question: why does the fable take different 
patterns? To confront this, this chapter employs a discourse analytic perspective. Our starting point is that the 
fable is related to the act of exemplifying a moral lesson. Exemplification is a rhetorical strategy in which the 
 The analysis and discussion in this chapter is based on Hirakawa (2012, 2017a).88
108
speaker supports a claim by giving an instance of it. In conversation, supporting a claim by narrating an 
exemplary story requires it to be anchored in an ongoing interaction with an interlocutor: the story needs to 
be initiated and concluded as an instance of the claim. This procedure for exemplification can be drawn on in 
composing fables. On the other hand, fables are realized in the context of written discourse. Since they are 
not engaging in an ongoing interaction with the reader, the writer can depart from the procedure in 
conversation and perform exemplification in more ‘elliptical’ ways, which results in different structures. This 
chapter argues that the structural variation of the fable is thus generated as a consequence of different ways 
of exemplifying a lesson in written discourse. 
 The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 6.2 explores previous studies on the fable and points out 
that the fable has more structures than is traditionally acknowledged. Section 6.3 reviews a conversational 
analytic research that describes the procedure for exemplification in conversational argument and claims that 
this procedure is drawn on in realizing some fables. Section 6.4 shows how the context of written discourse 
triggers fables to take more ‘elliptical’ patterns. The last section sums up the whole discussion and presents 
the significance of this study. 
6.2 Various Patterns of Fables 
 Though the fable is a widely recognized genre, it has received little attention that it takes several 
different structural patterns with regard to providing a moral lesson, reflecting different ways of linking the 
story and the lesson. This section reviews the previous research on the fable (6.2.1), observes that it takes 
multiple structures (6.2.2), and raises a question to confront in this chapter (6.2.3). 
 Before starting my discussion, the data set used in my analysis consists of randomly selected eight 
compilation books of fables: six of them are Aesopic and the other two are English translations of French 
fables by La Fontaine.  The fables analyzed amount to 1,567 in total. Note that the research interest here lies 89
in qualitative variation found in the genre in question rather than in quantitative distribution of different 
structures, although how many tokens are found in each structural type is parenthetically noted. 
6.2.1 Patterns Traditionally Described 
 Cross-linguistic comparison on fables from different cultural backgrounds would be an interesting (and perhaps fruitful) direction 89
of research.
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 The fable is traditionally formulated as follows: 
(55) A fable (also called an apologue) is a short narrative, in prose or verse, that exemplifies an abstract 
moral thesis or principle of human behavior; usually, at its conclusion, either the narrator or one of 
the characters states a moral in the form of an epigram. Most common is the beast fable, in which 
animals talk and act like the human types they represent. (Abrams, 1985: 6) 
Here, the term “narrative” is meant to refer to “a story, whether told in prose or verse, involving events, 
characters, and what the characters say and do” (Abrams, 1985: 173). As (55) and many other descriptions 
(e.g., Barton & Hudson, 2004; Cuddon, 1980; Drabble ed., 2000; Lanham, 1991; Shaw, 1972) point out, the 
central features of the fable are that it consists of a story (often with animals as its characters) and that the 
story serves to convey a moral lesson. 
 As the underlined part in (55) describes, though it does not recognize them as such, the fable has two 
structural patterns to present a lesson: it may be stated outside the story by the narrator, or inside it by a 
character. First, let us look at the former pattern. 
(56) The Fox and the Mask 
A fox entered an actor’s house and rummaged through all his properties. Among other things he 
found a mask representing a hobgoblin’s head - a work of a talented artist. He took it up in his paws 
and said: ‘What a fine head! A pity it has no brain in it!’ 
 ¶ This fable reminds us that some men of impressive physical appearance are deficient in 
intellect. (Handford & Robb, Fables of Aesop) 
This pattern is two-fold: a story is first narrated with the introduction by a title and then a lesson is presented. 
Importantly, the lesson is sometimes stated with some devices that mark its relationship with the preceding 
narrative. In (56), starting a new line and the paragraph symbol (“¶”) indicates the end of the narrative, and 
the underlined phrase characterizes what follows as something we should know. The introductory phrase also 
serves to extract the following lesson from the story. In addition, while the story of a fox is consistently 
narrated in the past tense (e.g., “entered,” “rummaged,” etc.), the present tense is chosen after the paragraph 
symbol. This indicates that while the story concerns past events, the concluding remark is a timeless, general 
statement, which may urge the reader to interpret this part as presenting a lesson. Moreover, the initial deictic 
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phrase “This fable” and the use of an inclusive we (“us”) collaboratively give an impression as if the narrator 
is talking to the reader face-to-face, like in conversation. In this way, this pattern of the fable, sometimes 
equipped with devices which contribute to differentiating and relating the story and the concluding remark, 
generalizes a moral lesson from the story. 
 On the other hand, in the latter pattern, one of the characters that appear in the story provides a moral 
lesson. Let us look at (57): 
(57) The Wolf Proud of His Shadow, and the Lion 
One day a wolf was wandering in some uninhabited regions at the hour when the sun sinks low 
down towards the horizon. Seeing his elongated shadow, he said: 
 ‘Look at that! With my stature, should I fear the lion? With such an immense size, should I not 
become the king of all the animals?’ 
 And as he was fully given up to pride with this thought, a lion of great strength suddenly leapt 
upon him and devoured him. 
 (a)The wolf changed his opinion and cried: 
 (b)‘Presumption brings us misfortune.’ (Aesop, The Complete Fables) 
In this example, the fabulist does not provide a concluding remark to present a lesson outside the narrative 
about an arrogant wolf but rather pulls the strings behind him. Consequently, the wolf asserts a lesson he 
learned at the expense of his life inside the story. 
 In this pattern, the fabulist equips the final part of the narrative with some devices to signal that the 
last words by a character express a lesson. In (57), first, the introductory sentence to the wolf’s final words 
(57a) implies that the following line (57b) may be something contrastive with the wolf’s ridiculous thought 
of becoming “the king of all the animals,” namely something ‘wise.’ Second, (the fabulist has) the wolf 
chooses the present tense to construct his final utterance (57b), generalizing his personal experience and 
claiming that the same thing he has just experienced may happen to other arrogant people. In this situation, 
he could instead choose the past tense or the present perfect. However, with either of these options, the 
wolf’s final utterance would refer only to his own experience and consequently he could not generalize his 
experience. Third, the wolf selects the first-person plural pronoun (“us”) rather than the first-person singular 
pronoun (me). Since it is the wolf alone that was devoured by a great lion for having an inflated pride, it 
would be possible to use me to mourn his “misfortune.” However, it could not show the applicability of his 
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experience to others, because it would refer only to the wolf himself. The use of “us” signals the general 
applicability of the wolf’s experience. In this way, the fabulist implicitly presents a moral lesson through the 
wolf’s last words. This is how this pattern of the fable is typically designed. 
 The two fables we have observed (56-57) instantiate the traditional formulation (55). Although it is not 
adequately recognized, they are obviously distinctive in terms of how a lesson is presented to readers. 
Whereas (56) consists of the story of a fox and a lesson derived from it by the narrator, (57) consists of the 
story of a wolf in which his experience is generalized into a lesson by the animal character. This difference 
is, though vital, underestimated, or almost neglected, in the literature, but gives rise to an important question: 
why does the fable take different patterns to state a moral lesson? Before starting to answer this, however, let 
us continue our search for other patterns that the fable takes. 
6.2.2 Patterns Newly Observed 
 The traditional description says that a story in the fable comes before a moral lesson. However, the 
sequential order between those two components is not always fixed that way. Let us examine the following 
example:  90
(58) (a)TIT FOR TAT 
(b)Do not do an ill turn to anyone. But if someone injures you, he deserves, according to the fable 
which I am going to relate, to be paid back in his own coin. 
 The story is that a stork which had arrived from foreign parts received an invitation to dinner 
from a fox, who served her with clear soup on a smooth slab of marble, so that the hungry bird 
could not taste a drop of it. Returning the invitation, the stork produced a flagon filled with pap, 
into which she stuck her bill and had a good meal, while her guest was tormented with hunger. 
‘You set the example,’ she said, ‘and you must not complain at my following it.’ 
(Handford & Robb, Fables of Aesop) 
This fable is totally distinct from the ones we have seen, which first narrate a story after a title and end with a 
lesson. The above fable does begin with a title (58a), but it is qualitatively different from the ones in (56-57) 
 A fable structurally equivalent to (5) is mentioned in Olmos (2015: 202). However, she does not recognize that fable as an instance 90
of a distinctive structural pattern.
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in that it does not mention the names of the animals that appear in the narrative that follows but implies its 
resolution. Directly after the title comes a moral lesson (58b). This part is designed in a way that makes it 
clear that it is a general statement: the expressions “anyone,” “someone,” and “you” refer to a person in 
general, and the use of the imperative (“Do not do”) and the present tense (“deserves”) indicates that this 
sentence expresses a timeless idea. Evidently, this lesson is told by the narrator, as the use of “I” clearly 
indicates. Then following (58b), a narrative is told at last. At the same moment as it comes to its end, the 
entire fable also reaches its conclusion. 
 Importantly, the functional relationship between the moral and the story is crucially different from that 
in narrative-first fables. This is explicitly indicated by the word “relate” in (58b). Because the initial 
imperative concerns a general attitude while the subsequent story (it is called a “fable”) depicts a particular 
event, the word “relate” substantially means ‘to give an example’ here. That is, the lesson is no longer 
generalized from the narrative, but rather it is substantiated with the following story. The story is 
characterized as an example proactively by the preceding lesson but not retroactively by a lesson after it. On 
this point, this pattern differs starkly from the above two (56-57).  91
 Furthermore, there are fables in which a lesson is stated both before and after a story. For instance, 
look at (59):  92
(59) THE HEN WHO LAID THE GOLDEN EGGS 
(a)Greed loses all by trying for too much. 
(b)To put this maxim to the touch, 
(c)Take but the Fool whose hen, as we are told, 
Laid once a day an egg of gold. 
Thinking she hid a treasure in her breast, 
He killed and cut her open - when behold! 
Inside she was exactly like the rest 
Whose eggs but fetched the market price: 
Himself had spoilt the best of his estate. 
 Fables like (58) are a minor pattern. In my collection, three compilations out of eight contain this pattern and it amounts to 41 91
instances (2.62%) in 1567 fables in total. This does not, however, makes it valueless to deal with this pattern, because this chapter 
focuses on the fact that the fable display variation. What counts in this study is not quantitative facts but qualitative difference 
observed among fables.
 A fable structurally equivalent to (59) is touched on lightly in Kitagaki (1970: 83, 86). However, he does not treat it as an example 92
of a distinct pattern.
113
(d)A lesson here for Avarice! 
(e)Many the Get-Rich-Quicks we’ve seen of late, 
Warm men at dawn, by dusk church mice. (La Fontaine, La Fontaine’s Fables) 
This fable states a moral lesson twice in different ways. First, it is presented after the title (59a) as a general 
statement in the present tense. Here, it expresses common inclination of greedy people, signaling its 
qualitative distinction from the following narrative by italicization. The italicized phrase is obviously 
supposed to be read as a lesson in that it is called “this maxim” in (59b). In addition, the expression “put this 
maxim to the touch” clarifies that the upcoming narrative substantiates the lesson. Then, the story about a 
fool and his precious hen starts to be narrated with an orientation (59c). Second, after the story the lesson is 
presented again in (59e), with an announcement of the lesson explicitly extracted from the story (59d). This 
time, the lesson is composed so as to tell the reader how “Get-Rich-Quicks” end up for their greedy nature. 
The “church mice,” which refers to them figuratively, is a metaphor for extremely poor people. The position 
after the narrative signals that the lesson is generalized from the narrated events, and the narrative in turn is 
retroactively characterized as an example of the lesson. In this way, the story about a fool and his hen is 
doubly designed as an example. The sequential and functional organization of the fable like (59), therefore, 
is different from that of others that presents a lesson only once.  93
 So far, we have observed that the fable takes multiple structures. The traditional study does not 
describe them as distinctive patterns and accordingly fails to account for how they are generated. In short, the 
previous research is unsuccessful both in description and in explanation of the structural variation of the 
fable. The observation in this section therefore contributes to elaborating the scope of the fable study. 
6.2.3 Summary 
 This section reviewed the traditional description of the fable (6.2.1) and observed that the fable takes 
several structures with distinct sequential and functional organization that are out of the attention of the 
previous study (6.2.2). These patterns can be represented schematically with a name after their structure as 
follows: 
 This is also a minor pattern in my data set: three books out of eight contain this pattern and it amounts to 64 instances (4.08%) in 93
1567 fables in total. But still this pattern should not be undervalued because what we are looking at is not a statistical tendency but 
qualitative variation found in the genre of the fable.
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(60) Generalization Pattern 
a. [TITLE] b. [STORY] c. [LESSON] 
e.g., (56) “The fox and the mask” 
(61) Embedding Pattern 
a. [TITLE] b. [STORY [LESSON]] 
e.g., (57) “The wolf proud of his shadow, and the lion” 
(62) Substantiation Pattern 
a. [TITLE] b. [LESSON] c. [STORY] 
e.g., (58) “Tit for tat” 
(63) Substantiation-Generalization Pattern 
a. [TITLE] b. [LESSON] c. [STORY] d. [LESSON] 
e.g., (59) “The hen who laid the golden eggs” 
 Though the genre of the fable is widely known, it is not commonly recognized that it takes those 
various patterns in exemplifying a moral lesson by telling a story. Given this, then, what enables the fable to 
state a lesson before, after, or both before and after the narration? This question may be difficult to answer by 
examining written, literary fables alone because the communicative activity between the writer and the 
reader is not evidently observable in the context of written discourse. So, let us analyze the process of 
conversational exemplification, where it is transparent how people exemplify their claim, in order to obtain 
some insights applicable to our analysis of written fables. 
6.3 The Narrative as a Persuasive Device 
 In the rhetorical study, the fable is counted as a device for exemplification (Sloane, 2001: 395; Olmos, 
2015: 194) in that it makes an assertion about how or how not we should behave by instantiating it with a 
story. ,  Whereas the fable is a written genre, exemplification with a narrative is not a rhetorical strategy 94 95
intrinsic to written discourse. Importantly, exemplification with a narrative is in effect done in conversational 
argument through a certain procedure, and following it results in a certain discursive pattern. 
 This does not mean either that exemplification is always achieved by telling a story or that narrating a story always contributes to 94
exemplification.
 The status of the fable as a rhetorical tool for exemplification can also be found in the description of the genre as in (1).95
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 This section reviews a conversation analytic research that reveals how the act of exemplification with 
a story is performed in oral talk-exchange (6.3.1) and clarifies that one of the structures of the fable (i.e., the 
Substantiation-Generalization Pattern) is realized in the same procedure (6.3.2). 
6.3.1 The Procedure for Conversational Exemplification 
 Müller & Di Luzio (1995) describes a pattern that recurrently occur in conversational claim making, 
based on data taken from “a 90-minute Italian radio phone-in program” (Müller & Di Luzio, 1995: 116-117). 
In this program, “[l]isteners are stimulated to call in, give a report and argue for a position. The question 
opened and to be answered [...] is [...]: Are our memories of the past something we should hang on to and 
accept as a guide for the future, or are they a burden we should rather get rid of to be open for new 
experience? Should we go back to revisit the places and people familiar from our childhood, or rather avoid 
this?” (Müller & Di Luzio, 1995: 118) 
 Cited below is a fragment of interaction between a caller, Fernanda (F), who thinks that one’s 
memories are useless, and the moderator of the program (A). ,  96 97
(64) (From FERNANDA call; last part of an extended turn) 
01 F: il nostro passato siamo noi e non i nostri ricordi 
  ‘it is we who are our past and not our memories’ 
02 siamo quelli che siamo: e:h (.) nel presente (.) e niente h 
 ‘we are what we are e:h (.) in the present (.) and nothing h’ 
03 dobbiamo vivere nel presente e guardare: in avanti 
 ‘we must live in the present and look ahead’ 
04 A: perché ta:nta rigidità nei confronti del proprio passato? 
 The transcription conventions adopted by Müller & Di Luzio are as follows (Müller & Di Luzio, 1995: 118): 96
 (.) short pauses (under 0.5 sec.) 
 e: h prolongation of a sound 
 h audible in- or outbreath 
 h (or multiples of this) laughing 
 tanti strongly accentuated syllable 
 (? ?) questionable or unidentifiable element 
 = (between turns) latching of turns 
 / audible break within ongoing utterance
 The English translation from original Italian is by Müller & Di Luzio (1995).97
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  ‘why so much rigidity against confronting one’s own past?’ 
05 F: perché penso  
  ‘because I think’ 
06 che non serva (.) non serva perché veramente 
 ‘it does not serve any purpose (.) it does not serve any’ 
07 io penso che venga sempre: mh/io ricordo per esempio 
 ‘purpose because really I think it will a:lways mh/I’ 
08 quando andai in villeggiatura da bambina in una certa 
 ‘remember for example when I went to vacation as a child’ 
09 Civitella (.) (?c’è?) un torre:nte che mi sembrava 
 ‘to a place called Civitella (.) (?there is?) there was a’ 
10 tanto bello (.) ci sono tornata verso i vent’anni (.) 
 ‘stre:am that seemed to me so beautiful (.) I returned to it’ 
11 era: (.) affare maledorante = 
 ‘when I was twenty (.) it wa:s (.) a stinking affair =’ 
12 A: =m::h 
  ‘=m::h’ 
13 F: una cosa proprio veramente che faceva ribrezzo (.) 
  ‘a thing that really and truly made you nauseated (.)’ 
14 e per me invece quel ruscello era chissà che cosa (.) 
 ‘and yet for me this stream had been god knows what (.)’ 
15 per cui insomma mh: une insegnamento di più che 
 ‘therefore in sum mh: one more lesson that’ 
16 i ricordi non sono mai fedeli e non essendo fedeli 
 ‘memories are never reliable and not being reliable’ 
17 non se:rvono 
 ‘they don’t serve any purpose’ (Müller & Di Luzio, 1995: 119-120) 
Answering the moderator’s question (line 04), the caller continues to clarify her position (05 through 07), 
and then starts recalling her experience about Civitella (line 08). Note that she introduces her story with the 
phrase “io ricordo per esempio” (“I remember for example”). With this, she positions the upcoming story to 
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be nothing but an example to support her claim (Müller & Di Luzio, 1995: 122). That is, this way of 
initiating a story characterizes it as something substantiating her assertion. F’s narration extends from line 08 
to 14, with the moderator’s brief response in line 12. In conclusion, the caller evaluates what she learned 
from revisiting a memorable place (lines 16 and 17), positioning this evaluation as “insegnamento” (a 
“lesson”) derived from the story (line 15). Because the narrative is designed as a piece of evidence to support 
her assertion, the lesson drawn from it functions not only as an evaluation of the preceding story but also a 
re-statement of the claim (Müller & Di Luzio, 1995: 124). In effect, the caller repeats the same phrase “non 
serva/servono” (“[memories don’t] serve any purpose”) before and after the story, emphasizing the same 
syllables. In addition, the lesson also “close[s] her extended turn” from line 06 to 17, and “[b]y moving 
(back) to genericness, speakers can signal that they have — at least for this turn — exhaustively treated their 
topic” (Müller & Di Luzio, 1995: 124). In the final line (17), Fernanda closes her argumentative step (i.e., an 
assertion by exemplification) by repeating the same phrase she uttered in the initial line of her extended turn 
(“not serve any purpose” in 06), and this repetition marks the end of her extended turn. The lesson thus 
functions as “closure of the narrative, closure of a step in argument and closure of an extended turn at talk” 
(Müller & Di Luzio, 1995: 124-125). Müller & Di Luzio (1995) finds in their data set that exemplification in 
conversational claim making proceeds in this way. 
 The recursive pattern in argument in conversational discourse like (64) can be “represented 
schematically as a three-step procedure” (Müller & Di Luzio, 1995: 141) as follows: 
(65) a. [CLAIM] 
 Making a generic claim 
b. [STORY] 
 Narration of a story as an example 
c. [EVALUATION/CONCLUSION] 
 Re-statement of the generic evaluation as if it were derived from the story 
(Müller & Di Luzio, 1995: 141; De Fina & Georgakopoulou, 2010: 98) 
This schema captures, first of all, the sequential organization of exemplification of a claim with a story in 
conversational argument. The arguer first clarifies his/her position in a generic manner in interaction with an 
interlocutor (65a) and starts to tell a story as a piece of evidence that supports that position (65b). In closing 
the narrative (65c), the arguer extracts his/her opinion from the narrative through displaying his/her 
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evaluation to the narrated events. Through this procedure, the arguer makes obvious the genus-species 
relation between the claim and the story. 
 Significantly, Müller & Di Luzio (1995) also reveals that the three steps in the procedure are 
functionally related to each other. The initial generic claim (65a) characterizes the following story to be an 
example that backs it up, and narrating the story (65b) conditions the subsequent evaluation as a re-statement 
of the arguer’s claim. In addition, the re-statement (65c) in turn characterizes retroactively the preceding 
narrative as an instance supporting the arguer’s position. Thus, “[t]he functional embedding of the story, its 
ancillary relation to prior talk and, more specifically, its status as an example to support a prior generic claim 
in an argument is displayed not only in the sequential proximity and the internal organization of the story. It 
is also explicitly invoked here by the speaker, who gives the story a frame and relates it, both at its beginning 
and at its end, to the preceding claim [...]” (Müller & Di Luzio, 1995: 120-121). The above structure thus 
reflects “how everyday narrators display the narrative work of a story as work that serves to substantiate a 
claim in argument” (Müller & Di Luzio, 1995: 140-141). 
 Müller & Di Luzio (1995) says that in exemplification by telling a story in conversational argument, 
the arguer doubly characterizes his/her narration as instantiating a generic claim s/he is attempting to make. 
Importantly, the arguer does so because the act of exemplary story-telling is embedded in an ongoing claim-
making (Müller and Di Luzio, 1995: 122, 136). Since the arguer starts narrating a story as an argumentative 
step, s/he needs to relate his/her narration to the ongoing act of assertion when starting it and connect the 
story to the initial argument after finishing it.  Without such tying, the arguee might not license the arguer to 98
start narrating or might not get the point of the narration. It follows that exemplifying a claim with a story in 
conversation requires the arguer to doubly characterize the story both before and after narration. The three-
step procedure for exemplification with a story in conversation, therefore, is motivated by performing the act 
of instantiating one’s claim by narrating a story in the context of conversational talk-exchange. Given that 
conversation is the most basic context of language use, the three-step procedure is characterized as a standard 
for narrative exemplification. 
6.3.2 Fables as Exemplification 
 The transition from interactional claim-making to story-telling, and the one from the narration back to the initial claim-making 98
respectively correspond to the “abstract” and the “coda” in the structure of the narrative modeled by Labov (1982: 364-366).
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 Now, it would be easy to see that a pattern of the fable that we observed in Section 2 mirrors the three-
step procedure (65). 
(66) (=(63)) 
Substantiation-Generalization Pattern 
a. [TITLE] b. [LESSON] c. [STORY] d. [LESSON] 
The first lesson (70b) corresponds to the initial generic claim (69a), the animal story (70c) to the instantiating 
story (69b), and the post-narrative lesson (70d) to the evaluation/conclusion (69c). Let us look at an example: 
(67) (59) with modifications 
THE HEN WHO LAID THE GOLDEN EGGS 
(a)Greed loses all by trying for too much. 
(b)To put this maxim to the touch, 
Take but the Fool whose hen, as we are told, 
Laid once a day an egg of gold. 
[STORY] 
(c)A lesson here for Avarice! 
(d)Many the Get-Rich-Quicks we’ve seen of late, 
Warm men at dawn, by dusk church mice. (La Fontaine, La Fontaine’s Fables) 
The fabulist first makes a claim about greedy people (67a) and characterizes the following story to serve as 
an example to substantiate the claim, initiating it with some metalinguistic introductory expressions (67b). 
After the narration (the end of which is marked with (67c)), the fabulist asserts the initial claim again, this 
time as a comment on the narrated events (67d). This concluding remark is characterized by the preceding 
narrative as a generalization about desirable behavior and at the same time characterizes it as an instance 
from which the lesson is extracted. The sequential and functional organization of fables like (67) thus 
explicitly demonstrates the process of exemplification, i.e., substantiation of the initial lesson with a story 
and generalization of the narrated events into a conclusion. 
 This indicates that this pattern is realized and may be interpreted by following the three-step procedure 
of conversational exemplification with a narrative (65) in written discourse. Because s/he employs a 
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narrative as a means to exemplify a lesson, the fabulist can draw on that procedure even with the contextual 
difference, generating the same textual pattern as a result, and because this same pattern is realized in the 
text, the reader can interpret it as a product of exemplification. That is, the discourse of the Substantiation-
Generalization Pattern is circulated by drawing on the exemplification procedure represented in (65) as a 
resource. 
6.3.3 Summary 
 Müller & Di Luzio (1995) reveals that a pattern is repeatedly observed in exemplification with a story 
in conversational argument and clarifies that it emerges as a consequence of the act of exemplifying a claim 
by narrating a story in conversational interaction. This pattern is shared by the Substantiation-Generalization 
Pattern of the fable and the exemplification procedure in conversation serves to be a resource for the fabulist 
to generate, and for the reader to consume, this pattern. Hence, it is now clear how the Substantiation-
Generalization Pattern is constructed and why it takes the shape that it does. Then, how are the other patterns 
of the fable composed? Let us confront this question in the next section. 
6.4 The Fable and its Context: Written Discourse 
 In fact, most fables do not present the same lesson twice; they state a lesson only once, either before or 
after narration.  Let us look at the former: 99
(68) (=(62)) 
Substantiation Pattern 
a. [TITLE] b. [LESSON] c. [STORY] 
(69) One Master as Good as Another 
Poor men generally find that a change of government simply means exchanging one master for 
another — a truth which is illustrated in the following little anecdote. 
 A timid old man was grazing his donkey in a meadow when all of a sudden he was alarmed by 
 See the footnote 4 above for the (fairly rough) statistics of the substantiation-Generation Patter.99
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the shouting of some enemy soldiers. ‘Run for it,’ he cried, ‘so that they can’t catch us.’ But the 
donkey was in no hurry. ‘Tell me,’ said he: ‘if I fall into the conqueror’s hands, do you think he will 
make me carry a double load?’ ‘I shouldn’t think so,’ was the old man’s answer. — ‘Then what 
matter to me what master I serve as long as I only have to bear my ordinary burden?’ 
(Handford & Robb, Aesop’s Fables) 
(70) The Mighty Fallen 
When a man loses the prestige that he once had, he becomes in his misfortune the plaything even of 
cowards. 
 A lion worn out with age and feebleness lay breathing his last. First came a boar and with a blow 
from its flashing tusks took revenge on him for an old injury. Then a bull lowered its horns and 
gored its enemy’s body. An ass, seeing these attacks delivered with impunity, started kicking the 
lion’s forehead with its heels. The lion was on the point of expiring. ‘It was hard enough to bear,’ 
he said, ‘when those brave animals triumphed over me. But as for you, you shameful blot on 
creation, to be at your mercy as I die is like dying twice over.’ (Handford & Robb, Aesop’s Fables) 
In this pattern, a moral statement (68b) precedes a story (68c), characterizing the narrative proactively as an 
instance that substantiates it. In (69), this functional relationship between these two components is stated by 
the underlined parenthetical phrase. This does not mean, however, that a narrative always accompanies such 
a remark when put after a lesson. Still, even without such an explicit linkage, it is natural to understand a 
story after a general statement as an exemplar of it based on their sequential order, as in (70). Whether or not 
a lesson and a story are explicitly linked, the sequence between them parallels the first two steps of the three-
step procedure for conversational exemplification (65a-b). 
 The latter pattern, on the other hand, shows a different sequential and functional relationship between 
the story and the lesson. 
(71) (=(60)) 
Generalization Pattern 
a. [TITLE] b. [STORY] c. [LESSON] 
(72) The Ass, the Raven and the Wolf 
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An ass who had a sore on his back was grazing in a meadow. A raven landed, perched on the ass’s 
back and started pecking at the sore. The ass, believing it was the sore that caused him such pain, 
began to bray and buck. The ass-driver, who saw this from some distance away, burst out laughing. 
A wolf who was passing by saw him and said to himself: 
 ‘How unfortunate we are! It’s bad enough that when we are seen we are driven off, but when 
one of those comes near them they just laugh at it.’ 
This fable shows that mischievous people are recognized for what they are at first sight. 
(Aesop, The Complete Fables) 
(73) The Mule 
A mule had grown fat and wanton from his huge daily rations of corn, and one day, as he was 
jumping, kicking, and gamboling about the fields, he thought to himself, “My mother must surely 
have been a thoroughbred racer, and I’m quite as good as she ever was!” 
 But he was soon exhausted from the galloping and frisking, and all at once he remembered that 
his sire had been nothing but an ass. 
 Every truth has two sides. It is best to look at both before we declare where we stand. 
(Zipes ed., Aesop’s Fables) 
In this pattern, the story (71b) sequentially precedes the lesson (71c) and the narrated events are generalized 
into a lesson. While in (72), the underscored introductory phrase to the lesson implies this relationship, such 
introduction is not necessary as exemplified in (73). The story is thus functionally characterized as an 
example to support the lesson retroactively by the subsequent moral statement. This way of exemplification 
parallels the last two steps of the exemplification procedure in conversation (65b-c). 
 Those two patterns of the fable thus partly share the procedure of exemplification with a story in 
conversation. To put it differently, one of the steps is omitted from the procedure: the Substantiation Pattern 
leaves out the EVALUATION/CONCLUSION step (65c); and the Generalization Pattern the CLAIM step 
(65a). As a result, the moral lesson characterizes the story as exemplifying it in only one way, proactively in 
the former and retroactively in the latter. The discursive structure of the above two patterns is therefore a 
consequence of partial employment of the procedure for exemplification with a story in conversation (65). 
 Then, why is it that in the construction of fables the exemplification procedure can be drawn on 
partially? To tackle this question, it is helpful to consider the difference in context between conversational 
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exemplification with a story and exemplification in written discourse (i.e., the fable). 
 In conversational discourse, the arguer needs to anchor a story in the ongoing talk-exchange in which 
s/he is engaging, characterizing it both pro- and retroactively as an exemplar of a claim. On the other hand, 
in exemplification by telling a story in the context of written discourse, the writer is not participating in a 
real-time interaction with the reader. This frees him/her from the burden of anchoring his/her narration to an 
ongoing interaction because in this context there is no such ‘ongoing interaction’ with the reader before (nor 
after) the story-telling.  That is to say, written discourse makes it unnecessary to doubly characterize an 100
exemplary story as such in the process of exemplification. It follows that the fabulist can choose ‘elliptical’ 
ways to exemplify a lesson: s/he can state it only once before or after telling a story. Thus, the Substitution 
Pattern and the Generalization Pattern are realized as a consequence of performing the act of exemplification 
in the context of written discourse, while drawing on the procedure for exemplification by telling a story in 
conversational argument. 
 Moreover, the context of written discourse triggers the Embedding Pattern to be generated. 
(74) (=(61)) 
Embedding Pattern 
a. [TITLE] b. [STORY [LESSON]] 
(75) The Charger & the Miller 
A horse, who had been used to carry his rider into battle, felt himself growing old and chose to 
work in a mill instead. He now no longer found himself stepping out proudly to the beating of the 
drums, but was compelled to slave away all day grinding the corn. Bewailing his hard lot, he said 
one day to the miller, ‘Ah me! I was once a splendid war-horse, gaily caparisoned, and attended by 
a groom whose sole duty was to see to my wants. How different is my present condition! I wish I 
had never given up the battlefield for the mill.’ The miller replied with asperity, ‘It’s no use your 
regretting the past. Fortune has many ups and downs: you must just take them as they come.’ 
(Rackham, Aesop’s Fables) 
In this pattern a lesson is not explicitly stated outside the story but uttered in the final remark of a character. 
 The context of written discourse, however, provides the writer with another option for initiating a story: the title. Intuitively, it 100
may not be so common to begin to tell a story only by showing its title in conversation.
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That is to say, the moral lesson is embedded in the narrative, rather than juxtaposed after it, with signals that 
may enable the reader to take the character’s final words as stating a lesson. In the above instance, the 
present tense is chosen (“is,” and “has”) with you that can be taken to refer not only to the charger but also 
people in general. In the Embedding Pattern, thus, a story is narrated without being characterized as an 
example of a lesson with the three-step procedure for exemplification (65) in any way. The lesson is 
presented as such less explicitly than in the other patterns of the fable. 
 This way of organizing the fable leaves the process of extracting a lesson from the story to the 
interpretive work of the reader. In written discourse, with no need for anchoring it in interaction with the 
reader, the fabulist can tell a story just for its own sake, rather than design it as an exemplar of a moral 
lesson.  The Embedding Pattern, as well as the Substantiation Pattern and the Generalization Pattern, is 101
thus motivated to occur by the context of written discourse in this way. 
 To make it more explicit that the genre of the fable is rooted in the context of written discourse, let us 
observe further examples with a lesson stated with lesser clarity. Look at (76): 
(76) The Flies and the Honey Jar 
After a jar of honey was knocked over in a kitchen, the flies were attracted by its sweet smell and 
began eating the honey. Indeed, they swarmed all over it and did not budge from the spot until they 
had devoured every drop. However, their feet had become so clogged that they could not fly away, 
no matter how much they tried. Stymied by their own voracious appetites, they cried out, “(a)What 
foolish creatures we are! (b)We’ve thrown away our lives just for the sake of a little pleasure.” 
(Zipes, Aesop’s Fables) 
This fable is equivalent with (57) and (75) in that the character(s) do something foolish and make a regretful 
remark about it at the end. In contrast, while (57) and (75) carry several devices to signal that a character 
expresses a lesson, (76) does not. In their last utterance, the flies attribute the vital consequence of their 
devouring honey to their own characteristic (76a), and regretfully look back at what they have done (76b). 
Importantly, the flies construct their utterance with first-person plural pronouns (“we” and “our”) in the 
present perfect tense (“We’ve thrown”). This indicates that they do not claim general applicability of what 
they have done but only regret it. Designed in this way, the whole narrative can be taken as a story of a vital 
 In conversational discourse, story-telling of any sort usually requires the narrator to anchor the story in the interaction at hand 101




 This does not, however, prevent the reader from understanding the story as exemplifying a moral 
lesson. For instance, in the process of comprehension, a reader may transform the flies’ last words of regret 
into something like ‘It is ridiculous to throw away your life for the sake of a little pleasure’ or ‘Don’t throw 
your life away for the sake of a little pleasure,’ generalizing their experience. Reading (76) in such a way, s/
he can recognize the story as an example of a lesson as in fables with a lesson obviously presented. In this 
sense, even though fables like (76) do not explicitly state a moral lesson, they still bears traces of it. 
 Leaving the labor of deriving a lesson from the story to the reader’s inference, furthermore, may result 
in a fable in an even vaguer way. Consider the instance below: 
(77) The Old Woman & the Wine Jar 
An old woman picked up an empty wine jar which had once contained a rare and costly wine, and 
which still retained some traces of its exquisite bouquet. She raised it to her nose and sniffed at it 
again and again. ‘Ah,’ she cried, ‘how delicious must have been the liquid which has left behind so 
ravishing a smell.’ (Jones & Rackham, Aesop’s Fables) 
This fable shares the same features as (76): a narrative is told in the end of which a character makes a 
remark. However, it seems highly difficult to read her utterance as stating or even implying a moral lesson 
because it does not sound regretful. The woman admires the good quality of the smell on the empty wine 
bottle that she sniffed and makes a guess about its former contents. Her words thus constitute her ridiculous 
act rather than display her regret about something she has done. This makes her utterance (and the whole 
story) rather difficult to comprehend as instantiating a lesson. Due to this, the above fable may seem to fail to 
convey a moral lesson, but this does not mean that any reader cannot inferentially draw a lesson of any kind 
from it. Importantly, whether a reader extracts a lesson from (77) depends on his/her interpretive work and 
this is the consequence of how the text is designed. 
 The two fables we have just observed clearly illustrates that what enables the fabulist to build such 
indeterminate fables is the context of written discourse. Because the fabulist is free from the contextual 
requirement for explicit orientation to the reader, s/he can choose to tell a story for the story’s sake, whereby 
making vague the point of the story. The above ‘moralless’ fables are clear examples that indicate that 
written discourse enables the fabulist to depart from the act of exemplification in telling a story. 
 Now, we are ready to answer the questions we have been confronting: what motivates the various 
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patterns of the fable to be generated? What gives rise to various patterns is different degrees of how 
completely the fabulist draws on the procedure for conversational exemplification with a story in writing 
fables. The degree is highest in the Substantiation-Generalization Pattern with the total equivalence in 
discursive structure with conversational exemplification, and the lowest in the Embedding Pattern, which 
structurally parallels the exemplification in conversational argument only in that a lesson is derivable from 
the story. The remaining two patterns (i.e., the Substantiation Pattern and the Generalization Pattern) are 
placed between those two, as they partly activate the exemplification procedure. Thus, the four patterns of 
the fable can be characterized in terms of different levels of how explicitly the fabulist draws on the 
exemplification procedure in conversation in constructing fables (and the reader in interpreting them). That 
is, the procedure to support one’s claim in conversational argument by telling a story as an example serves to 
be a procedural resource for the fabulist, and they can choose how much to depend on the procedure in 
realizing fables. 
 The different degrees of the fabulist’s dependence on the procedure for conversational exemplification 
with a story is, in turn, motivated by the context in which they realize fables: written discourse. Written 
discourse enables the fabulist to exemplify a lesson more elliptically, whereby generating the Substantiation 
Pattern, the Generalization Pattern, and the Embedding Pattern. Seen this way, written discourse serves to be 
a contextual resource for the fabulist to step away from strictly following the procedure for conversational 
exemplification in composing fables. To summarize, the structural variation of the fable is motivated by 
performing the act of exemplification by narrating a story in the context of written discourse. 
6.5 Conclusion 
 This chapter pointed out that the genre of the fable has different structural patterns, and revealed what 
motivates the variation. To summarize, the structural variation of the fable stems from two facets of this 
genre: (i) it performs the act of exemplification; (ii) it is realized in written discourse. 
 This insight is obtained due to the focus on the structure of the fable. Previous research on this genre 
tend to analyze it in terms of personification — or more broadly, in terms of metaphor and analogy (Seto, 
1992, 1997; Olmos, 2015). Indeed, the use of personification is a crucial feature of the fable, but it is not 
everything about the genre. This inclination to focus on personification may have distracted analysts’ 
attention from the structural aspect of the fable. In addition, previous research does not take a systematic 
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approach to the fable in describing its characteristics, which seems to be a methodological flaw. Data 
collection (as broad as possible) is a vital step in descriptive research. Each of the structures of the fable 
analyzed in this chapter has been mentioned in different studies (Kitagaki, 1970; Olmos, 2015; Preminger & 
Brogan, 1993) but only separately, and those accounts have not been integrated into one. Hence, this study, 
first and foremost, has a descriptive significance. 
 Another importance of this study lies in the perspective that it takes to investigate the fable. One of the 
crucial steps was connecting conversational exemplification and written fables. Although exemplification is 
recognized as a persuasive strategy in the rhetorical study (Lanham, 1991; Sloane, 2001; Walton et al, 2008), 
and although the fable is generally recognized as a genre that exemplifies a moral lesson (cf. (55)), it is not 
analyzed with regard to that rhetorical strategy. That is, the fable is traditionally separated from 
exemplification in actual analysis. As has been revealed in this chapter, however, it is valuable to shed 
analytical light on the fable in terms of exemplification, because it clearly accounts for the fact that the fable 
takes multiple structures. 
 A third significance of this study concerns the stance on the notion of genre in general. A discourse 
genre is usually defined as “a group of texts that share specific discursive features” (Gill & Whedbee, 1997: 
163), where the “specific discursive features” is to be taken to refer to “a conventionalized purpose or 
occasion” (Johnstone, 2008: 183). As this way of definition implies, genre studies tend to treat the genre as a 
simple, unitary class of texts or talks and put their central focus on generic commonality among the texts or 
talks that they consider. Every text that is categorized in a genre, however, is not the same in every respect; 
rather, instances of a genre are, as has been demonstrated with fables, more or less different from each other 
while having identical features. Given this, a possible direction of genre studies is to focus on such variation 
as well as commonalities among genre tokens. The present study exemplifies the validity of this way of 




 Based on the basic view of allegory as a rhetorical strategy to shape discourse as outlined in Chapter 2, 
Chapters 3 through 6 scrutinized four allegorical genres of discourse (allegorical arguments, proverbs, 
parables, and fables) by adopting the philosophy and methodology of discourse analysis. The detailed 
analysis and discussion, first and foremost, have provided specific insights into how the allegorical genres 
are shaped with the strategy of allegory. This final chapter shows that the investigation so far has theoretical 
and methodological implications for rhetorical studies in general. 
 In what follows, Section 7.2 briefly reviews how we approached the data and what we discovered in 
each of the preceding chapters. On this foundation, Section 7.3 reveals how the philosophy and methodology 
of discourse analysis contribute to the study of rhetoric. Section 7.4 considers the concept of ‘rhetoric’ itself, 
providing some prospects for future research. 
7.2 Overall Summary 
 Chapter 2 established the theoretical and analytical foundation, showing that allegory is employed in 
various ways in different contexts of use. The starting point of our discussion was the fact that the strategy is 
employed in conversational interaction, although no attention was paid to this type of allegorical discourse in 
previous studies. Utilized in talk-exchange, allegory functions as an argumentative resource for persuasive 
goals. The analysis of allegorical talk in conversation led us to elaborate the traditional, insufficient 
description of the four kinds of discourse that are shaped with the strategy (proverbs, parables, fables, and 
allegorical novels), with a new focus on their discursive dimensions. Through examining in detail how each 
kind of allegorical discourse is actually realized, Chapter 2 then clarified the characteristics of the allegorical 
strategy as a method to shape discourse of various kinds. In addition to the details of those kinds of 
allegorical discourse, their relationship was also illustrated. That, is, the genres differ along three dimensions: 
(i) whether they are oriented to talk-exchange or to story-telling; (ii) to the extent that analogies are made 
explicitly or implicitly; and (iii) whether analogies are aimed at argumentation or designed to leave some 
room for interpretation. Chapter 2, thus, showed how the rhetorical strategy of allegory is flexibly utilized in 
order to realize a variety of discourse genres. 
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 Based on the insights obtained in Chapter 2, Chapters 3 through 7 examined allegorical argumentation, 
proverbs, parables, and fables, respectively, specifically focusing on how each of them shapes, and is shaped 
in discourse. Each chapter not only revealed the details of its target discourse, but also carried implications 
for the functioning of rhetorical strategies in general. 
 Chapter 3 observed allegorical utterances in conversation. In an attempt to clarify how allegory is 
deployed and interpreted in conversational interaction, we observed in detail several conversational scenes in 
films and novels. As a consequence, it turned out that when allegory is used for argumentation in 
conversation, that there are two general directions for the speaker to follow in allegorical construction of 
talk: (i) to complete an allegorical utterance in his/her own words alone; and (ii) to elicit certain responses 
from the interlocutor in drawing allegorical correspondences. Both directions are rooted in the basic 
mechanisms of conversation, where participants exchange talk, taking turns. As a consequence of the 
reciprocity, allegorical talk in this context may sometimes be extended, modified or rejected by the 
interlocutor. Against the traditional definition of allegory as a concept to refer to a literary genre, Chapter 3 
thus revealed how the strategy contributes to argumentation and how it is a resource for the construction of 
talk in conversation 
 Chapter 4 focused on the deployment and interpretation of proverbs in conversation. This chapter first 
described in detail the Receptive Use, a usage type that had gone unnoticed in previous research, in which 
the speaker displays how s/he receives an assertion of the interlocutor with a proverb. The Receptive Use 
contrasts with the other usage types — i.e., the Affirmative Use and the Assertive Use — in that proverbs 
reflect the interlocutor’s, but not the speaker’s perspective. In the Affirmative Use, the speaker illustrates the 
situation at hand according to proverbs, affirming their general applicability, while in the Assertive Use, 
proverbs are employed as authoritative resource so as to advance opinions. Given the details of the three 
uses, a two-continuum model was proposed for systematic understanding of proverb use in conversational 
talk-exchange. The model clearly illustrates that the three types of proverb uses in conversation reflect 
different aspects of conversational interaction. 
 Chapter 5 scrutinized parables in the Synoptic Gospels. An important characteristics of the parables is 
that they are not so easy to understand. They are designed in a way that leaves more or less interpretive room 
for the reader, without exhaustively showing what the entities and events in the story represent. In addition, 
they often collaborate with aposiopesis, the strategy of describing the scene only partially: When Jesus 
narrates parables, the Gospels consistently avoid describing how his interlocutors understood and responded 
to the stories, even though it is possible to do so. Through hiding reactions to his words, aposiopesis invites 
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the reader to hear his voice as if he talks to him/her, and think about his message on his/her own. The 
strategy also contributes to authorize Jesus and his teachings. Together with the use of aposiopesis, the 
Synoptic parables functions as a means to effectively deliver Jesus’ messages to the reader by inviting him/
her to what he attempts to teach, thereby tightly connecting Jesus and the reader. 
 Chapter 6 concentrated on structural variation of the fable. Although it is traditionally defined as a 
story that exemplifies a moral lesson stated at the end, the fable in fact takes several different structures in 
terms of exemplifying a lesson. On the other hand, the act of exemplification with a story has a standard 
procedure to achieve it in conversational talk-exchange. Given this, this chapter argued that the structural 
multiplicity of fables is rooted in the context in which they are realized: written discourse. Whereas the 
speaker in real-time conversation is usually expected to anchor an exemplary story in the ongoing talk-
exchange s/he is engaging in with the interlocutor, the fabulist is free of such a contextual constraint. This 
allows them to tell exemplary stories in more elliptical ways, resulting in fables in a variety of structures. The 
structural variation of the fable is thus motivated by performing the act of exemplifying a lesson in written 
discourse. 
7.3 Theoretical and Methodological Implications 
 In addition to the specific insights into the allegorical genres of discourse obtained in the previous 
chapters, this study has theoretical and methodological implications for the study of rhetoric in general. 
Focusing on allegory from a discourse analytic perspective, this study is distinguished from traditional 
rhetorical studies in shedding analytical light on the discursive functioning of the strategy. Against a 
backdrop of a great amount of research in multiple disciplines, this study can point to a new direction of the 
rhetorical study in terms of methodology. 
 Rhetoric is a very complex notion and hence has been approached in multiple ways. Earlier rhetorical 
studies can be classified into four types: oratory rhetoric, argumentative rhetoric, literary rhetoric, and 
cognitive rhetoric (cf. Sato, 1987: ch.1). ,  102 103
 Needless to say, this classification is not meant to classify all the previous rhetorical studies in a mutually exclusive and 102
collaboratively exhaustive way. Rather, it specifically aims to gain a certain understanding of the divergent field.
 As Perelman (1982: 1) appropriately points out, it is essential to pay comprehensive attention to the relationship of rhetoric with 103
adjacent fields such as grammar, logic, poetics, philosophy, and dialectics, in order to understand its disciplinary status appropriately. 
For fuller pictures of the discipline, cf. Sato (1987: ch.1), Barthes (1979) and Leith (2014); and for a historical overview, cf. Kennedy 
(1994), Seto (1992), Nouchi (2002: ch.1), Reboul (2000: ch.1), and Senge (1986: pt.1), among others.
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 Oratory rhetoric is organized and developed as an integrated, systematic discipline for oratory (Sato, 
1987: 36-38; also cf. Aristotle, 1968: book1 ch.2 sec.1; Quintilian, 1981: book2 ch.15 sec.38). This type of 
rhetoric aims to provide detailed directions for orators to reference in making effective, in particular 
persuasive, speech in any occasion (Sato, 1987: 18; Seto & Nouchi, 2009: 25). Given the purpose, first, it 
divides the whole process of oration into five steps, with specific guidelines and explanations: Invention, 
discovery of all the possible arguments that can be brought in support of a thesis; Disposition, the most 
effective ways to organize arguments in the introduction, body, and conclusion of a speech; Elocution, 
expressing the ideas and arguments in clear and vivid language; Memory, various mnemonic devices for 
remembering the ideas and language of the speech; and Delivery, the strategies for effective verbal and non-
verbal presentation, including vocal pitch, rate, and volume as well as gestures and movement (Gill & 
Whedbee, 1997: 158).  Second, oratory rhetoric divides different occasions of oration into three genres: 104
Deliberative (legislative), to exhort or dissuade; Judicial (forensic), to accuse or defend; and Epideictic 
(ceremonial), to commemorate or blame (Lanham, 1991: 164). They explain in detail what sort of 
preparation and performance is necessary and effective in each genre, in order to help the orator know how 
to deal with different purposes and occasions of speech to make. Third, it points to three ways to be 
persuasive: Ethos, establishing the persuader’s good character and hence credibility; Pathos, putting the 
audience in an appropriate mood, by playing on its feelings; and Logos, proving, or seeming to prove the 
case (Lanham, 1991: 166). Oratory rhetoric, in this way, aims to offer an integrated system of techniques that 
enables orators to generate effective speech in a variety of occasions. 
 Argumentative rhetoric pertains to persuasive claim-making. According to Perelman (1982: 5), “The 
theory of argumentation [= argumentative rhetoric], […] covers the whole rage of discourse that aims at 
persuasion and conviction, whatever the audience addressed and whatever the subject matter.” In contrast to 
oratory rhetoric, which covers the whole process and different genres of speech-making, it puts specific 
focus on rational dimension of persuasive discourse. Argumentative rhetoric centrally focuses on the process 
of “proof” of the speaker’s opinion (Sakisaka, 1985: 19-20). Note, however, the ‘proof’ here means 
argumentative, and not logical, one. “Therefore an argument that is successful in a debate — successful in 
the sense of attaining its rhetorical objective of persuasion — may be logically incorrect and fallacious in 
itself. [...] In fact, there are sound reasons for believing that there is considerable divergence between 
rhetorically effective debating technique and correct logical reasoning” (Walton, 1987: 49). As such, 
argumentative rhetoric describes and classifies a variety of argumentative patterns observed in actual 
 The five steps are originally attributed to Cicero (1942).104
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discourse, such as argumentum ad hominem (“abuse of your opponent’s character / basing your argument on 
what you know of your opponent’s character”) and argumentum ad vercundiam (“an appeal to reverence for 
authority, to accepted traditional values”) among others (Lanham, 1991: 21). In the process, researchers in 
the field point out the strengths and weaknesses of the argumentative patterns, characterizing some of them 
as logical fallacies for arguers to avoid. Argumentative rhetoric, thus, aims to examine how actual arguments 
are shaped in terms of reasoning, and provide guidelines for persuasive arguments. 
 Literary rhetoric examines how rhetorical devices are deployed and interpreted in literary proses and 
verses. The rhetoric in this sense generally contributes to the analysis and interpretation of literary works, 
and therefore forms part of literary studies and criticism (Le Groupe µ, 1981: 32-33). As such, it particularly 
focuses on what roles figures of speech play in the construction of literary texts, and how the use of them 
provides readers with the foundation and possibilities for creative interpretation (Suzuki, 1996: 51). 
 Cognitive rhetoric, or rhetorical research in the framework of Cognitive Linguistics, explores 
rhetorical devices, especially figures of speech, in relation to the cognitive activity of human beings. It 
recognizes rhetoric not merely as verbal skills for persuasive speech or literary crafts but as a window into 
human thought (Dancygier & Sweetser, 2014: sec.1.1; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999; Sato, 1992a: 11-12; 
Seto, 1988: i-ii, among many others). Researchers in this endeavor see the use of verbal metaphors, for 
example, whether in everyday language or literary texts, as a linguistic manifestation of metaphorical 
thought (Dancygier & Sweetser, 2014: ch.2; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff & Turner, 1984). In the same 
vein, they employ metaphor, metonymy, and sometimes synecdoche as mental processes/mechanisms to 
analyze other ordinary, pervasive phenomena such as lexical polysemy and semantic change (Arizono, 2017; 
Evans & Green 2006: ch.10; Seto et al., 2007; Yamaguchi, 2001; Yamaizumi, 2017). Furthermore, cognitive 
rhetoricians point out that figurative language as a manifestation of mental process also plays a crucial role in 
the grammar of language (Komatsubara, 2016: 61; Langacker, 1987: 1). For instance, metonymy (or 
metonymic thought pattern) underlies and motivates  Cognitive rhetoric, in this way, aims to reveal the 
cognitive foundation for the use of rhetorical devices. 
 Whereas each of the four classes of previous rhetorical studies has brought a variety of insights into 
the workings and mechanisms of rhetorical schemes and tropes, earlier research has only paid insufficient 
attention to how those devices shape, and are shaped in actual discourse. That is to say, rhetorical researchers 
have not asked some important questions which seem valuable to confront: how do people actually use 
rhetorical schemes and figures in communicating with others, what do they do with those strategies, and why 
in the first place do they speak rhetorically? As a consequence, for most strategies, we are still far from a 
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comprehensive understanding of “rhetoric in action” (Hayashi & Kuno, 1974: ch.13). 
 In a similar vein, scholars of rhetoric have been inclined to put conversational talk-exchange out of 
their analytical interest. Traditional researchers only focused on the speaker or writer does with rhetorical 
devices, putting his/her audience (i.e., the hearer or reader) out of consideration. By so doing, they basically 
recognize the use of rhetoric as a result of the speaker’s independent act, and hence analyze how s/he shapes 
his/her words alone. This is reflected in data collection in traditional studies. They usually analyze 
monological texts such as literary works, opinion articles, and political speeches, sources that do not 
necessarily require analysts to take the audience into consideration. Although it might possibly be a 
reasonable choice for their purpose, it makes quite difficult to sufficiently observe the resultant effect(s) of 
the use of rhetoric (Komatsubara, 2016: 41). In addition, the exclusion of conversation from the analytical 
purview is a serious problem because, as in language use in general (Fox et al., 2013: 729; Levinson, 1983: 
284), conversational interaction may be the most basic context in which people speak rhetorically. Thorough 
analysis of how rhetorical strategies work in discourse is inseparable from the observation of the processes 
and effects of using them, and conversation is the best context for this purpose. If one attempts to investigate 
how the use of rhetorical figures and schemes can influence hearers, written discourse will not suffice since 
the interaction between writer and reader is often quite indirect (Chafe, 1982: 45-49, 1994: 44-45; 
Jahandarie, 1999: 139-141), and hence their workings and effects may be essentially difficult to identify. In 
conversational talk-exchange, in contrast, interlocutors directly interacts with each other in a reciprocal 
manner, taking turns and monitoring the other interlocutor(s)’s response in real time (Schegloff, 2007: 1). 
This will make quite transparent to analysts how a rhetorical strategy is utilized and what it causes. In fact, 
we saw how the use of allegory affects the process of conversation in Chapter 3, and how different ways of 
proverb use are closely connected to different aspects of the structure of conversational interaction in 
Chapter 4. For these reasons, conversational interaction is a promising data source for a rhetorical analysis 
though it has long been excluded in the traditional rhetorical research. 
 This does not, however, mean that the study of rhetoric should deal with conversational data alone. 
Though talk in interaction provides fruitful data for rhetorical analysis, we definitely cannot ignore the bare 
fact that it is not the only communicative environment where people use language rhetorically. The point 
here is that rhetorical strategies can possibly be used in different contexts in different manners. Given that 
rhetorical schemes/figures are utilized differently in a variety of contexts, a possible approach to the 
strategies is observing how those uses are different and considering what gives rise to those differences. This 
direction of research was demonstrated in Chapters 2 and 6. Chapter 2 pointed out that the rhetorical strategy 
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of allegory shapes several different genres of discourse, and revealed how they are related to each other 
through detailed analysis of their discursive aspects. Chapter 6 compared exemplary stories in conversation 
and written fables, arguing that the context of written discourse leads the latter to take several different 
structures. In previous studies, however, little light was shed on this kind of flexibility in employing 
rhetorical strategies. Given the fact that rhetorical strategies are deployed flexibly in a variety of discourse, it 
is productive and valuable to focus on the flexibility. 
 The focus on the flexibility of rhetoric leads to the integration of different fields of rhetorical research. 
On the linguistic aspect, the study of rhetoric is traditionally split in two major orientations: argumentative 
orientation and literary orientation (Nouchi, 1998, 2002). The first is related to invention and disposition (or 
arrangement) divisions of the canonical model of rhetoric.  That is, it concerns the discovery of “all the 105
possible arguments that can be brought in support of a thesis” and “explains the most effective ways to 
organize arguments in the introduction, body, and conclusion of a speech” (Gill & Whedbee, 1997: 158). 
Researchers in this orientation focus on schemes for argumentation, such as argumentum ad populum (an 
appeal to the crowd) and argumentum ad hominem (abuse of the opponent’s character), as devices and 
heuristics for reasonable claim-making, and analyze how they can contribute to compose and counter 
arguments. Meanwhile, the second orientation concerns the division of elocution (or style), which originally 
“focuses on expressing the idea and arguments in clear and vivid language” (Gill & Whedbee, 1997: 158). In 
this orientation, researchers pay attention to figures of speech, such as alliteration and tautology, as creative 
and analytical means for poetic expression in literary texts. Although those two orientations of rhetorical 
studies are usually recognized to be isolated from each other with exclusive aims and objects, the distinction 
between them should not be taken for granted because rhetorical strategies, if not all of them, can in fact 
serve for both argumentative and literary purposes (Nouchi, 2002: 26-27). In fact, for example, metaphor 
serves for both poetic construction of literary texts (Humma, 1990; Semino, 2008: ch. 2) and persuasive 
claim making in disputes (Cameron, 2011; Semino, 2008: sec. 3.2), and argumentative schemes can 
sometimes contribute to portraying characters’ personality in literary works (Kozai, 2007: 76-84, 2010: 
178-193). This clearly shows that the split between the two orientations of traditional rhetorical studies is not 
inevitable and hence points to a possibility of mending it. Accordingly, it would be beneficial to take a 
‘connective’ perspective and examine how the same strategy can be utilized for different purposes in 
discourse. 
 For the details of the five divisions, see Lanham (1991: ch.2) and Sato (1987: 21-24), for example.105
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7.4 What is ‘Rhetoric’? 
 As already noted above, conversational talk-exchange is both a basic context in which rhetorical 
strategies are used, and a fruitful resource for analysts. Rhetorical phenomena in this setting lead us to 
reconsider the definition of rhetoric itself. Whereas rhetorical studies have been conducted in a variety of 
disciplines since the age of Aristotle, rhetoric is invariably recognized as the use of individual schemes and 
figures inventorized and classified in the long history, such as metaphor, irony, hyperbole, dilemma, 
argumentum ad hominem, etc. In conversational talk-exchange, however, an utterance is not necessarily 
rhetorical whenever it is devised with one of those strategies, because whether an utterance is rhetorical or 
not partly depends on how it is received by the hearer. 
 For example, consider the following two excerpts. The first one is taken from the film Star Trek: Into 
Darkness. In the scene, in order to deal with a looming threat, the captain of a spaceship, Kirk orders the 
main pilot Sulu to take the conn on behalf of him. Seeing this, Doctor McCoy claims that Sulu is not the 
right person to take the position: 
(78) KIRK: Mister Sulu, you have the conn. Once we’re en route, I want you to transmit a targeted 
comm burst to Harrison’s location. You tell him you have a bunch of real big torpedoes 
pointed at his head and if he doesn’t play nice, you’re not afraid to use them. Is that a 
problem? 
SULU: No, sir. I’ve just never sat in the chair before. 
KIRK: You’re gonna do great. 
MCCOY: [sotto] Jim, wait. (a)You just sat that man down at a high stakes poker game with no cards 
and told him to bluff. Now Sulu’s a good man, but he is no captain. 
KIRK: [sotto] For the next two hours, he is. (b)And enough with the metaphors, all right? That’s an 
order. [normal] Mister Sulu, make sure that K’normian ship is ready to fly. 
(Abrams, Star Trek: Into Darkness) 
McCoy criticizes Kirk’s command through allegorically comparing having Sulu take the conn with putting 
him in a hopeless poker game (82a), attempting to persuade the captain to reconsider his decision. It may be 
possible to characterize the utterance as rhetorical, based on the fact that the strategy of allegory is used. 
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McCoy’s allegorical evaluation, however, is rejected by Kirk (82b). In fact, he shows a negative attitude to 
McCoy’s use of the strategy itself (here, he uses the term metaphor to refer to it), rather than to what he 
attempted to say through it. That is to say, although the allegorical utterance is aimed at persuading Kirk, it 
not only failed to reach the intended goal but also ended up (unintentionally) provoking a negative response 
exactly for its allegorical quality. Given the result, then, the utterance in question can also be seen as no 
longer rhetorical, because it could not function rhetorically on the hearer. 
 The second instance is cited from the film Star Trek. In it, Spock exiles Kirk from their spaceship as a 
result of arguing about the policy of the ship after barely averting a crisis, and McCoy condemns him for it: 
(79) MCCOY: Permission to speak freely, sir. 
SPOCK: I welcome it. 
MCCOY: Do you? Okay, then. Are you out of your Vulkan mind? Are you making a logical choice, 
sending Kirk away? Probably. But the right one? You know, back home we got a saying. 
(a)“If you’re gonna ride in the Kentucky Derby, you don’t leave your prize stallion in the 
stable.” 
SPOCK: (b)A curious metaphor, Doctor, as (c)a stallion must first be broken before it can reach its 
potential. 
MCCOY: My God, man, you could at least act like it was a hard decision! (Abrams, Star Trek) 
McCoy criticizes Spock’s decision by quoting a saying about horse racing (83a). In this context, the 
Kentucky Derby represents the difficult situation they are facing, and the “prize stallion” corresponds to 
Kirk. Through the matching, he is claiming that they need Kirk in the ship in order to successfully deal with 
the situation, just as a racer needs to ride his/her prize stallion so as to win the big race. In reply to this, 
Spock evaluates the saying as interesting (83b), referencing knowledge he has about horse training (83c). 
Given the allegorical correspondences, breaking a stallion clearly means gaining command of Kirk by 
getting him away from the ship. Thus, Spock argues that he is just attempting to ‘tame’ Kirk in order to 
develop his full potential and make him as valuable for the ship as the prize stallion for a racer. Put 
differently, Spock skillfully extends the allegorical idiom in a direction that justifies his treatment of Kirk, 
thereby successfully counter-arguing him. This downgrades the rhetorical quality of McCoy’s utterance 
(83a). On the one hand, the allegorical saying can be seen as rhetorical itself in that it consists of the 
allegorical strategy, as is apparently admitted by Spock (83b). On the other hand, it is not fully rhetorical, 
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simply because it ends up failing to achieve the intended purpose. McCoy’s rhetorical attempt to persuade 
Spock is defeated by Spock’s technique of counter-argument (83c). The rhetorical quality of the allegorical 
utterance in question is thus lowered by the hearer. 
 The two examples above clearly shows that in conversation, rhetorical strategies does not simply 
function rhetorically once they are used. Rather, whether those persuasive devices is rhetorical or not is 
crucially dependent on how they are received by the hearer in each usage event. They only work fully 
rhetorically when they successfully influence the interlocutor. In this sense, strategies are not rhetorical by 
themselves; they become rhetorical in actual use. 
7.5 Future Prospects 
 This final chapter discussed that the analysis of the allegorical genres has several theoretical and 
methodological implications. The insights further points to possible directions of future research. First, it is 
essential for the study of rhetoric to pay more attention to conversational talk-exchange as a field of research. 
In addition, given that rhetorical schemes and figures are flexibly utilized for different purposes in a variety 
of settings, it is valuable to consider how they are used in each context, comparing different usages with each 
other. Third, given that the rhetoricality of schemes and figures resides in usage events, the study of rhetoric 
should focus on how they are used in actual discourse. Indicating these analytical directions, this study is 
thus a starting point for several directions of research. 
 Recently, some researchers are beginning to consider rhetorical strategies, mainly metaphor, as useful 
tools for the analysis of a variety of discursive phenomena (e.g., Cameron, 2008, 2011; Deignan, 2012; 
Ferrari, 2018; Johnstone & Eisenhart eds., 2008; Semino, 2008). These studies have elucidated different 
functions and mechanisms of various schemes and figures. For example, Cameron (2011) describes in detail 
how metaphorical expressions are employed in a series of dialogues between a former IRA bomber and the 
daughter of one of the victims of the bombing. Her analysis reveals that their metaphorical talk crucially 
contributed to the process of reconciliation between the two participants over time. Musolff (2017) 
investigates the interplay between metaphor, irony and sarcasm in political debate in Britain. He illustrates 
how participants follow and counter-argue figurative expressions used by other participants, through ironical 
and/or sarcastic allusions or quotations, in order to criticize the original version and/or draw a new, 
contrarian conclusion from it. Even though such discourse analytic rhetorical studies have been increasing, 
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we are still distant from comprehensive understanding of how rhetoric works in language use. There is a lot 
more to discover in the field of rhetoric at work. 
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